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ABSTRACT 
 
In the past twenty years there has been a movement against the 
tradition of positivist, scientific research that treats children as the 
‘object’ of research.  This movement has been led by the sociology of 
childhood literature but also has supporters in disciplines such as 
developmental psychology and early childhood studies.   Research 
within this new paradigm often seeks to gain the perspectives and 
lived experiences of children, giving them a voice through naturalistic 
methodologies such as ethnography and informal interviews.     
However, giving children a ‘voice’ has not been purely an academic 
endeavour.  Supported by the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (1990) which stipulates that States should assure 
that children have the right to express their views in all matters 
affecting them, there is a push at all levels of government for children 
to be given a chance to express their views on issues that concern 
them.  In Australia and overseas, the consulting of children on issues 
that concern them has become more commonplace.  Thus in both 
research and policy development, methodologies which enable adults 
to get closer to the world of the child and to hear their views are being 
explored. 
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This thesis explores some of the issues involved in this form of 
qualitative research with children. It does so through combining 
theoretical exposition and systematic reflection with the author’s own 
empirical research which sought to gain an understanding of young 
children’s views of ‘difference’ through an ethnographic methodology. 
 
Part One provides the theoretical base for the thesis, by exploring how 
‘the child’ and childhood have been conceptualised within western 
thought. Drawing on the sociology of childhood, it also probes a 
number of the implications of this tradition and examines  how it has 
shaped research on children both in terms of the methods that have 
been employed and the topics that have been of interest. 
 
Both chapters in Part Two focus on the empirical component of the 
study.  The first is an extended methodology chapter which explores 
not only the method employed and the research setting but also some 
of the challenges that the author faced in the field and a discussion of 
issues such as ethics and the status of the researcher.   Using logs of 
the children’s activities and the author’s field journal, the next 
chapter explores how the initial research question altered and the 
issues that came to the fore during the research. 
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Part Three reconsiders a number of the theoretical issues raised in 
Part One in light of the fieldwork discussed in Part Two. It asks how 
certain ethnographic studies, claiming affiliation with the sociology of 
childhood, nevertheless ended up with depictions of children not far 
from the positivistic studies their authors had critiqued.  It argues 
that this can be explained by the persistence of a ‘problem centred’ 
adultcentric frame which privileges understanding of a particular 
issue (e.g. the development of racism in children) over the actual 
experiences of individual children. Given the renewed interest in 
consulting children this proposition has practical as well as 
theoretical significance as it reveals how easy it is for slippage to 
occur and the importance of preventing it.  
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Introduction 
 
 
In 2001 I became involved in a project which carried the working title 
“Celebrating Diversity in Child Care”.  Broadly, the aim of the project 
was to investigate the ways in which inclusive practices could be best 
effected in childcare.  It was a collaborative project between Murdoch 
University and two industry partners – the Resource Unit for Children 
with Special Needs (RUCSN) and the City of Fremantle.  Both of these 
agencies run Commonwealth funded Supplementary Services (SUPS).  
These programs aim to increase accessibility and participation for 
children with additional needs and to facilitate culturally and 
developmentally appropriate programs for these children. 
 
The philosophy that drives the SUPS program is ‘inclusion’ or 
‘inclusive practice’, a term which has been employed in Australia and 
internationally to encourage government and professional practices to 
recognise and incorporate diversity.  While ‘inclusion’ often refers to 
the practice of incorporating children with disabilities into 
mainstream institutions, the Australian federal program targets four 
main groups.  The priority groups for the SUPS program are: children 
of non-English speaking backgrounds; children with a disability; 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and Australian South 
Sea Islander children.  The focus of these programs is to develop the  
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capacity of childcare services to cater for these children through the 
provision of training, programs, resources and/or facilities 
(Commonwealth Government 1996: 1-2). 
 
While inclusion is not compulsory in Australia (Llewellyn et al 2002: 
1), one of the accreditation requirements is the respect for diversity, 
as articulated in Principle 2.2 of the guidelines: 
Principle 2.2: Staff respect diversity in the social and 
cultural background and abilities of all children and 
accommodate the individual needs of each child (QIAS 
Source Book 2001: 20). 
 
In the first few weeks after taking up the project I decided to 
undertake some informal observation to orient myself to the issues 
and practices involved.  I observed several information sessions for 
bilingual liaison workers who helped newly arrived migrant parents 
adapt to the childcare system in Australia and spent several days at 
the Murdoch University day care centre. 
 
I began to feel that, while a lot of attention went into helping parents 
cope with the new customs and expectations inherent in their 
children’s attendance at childcare in a new country, there was less 
discussion on what the children at childcare were actually 
experiencing and what was important to them.  While parents and 
carers were concerned about issues such as the wearing of shoes,  
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feeding patterns and so on, it was by no means clear that such things 
were the most important factors in how the children felt about being 
at childcare.    What, I wondered, were the factors that helped make 
any particular child feel ‘included’ or welcome?  Did children exclude 
children who fell into the ‘special needs’ group because they were 
‘different’?   Were the differences that were important to adults 
important to young children?  What might difference mean to 
children? 
 
These questions informed the basis of both my fieldwork, which I will 
come to shortly, and the conceptual study which was to become a 
major part of the thesis.  These conceptual foundations were initially 
informed by the extensive sociology of childhood literature. Its 
deconstructive account of children and childhood (which started in 
the 1970s but has developed in earnest since the 1990s) challenges 
the concept of ‘the child’ as a natural and universal phenomenon.       
Whilst not ignoring the biological reality of the immaturity of children, 
it looks at how different societies conceptualise this immaturity and 
what this means for children (and adults).  For example when is 
‘childhood’ deemed to be ‘over’? What are children thought capable of 
doing? 
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The deconstructive challenge of the sociology of childhood literature 
encouraged me to look afresh at my research issue.  At the same time 
as I was reading it, I was also researching the extensive literature 
produced by mainstream educationists, psychologists and indeed, 
sociologists, about children, child development and the ways in which 
children notice and deal with difference.  Straddling these two bodies 
of work led me to one of the main questions underlying the thesis: 
namely, the ways in which experts and professionals have come to 
understand children and difference and the implications of those 
understandings.  I felt that answering this question involved 
unravelling three quite distinct terms contained in the phrase 
‘researching children and difference’, namely: 
•  Children (what is ‘the child’?, what assumptions do 
we make as adults about children and childhood?   
How has this come to be?) 
•  Researching children (what social factors have shaped 
the type of research that is done on children?  What is 
the aim of the research?  What can adults ‘know’ 
about children?) 
•  Difference (what is ‘difference’?  why do we focus on 
physical aspects of difference – eg the colour of 
people’s skin). 
 
I believe that these three factors influence the starting point of any 
research – they infiltrate understandings before the research has even 
begun, shaping our ways of conceptualising children, what we think 
we can know about them and the differences seen to be important to  
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children.  They also shape the way we actually go about doing the 
research, prioritising some forms over others.  Unpacking these 
starting points was, I realised, fundamental to my wish to understand 
more about the ways we had come to “know” about children and 
difference. 
 
As well as the conceptual investigation (the foundations of which are 
discussed in Part One of the thesis), I also undertook a small scale 
empirical study (the subject of Part Two of the thesis).  This involved 
spending three mornings a week in a childcare centre for four 
months, observing three and four year old children in their outdoor 
“free play” period.  As explained below, the methods whereby I 
undertook this study were shaped by my readings in the sociology of 
childhood, but my intentions were soon overtaken and disturbed by 
the fieldworks own ‘unsettling’ process. 
 
After reviewing sociology of childhood literature and traditional forms 
of research on children and prejudice I was clear about what I did not 
want to do.  In essence the literature warned against seeing children 
as research objects rather than people in their own right and 
emphasised the importance of seeing the actions of children within 
the context they occurred.  On this basis, I decided to conduct an 
ethnographic study which sought to ascertain patterns of inclusion  
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and exclusion in the children’s interactions.  Rather than approach 
the study with the aim of understanding how children perceived 
certain types of pre-defined difference, I wished to trace the children’s 
actual patterns of inclusion and exclusion to determine whether the 
same ‘markers’ appeared to be important to them as to adults.     
However, the assumptions underlying this were soon challenged, 
resulting in a process of interpretation and reinterpretation that 
persisted throughout the empirical research and well into the analysis 
and writing up stages.  In essence, the process of undertaking this 
empirical research, what I learned from it and how it changed my 
ideas, also had a direct impact on the way in which I thought and 
wrote about the broader conceptual questions. 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
In Part One I draw on primary and secondary sociological, 
psychological, historical and philosophical texts to elucidate how our 
dominant understandings of children have been formed.  The purpose 
of this exploration is not to provide a comprehensive account of each 
but rather to “problematise” them, to unsettle the “taken-for-
grantedness” of the dominant ways of seeing.  In Chapter One I trace 
how dominant conceptions of ‘the child’ and childhood have developed 
in western society, particularly over the past century.  This discussion 
is structured into two themes.  The first, The Child as the Nation’s  
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Future examines how a teleological conception of the child has been 
entrenched through a century of science that sees children as the 
hope for a better society and as a series of stages that must be 
completed before reaching the ultimate goal of adulthood.   As noted 
previously, theorists working in the sociology of childhood have 
problematised this way of looking at childhood and in the last part of 
this chapter I review some of the central arguments of this literature.  
Chapter Two first examines how mainstream conceptions of the child 
have shaped research and then returns to the sociology of childhood 
literature to explore how they challenge these research methods and 
the way of seeing children as research ‘objects’.  In Chapter Three I 
turn specifically to research on racism and prejudice in children and 
review the methodologies employed in light of the argument developed 
in Chapters One and Two.  This chapter also provides a background 
to my own study in terms of the method employed. 
 
Part Two discusses my empirical study in the childcare centre.  My 
methodology and the experience of doing the research, and the kinds 
of changes which took place, are discussed in Chapter Four.  Chapter 
Five describes the day-to-day rhythms of the centre and then details 
what I came to see in the childcare centre and my reflections on these 
observations. 
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In many respects, my empirical research was an attempt to do things 
differently and see what emerged when I did.  In this way it was a 
partial attempt to answer my foundational question of whether it was 
possible to see things more directly and authentically from the 
viewpoint of the child – to understand his or her sense of ‘difference’ 
without imposing adult conceptions at the outset.  Early on, I found 
that there was plenty of literature giving reasons why we should 
attempt to develop a more active, child-centred approach.  It pointed 
out how traditional research tends to provide a ‘static’ picture that 
ignores cultural diversity and differences between children, treating 
children as passive recipients of societal knowledge.  Against this, 
authors such as James and Prout (1988) argue that research must 
acknowledge children’s agency in their own lives.  This, in its turn, led 
to a body of literature that examines how one should do research 
‘with’ rather than ‘on’ children.  This has presented the sociology of 
childhood with some major theoretical challenges, not least of which 
is the difficulty inherent in conceptualising children as social actors 
in their own right while acknowledging the structural influences that 
shape their lives. 
 
That something yet more fundamental than this might be at stake 
was suggested both by my readings of certain research studies that 
had attempted to ‘do better’ and by my own reflections on my  
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fieldwork.  In a nutshell, I became aware how difficult it was to push 
the new insights forward at a conceptual level and how often they 
were observed in the breech.  In this respect I came to endorse James 
et al’s observation that our dominant perceptions of childhood, 
shaped as they are by psychological and sociological concerns, have 
“overwhelmed our capacity to theorize childhood” (James et al 1998: 
196).  Our conceptions of children and childhood, in other words, 
have become so established that it is difficult to think outside of 
them. 
 
Thus, in Part Three I reconsider a number of the theoretical issues 
raised in Part One in light of the fieldwork discussed in Part Two.   
Chapter Six asks how certain ethnographic studies, claiming 
affiliation with the sociology of childhood, nevertheless ended up with 
depictions of children not far from the positivistic studies their 
authors critique.  It argues that this can be explained by the 
persistence of a ‘problem centred’ adultcentric frame which privileges 
understanding of a particular issue (e.g. the development of racism in 
children) over the actual experiences of individual children.   It 
contrasts research that retains a focus on ‘the child’ with research 
that has ‘children’ at its centre and examines how the distinction 
regarding the primary purpose of the research has a crucial influence 
in the way that research is conducted and presented.  In Chapter  
  10 
Seven I return briefly to the original topic of my study: inclusive 
practice in childcare to discuss some of the implications for practice 
that might be gleaned from the insights I gained during my time in 
the field. 
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Chapter 1: What Is the Child And Childhood? 
 
Childhood is unknown.  Starting from the false idea one has 
of it, the farther one goes, the more one loses one’s way. 
(Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Preface Emile or On 
Education 1762) 
 
Over at least the last two decades there has been a steady challenge 
to the notion of the child as a universal, acultural, ahistorical, 
apolitical phenomena.   This has been led by sociologists (e.g. Jenks 
1982; James & Prout 1990; Qvortrup 1994 and Alanen 1992; 1994), 
but is also evident in the disciplines of history (e.g. Hendrick 1997; 
and Somerville 1982), philosophy (e.g. Archard 1993 and Archard & 
Macleod 2002) and law (e.g. McGillivray 1997 and Freeman 1996).   
While not dismissing the reality of the biological immaturity of 
children, accounts which see ‘the child’ and ‘childhood’ as social 
constructions or ‘cultural inventions’ (Hatch 1995) challenge us to 
examine what different societies (both historically and culturally) 
make of this immaturity (Hendrick 1997: 10).  These accounts reason 
that how societies ‘invent’ notions of the child and childhood 
determines how children are seen and treated by adults and indeed 
how children come to see themselves.    
 
The origins of the sociology of childhood are often (e.g. James & Prout 
1997, James et al 1998) traced back to the work of the historian  
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Phillip Aries and his book Centuries of Childhood (1962). This book 
posited that, as a concept, childhood did not emerge until between the 
fifteenth and eighteenth centuries (Aries 1962: 125).   The historical 
accuracy of Aries’ account has been criticised by theorists such as 
Pollock (1983) and Archard (1993).  Pollock and Archard share the 
position that whilst previous societies might have lacked our 
contemporary conceptualisation of childhood it does not necessarily 
follow that they lacked any  conceptualisation of childhood (Archard 
1993: 20).  However, these critiques aside, Aries’ most important 
contribution from a sociological standpoint is the fact that, on its 
publication in the 1960s, it started to challenge the ahistorical and 
acultural conceptualisations of childhood that had developed. 
 
In his critique of Aries’ work, David Archard (1993) offers an 
important distinction between the concept  of childhood and the 
conception of childhood, demonstrating why Aries’ claim that medieval 
society had no concept of childhood is problematic.  The distinction 
between these two terms is also useful in articulating the parameters 
of childhood as a social construction: 
The  concept  of childhood requires that children be 
distinguishable from adults in respect of some unspecified 
set of attributes.  A conception of childhood is a specification 
of those attributes.  In simple terms, to have a concept of 
‘childhood’ is to recognise that children differ interestingly 
from adults; to have a conception of childhood is to have a  
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view of what those interesting differences are (Archard 1993: 
22). 
 
It is the dominant conception  of children and childhood, or what 
James and Prout describe as the ‘dominant framework’ (James & 
Prout 1997: 10), that is scrutinised by contemporary academics.  It is 
not my intention to recover this ground here, rather, in this chapter I 
wish to examine two dominant conceptions, one of the child and one 
of childhood, which shape the way that research on children is 
developed and carried out.  The first of these is an image of the child 
as the nation’s future, particularly as influenced by the developmental 
model and the liberal ideal.  The second is a notion of childhood as a 
time of innocence and vulnerability, play and fun.  This schema 
enables this review of the literature to cover the dominant issues of 
the sociology of childhood and also to situate the empirical research 
on children’s social worlds in Part II.  This chapter also discusses 
some of the possible consequences of the dominant frameworks. 
The Child as the Nation’s Future 
[Childhood is] a period of growth, that is to say, the period in 
which the individual, in both the physical and moral sense, 
does not yet exist, the period in which he (sic) is made, 
develops and is formed… In everything, the child is 
characterised by the very instability of his nature, which is 
the law of growth.  The educationalist is presented not with a 
person wholly formed – not a complete work or a finished 
product – but with a becoming, an incipient being, a person in 
the process of formation (Durkheim 1911 in Pickering 1979: 
150). 
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In his book The Rise and Fall of Childhood, John Sommerville (1982) 
outlines how children and childhood have been regarded from as early 
as 1800BC.  In showing how Spartan childrearing practices focussed 
on developing strong future soldiers while Athenian practices 
emphasised the importance of the education of upper-class boys, 
Sommerville demonstrates that children have always been seen (to 
varying extents) for what they will become: the future of the clan, tribe 
or nation – in a sense the ‘apprentice’ adult.  Prout and James (1997) 
observe that this conception of child as ‘apprentice’ forms an 
important element of our current paradigm, entrenched as it is by 
developmental approaches to childhood.   Thus, Smart, Neale and 
Wade point to prevalent notions of ‘children as embryonic adults’ 
(Smart et al 2001: 3) or the ‘child as project’ (Smart et al 2001: 7), 
while Archard refers to the importance of ‘teleology’ in the 
development model of children whereby adulthood is regarded as the 
ideal end-state which children progress towards (Archard 1993: 33).  
 
How adults seek to mould worthy future members of society varies 
historically and is also shaped by perceptions about the natural state 
of children. In this respect, the work of John Jacques Rousseau is 
particularly important in its influence on our contemporary 
conceptions of children (James, Jenks & Prout 1998; Mills & Mills 
2000; and Hendricks 1997).  Indeed, Archard notes that Rousseau  
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has been credited with actually establishing a modern view of 
childhood (Archard 1993: 22).  This view is strongly put by Robertson 
(1976): 
If the philosophy of the Enlightenment brought to 
eighteenth century Europe a new confidence in the 
possibility of human happiness, special credit must go to 
Rousseau for calling attention to the needs of children.  For 
the first time in history, he made a large group of people 
believe that childhood was worth the attention of intelligent 
adults, encouraging an interest in the process of growing up 
rather than just the product.  Education of children was 
part of the interest in progress which was so predominant in 
the intellectual trends of the time (Robertson 1976: 407). 
 
Rousseau believed that children were moral innocents with a natural 
goodness who required freedom to express themselves (James et al 
1998: 13).  His belief that humans were born innocent and that it was 
social convention that ultimately corrupted is famously encapsulated 
in the introductory lines of Emile: “Everything is good as it leaves the 
hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of 
man” (Rousseau, 1979).   This view has ramifications for the role of 
parents and educators who are charged with the responsibility of 
protecting the innocent child from the ugliness and violence that 
surrounds them (James et al 1998: 14) and for producing the ‘good’ 
adult. 
 
Rousseau’s view of the child and his subsequent ideas on freedom in 
childrearing were in stark contrast to the evangelical beliefs of the  
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same era and their revival in the late 1700s and early 1800s.  The 
doctrine of  ‘original sin’ saw the child as born innately sinful due to 
the wayward choices of Adam and Eve.  This belief shaped advice 
regarding child-rearing practices that sought to rid the child of 
badness.  In the words of John Wesley, Methodist leader in Southey 
(1732): 
Break their wills betimes, begin this work before they can 
run alone, before they can speak plain, perhaps before they 
can speak at all.  Whatever pains it costs, break the will, if 
you would not damn the child.  Let a child from a year old 
be taught to fear the rod and to cry softly; from that age 
make him (sic) do as he is bid, if you whip him ten times 
running to effect it.  If you spare the rod, you spoil the child; 
if you do not conquer you ruin him.  Break his will now, and 
his soul shall live, and he will probably bless you to all 
eternity (Wesley in Southey 1925: 304-5). 
 
As Cleverley and Phillips note, breaking the will of the child thus 
became crucial to parenting, with strict discipline, prayers and a lack 
of things to ‘gratify the senses’ being important parts of a strict regime 
designed to achieve this (Cleverly & Phillips 1987: 29 – 34). 
 
Pointing in yet another direction is the influence of evolutionary 
theory subsequent to the publication of Darwin’s The Origin of the 
Species  in 1859.   John Somerville shows how evolutionary theory 
brought with it a view of humans which emphasised their animal 
characteristics at the expense of spiritual aspects.  In the wake of 
this, children, who had been most exalted under the Rousseau  
  18 
inspired ideal, were ‘taken down from their pedestal’ and 
demythologised (Sommerville 1982: 209).  Further, the evolutionary 
paradigm had three major ramifications for the way that children 
were now seen.  First, child upbringing was no longer only important 
in terms of how a particular child would develop into an adult, but 
also held the key to the improvement of the human species on a 
generation by generation basis.  As Ehrenreich and English state, “In 
the child lay the key to the control of human evolution” (Ehrenreich & 
English 1979: 1986). 
 
Second, philosophical introspection regarding children’s nature was 
no longer sufficient.  Scientists realised that they knew little of how 
children grew and ‘the child’ now became an object of study.  From 
here, as Sommerville notes, came the development of scientific 
e n d e a v o u r s  w h i c h  s o u g h t  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  c h i l d r e n  w i t h  t h e  g o a l  o f  
improving them, both as children and as the adults that they would 
become.  Thus, the first two decades of the twentieth century saw the 
development of a series of tests and measures centred on children’s 
aptitude, physical growth and achievement (Sommerville 1982: 211).  
The issue of how children came to be ‘known’ will be returned to in 
Chapter Two which examines the development of research on 
children. 
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Third, as Archard (1993) notes, Darwin firmly tied the life of the child 
to evolutionary theory.  In ‘A Biographical Sketch of the Infant’, 
published in 1877, Darwin argued that the beginnings of human life 
in the form of the infant could provide an understanding of the 
beginning of human life more generally (Archard 1993: 32).  The 
German scientist Ernst Haeckel formulated this idea into ‘biogenetic 
law’ which postulates that individual human development from 
embryo to adult replicates the development of the species or race 
(Archard 1993: 32).   This theory of ‘recapitulation’ is succinctly 
explained by Cleverley and Phillips: 
Thus, if mammals evolved from reptiles, and reptiles evolved 
from amphibians and fish, then during embryonic 
development a young mammal will pass through a fish, an 
amphibian and then a reptile stage (Cleverley & Phillips 
1987: 43) 
 
Herbert Spencer believed that recapitulation could be applied to 
numerous phenomena – the solar system, societies, as well as 
organisms and species.  In his Essays on Education (1861) Spencer 
saw education as a means to “carry each child’s mind through a 
process like that which the mind of humanity at large has gone 
through” (Spencer 1949: 7). 
 
Archard (1993) notes that this biogenetic law strongly influenced the 
work of Sigmund Freud.  Within such a framework, development of  
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the child into adult was a unilinear process, one stage building on the 
next, with adulthood as the end-state.  Abnormal outcomes in the 
adult could be attributed to disruptions in the developmental path.  
The theory of recapitulation is evident in the belief that each stage of 
development moves the child to a more complex level   (Archard 1993: 
33).  Thus, Freud provided another element to the developing 
conception of the child and childhood:  childhood as the adult’s past  
(James et al 1998: 20).   This framework had a double effect: it 
enabled psychosis in adulthood to be ‘explained’ by examining, 
through psychoanalysis, conditions in childhood and it also 
highlighted the importance of the provision of the ‘correct’ conditions 
in childhood necessary to the production of the ‘healthy’ adult and 
firmly established this causal relationship between childhood ‘trauma’ 
and adulthood psychosis.  However, Sommerville makes the 
important point that Freud’s ideas have often been taken out of 
context and over-simplified and his cautionary words are worth 
quoting at length: 
If certain tensions are known to cause psychological 
problems, it is tempting to assume that they invariably do 
so.  Actually, it may be that what is found in the sick could 
be found in us all, to varying degrees.  But the first reaction 
was to suppose that where there is a problem there must be 
a solution.  If tension can lead to neurosis, then we must 
ensure tension-free lives for our children.  If an unrepressed 
life sounds desirable, then it must be possible.  To this end, 
the popular mind has turned Freudianism into preventative 
medicine.  Freud himself held out no hope for this kind of 
perfectionism and would have dismissed the idea of an  
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entirely unrepressed and uninhibited life as a fantasy 
(Sommerville 1982: 217). 
 
The developmental model of childhood with one stage building on the 
next was given further credence by the work of Jean Piaget from the 
1920s.   Erica Burman (1994), in her exploration of Piaget’s work, 
notes the influence that biological evolutionary principles had on 
Piaget’s work.  Piaget was not interested in children per se, but rather 
what would come to be called ‘genetic epistemology’ or the study of 
knowledge, specifically with regard to the growth of knowledge in 
children (Burman 1994: 153).  From the biological evolutionary 
principles of assimilation, accommodation and equilibration, Piaget 
proposed a theory about the development of knowledge in children 
(and thus the human species).  This theory saw the cognitive 
development of children as a process whereby the environment could 
be assimilated by the child through the construction of a set of 
cognitive structures.  Encountering a new difficulty would disrupt a 
child’s mental equilibrium, forcing her to make an addition to her 
mental apparatus; cognitive development then occurred and the child 
moved back to a state of equilibrium.  As Piaget explains: 
The psychological development that starts at birth and 
terminates in adulthood is comparable to organic growth.   
Like the latter, it consists essentially of activity directed 
toward equilibrium.  Just as the body evolves toward a 
relatively stable level characterised by the completion of the 
growth process and by organ maturity, so mental life can be  
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conceived as evolving toward a final form of equilibrium 
represented by the adult mind (Piaget 1967: 1). 
 
Building on this, Piaget and his colleagues produced a theory of 
cognitive development in which the child was seen to pass through a 
series of stages through to adulthood (Piaget 1967: 5,6). 
 
Again, through Piaget’s framework, children were placed at the 
bottom of the evolutionary ladder as what Ehrenreich and English 
refer to as a kind of ‘evolutionary protoplasm’ (Ehrenreich & English 
1979: 186).  Archard observes the normative nature of this 
developmental model in that the state of adulthood is regarded as the 
end product, an achievement.  Each stage is seen to build on and is 
incorporated into the next, culminating in a more and more complex 
understanding.  This means that each stage is regarded as not only a 
quantitative improvement but also a qualitative one, producing a 
particular view of adulthood whereby “adulthood is not more of what 
childhood has less of; it is of a different and higher order” (Archard 
1993: 33).   For Piaget, understanding the cognitive development of 
children (and thereby humans) could inform the quest for human 
progress: 
Childhood, I believe, will furnish an explanation of our 
difficulties and failings.  At the same time, however, it will 
teach us how to do better than we have done, showing us 
the reserves of energy that exist in human beings and the  
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sort of education that will enable us to rise above our 
present level of development (Piaget 1933: 13). 
 
Piaget’s work had considerable significance for the theory and practice 
of teaching, helping to move education from what Piaget described as 
the “traditional school” to the “new methods of education” (Piaget 
1971: 145).  For Piaget, the traditional method constrained the 
student, “imposing” work on the student by the teacher.  On the other 
hand, the new method “appeals to real activity to spontaneous work 
based upon personal need and interest” (Piaget 1971: 152). 
 
While, as Burman notes, the influence that Piaget’s work had on the 
development of pedagogical practice was extensive (Burman 1994, 
163-176), the influence of his work spread wider than childhood 
education.  In particular, the division of the life of the growing child 
into stages enabled the more detailed calibration of the child.  Just as 
medical practitioners could measure and tabulate the physiological 
growth of children and thereby establish ‘normal’ ranges of height and 
weight, developmental psychologists could now predict and measure 
‘normal’ cognitive and social development.  As James, Jenks and 
Prout (1998) point out, this standard of ‘normality’ became that 
against which the child was judged (James, Jenks & Prout 1998: 19). 
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My exploration so far suggests that the view of the child as the future 
hope of humankind was becoming well entrenched during the first 
half of the twentieth century.  Evolutionary theory opened up the 
possibility that humankind had some kind of control over its future 
development and provided - through recapitulation theory - a 
framework for understanding the development of children through to 
adulthood.   Freud had brought attention to the importance of 
childhood for the healthy functioning in adulthood and Piaget had 
provided a schema which both explained the cognitive development of 
children and enabled adults to envisage how they might shape this 
development.  As a result, from the early 1900s children came under 
the gaze of experts who observed and measured them so that they 
might be understood and their formative childhood years could be 
shaped. 
 
The key to solving societal ills came to lie in the way in which children 
were reared and educated and a lot of money and effort was put into 
discovering the ‘correct’ childrearing techniques.  For example, the 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Foundation in the United States 
spent $7 million in the drive for expert-controlled child raising during 
the 1920s (Cleverley & Phillips 1987: 208).   Under this venture, 
parents were instructed by experts about appropriate ways to bring 
up their children.  The American behaviourist John B. Watson was an  
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important influence at this time, with his child-rearing book 
Psychological Care of Infant and Child (1928) becoming the 
authoritative work on parenting (Somerville 1982: 213).  Watson 
advocated ‘conditioning’ children through the application of strict 
feeding schedules, early toilet training and cooler relations between 
parents and their children.  Too much affection, he believed, resulted 
in “sentimentality, dependency and an invalid complex” (Sommerville 
1982: 213).   Sommerville also notes that parents were incited to feel 
guilt if unable to be completely consistent with the regimes 
recommended. 
 
The production of strict parenting guidelines was just one element of 
what both Hendricks and Sommerville term the ‘standardisation’ of 
childhood whereby through compulsory schooling, welfare, youth 
groups and the juvenile justice system, attempts were made to shape 
children into the conforming ideal envisaged (Hendricks 1997; 
Sommerville 1982).  A number of theorists (e.g. Hopkins 1994, Wardle 
1974, Sommerville 1982) agree that the first of these – compulsory 
schooling – was a pivotal factor in the way that children were 
reconceptualised at the time.  David Wardle goes so far as to state 
that the rise of formal schooling was “accompanied by a change in 
attitude towards children so fundamental as to make it reasonable to 
say that childhood was invented in the eighteenth and nineteenth  
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centuries” (Wardle 1974: 27).  As Hendrick notes, compulsory 
schooling involved far more than simply the academic education of 
children.  In his discussion of classroom practices, he describes the 
way educationists attempted to shape children (especially working 
class children) in terms of discipline, respect for authority and 
structure.  As part of this movement, previous divisions between 
urban and rural schools in countries such as the United Kingdom 
were (in theory at least) to be removed in the quest for a ‘truly national 
childhood’ (Hendrick 1997: 12).  Compulsory schooling also enabled 
the ‘proper’ segregation of children from adults for a fixed period of 
the day during which they could be taught both their place as 
children and as future adults (Hendrick 1997: 73). 
 
The Child and the State 
Behind many of the developments outlined so far lies the hand of the 
state.  The work of theorists such as Donzelot (1979), Rose (1989) and 
McGillivray (1997) are particularly important in describing its role in 
assisting in the process of ‘standardisation’.   In his seminal work The 
Policing of Families (1979) Jacques Donzelot adopts a Foucaultian 
framework to examine how regulatory practices were developed during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to enable the improvement of 
the quality of the population whilst still heeding liberal political ideals:  
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How was it possible to ensure the development of practices 
of preservation and formation of the population while at the 
same time detaching it from any directly political role and 
yet applying to it a mission of domination, pacification and 
social integration? (Donzelot 1979: 55).   
 
Donzelot examines how, through the tutelage of the ‘psy’ disciplines, 
the family, particularly the working class family, was to become the 
focus of programs aimed at the normalisation of difficult and deviant 
children.  He argues that rather than using regulatory or coercive 
measures, psychoanalysis worked to align “familial values and social 
norms” (Donzelot 1979: xxiv) by working with parents’ own desires: 
By playing on the educative strategy of the family, 
psychoanalysis introduced a concern with the observance of 
social norms in the family without colliding head on with it, 
but rather … taking support from its desire.  Psychoanalysis 
made the family amenable to social requirements, a good 
conductor of relational norms (Donzelot 1979: 209 emphasis 
in original).  
 
Thus, it is important to note that the state was (and still is) forming 
children against a ‘liberal’ standard invested with notions of personal 
freedom, democracy and limitations on rule.  As Archard (1993) 
argues, the ‘liberal standard’ presumes certain things about the 
state’s role in regard to the family: 
First, the State has a legitimate interest in the welfare of 
children but, second, it acts as their caretaker in the last, or 
at least not first instance.  Third, the State assumes a 
public role in protecting children which is initially 
circumscribed by the private space of the family (Archard 
1993: 111).  
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Hence, while the liberal state has a vested interest in the well-being 
and development of children, the presumption is that these children 
will be raised in families which fall within the private domain and, 
therefore – in the first instance – outside the control of the state.   
Within such a framework, subject to certain conditions, parents are 
entitled to autonomy and freedom to bring up their children in the 
way that they see fit (Archard 1993: 111).  This, however, as Rose 
(1989) points out, is conditional on parents and families 
demonstrating the capacities of self-regulation and (reasonably) 
democratic governance. 
 
From another perspective, Barbara Arneil (2002) reminds us of the 
importance of the notion of ‘rational capacity’ in classical liberal 
theory.  In the movement away from the rule of monarchy, citizens 
came to be regarded as worthy of participation in politics due to their 
‘rationality’.  However, an important distinction was made between 
the rational adult and the non-rational child.  On this basis, children 
are seen as ‘citizens in waiting’ who, as yet, do not possess the reason 
and autonomy necessary for citizenship and, most importantly, need 
to be educated to develop the attributes of citizenship (Arneil 2002: 
70). 
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The broad influence of the developmental model and the particular 
influences of the liberal ideal are evident in contemporary parenting 
literature.  Thus, the West Australian Government’s advisory 
pamphlets comment that: 
Parents start with a helpless infant and turn him or her into 
a happy, well adjusted, responsible adult member of society. 
… Then parents teach children to look after themselves, to 
know right from wrong, to be responsible for their own 
actions, to be able to control their anger, to make right 
choices – all of the things which go into making a balanced, 
responsible person (WA Government 1995: 2 emphasis 
added). 
 
These sentiments are echoed in parenting books such as Parenting 
Young Children  (Dinkmeyer et al 1989).  Dinkmeyer et al note that 
historically parents were seen to have “succeeded at their job” if their 
offspring survived through to adulthood without them succumbing to 
disease or violence.  Today’s parents, they argue, have a “more 
complicated vision” and wish to raise children who are (among other 
things – the list comprises eleven qualities): responsible and co-
operative, successful, respectful of others’ feelings and property, and 
self-reliant (Dinkmeyer et al 1989: 5). 
 
While reminding parents that children are unique, both the West 
Australian  Living with Children publication and Parenting Young 
Children include a chart that maps the developmental process.  This 
is common to parenting advice books and guides, demonstrating the  
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influence of the developmental model.  The chart setting out the 
developmental stages of children from four to twelve years of age is 
included below (fig 1). 
Fig 1: Developmental stages of children from four to 12 years of age 
 
Age Physical 
development 
General 
behaviour 
Language & 
Education 
Typical 
personality 
Common 
normal 
‘problems’ 
Common 
misconceptions 
4 Can  climb  a 
ladder; walks up 
and down stairs 
with ease 
Fully toilet trained; 
can almost dress 
and undress self; 
eats with fork and 
spoon; washes 
and dries hands 
Engages in 
coherent 
conversation; gives 
name; age and 
address; 
understands time 
Uses 
imagination to try 
out new things; 
increasingly self 
sufficient lively; 
can share – not 
always 
successfully 
Noisy and 
assertive; wilful; 
makes up stories 
that didn’t 
happen; 
explores, 
wanders; shows 
off, swears 
Liar; disobedient; 
aggressive; bossy; 
cheeky 
5 Runs  quite  well; 
right or left 
handedness now 
fairly clear 
Dresses and 
undresses without 
aid; washes and 
dries face and 
hands; plays 
constructively; 
draws 
recognisable 
human and house; 
elaborate make 
believe group play. 
Speaks fluently; 
counts objects up 
to about 20 
Serious minded; 
practical; 
cooperative; is 
learning to 
share; thrives on 
praise 
Tells fanciful 
tales (using 
imagination); 
swears; may still 
suck thumb 
Tells ‘whoppers’; 
lies; foul mouthed; 
babyish 
6  More skilful now in 
use of hands; may 
be able to ride a 
bicycle; starts to 
lose first teeth and 
acquire permanent 
molars. 
Casual and 
careless in 
washing and 
dressing; draws 
pictures with some 
supporting detail; 
knows left hand 
from right hand 
Begins to read and 
prints letters and 
simple words; 
reads and writes 
numbers; adds and 
subtracts single 
digit numbers 
Excitable, 
impulsive and 
changeable; may 
seem rude or 
aggressive. 
Mild sex play; 
exhibitionism in 
toilet; fearful – 
sounds, ghosts, 
being lost; slow 
to follow 
instructions; 
wants to be first 
and to have the 
most; boasts. 
Pervert; sook; lazy; 
selfish; a bragger 
7 Shows  some 
elementary skill in 
bat and ball 
games, skipping, 
hopscotch; is able 
to learn to swim or 
to play musical 
instrument 
Shows increased 
awareness and 
understanding of 
the world around; 
polite and anxious 
to impress 
Reads simple 
words and 
sentences; prints 
large and small 
letters; adds within 
20 and subtracts 
within 10 
Quiet and 
thoughtful; 
shows sense of 
responsibility 
Forgets 
instructions; 
“Nobody loves 
me”; jealous of 
older siblings 
getting more 
privileges; sex 
play but occurring 
less often 
Disobedient; lazy; 
selfish; ungrateful 
8 Physical  play  very 
lively; sporting 
skills develop 
markedly 
Bathes, dresses, 
sleeps and eats 
well; talks to 
strangers; takes 
part in team 
sports; drawings 
show some 
proportion and 
perspective 
Reads with 
understanding; 
learns running 
writing; starts to 
add and subtract 
two or three digit 
numbers and 
multiply and divide 
single digit 
numbers 
Self reliant, 
sociable and 
outgoing; active; 
may be critical of 
others; 
popularity and 
success are very 
important 
outside the 
family; aware of 
own failures. 
Failure hard to 
cope with; 
tempted to cheat; 
does not finish 
tasks and may 
cry if failure is 
mentioned 
Oversensitive; cant 
stick to anything; 
cant accept 
criticism 
9  Adept with hands 
and fingers; 
special skills such 
as sport and music 
become evident 
Well behaved; 
perseveres in work 
or play; self 
sufficient and may 
enjoy being alone 
Masters basic 
techniques of 
reading, writing, 
adding, subtracting, 
multiplying, and 
Sensible; self 
motivated; may 
be shy in social 
situations; may 
talk about sex 
Worried and 
anxious; has 
physical 
complaints such 
as stomach 
Neurotic; 
undisciplined  
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dividing; reads 
stories and writes 
brief letters to 
relatives 
information with 
friends; 
interested in 
body organs and 
functions; less 
afraid of dark; 
not afraid of 
water. 
aches and 
headaches when 
has to do disliked 
tasks; rebels 
against authority; 
sex swearing 
beginning; 
perseveres with 
tasks. 
10 Has  natural 
command of basic 
physical skills 
such as dressing, 
feeding, ball 
games and bike 
riding 
Quite the little 
adult – able to 
shop alone, go to 
school camps; 
asks about social 
issues. 
Reads well; does 
long multiplication 
and long division 
by one digit 
numbers; writes 
stories up to about 
a page in length. 
Cool, clam and 
collected; 
generally a 
peaceful age; 
accepts parent’s 
word as law 
Interest in smutty 
jokes; name 
calling and may 
physically fight 
with siblings 
 
 
10-12 Early 
adolescence; rapid 
physical change 
with the 
development of 
pubic hair, breasts 
in girls, pimples 
and gawkiness 
Develops strong 
sexual feelings; 
concern with own 
identity and 
values; wants to 
be listened to and 
taken seriously; 
experiments and 
takes risks; 
questions parents’ 
values 
 Impulsive;  strong 
emotions; large 
mood swings; 
self conscious; 
relates strong to 
age mates; less 
dependent on 
family; wants 
more privacy 
Takes risks; 
rebellious; over 
sensitive about 
appearance; over 
optimistic; 
confident; 
unrealistic; 
preoccupation 
with sexual 
matters; doesn’t 
want to join in 
family activities 
Delinquent; cant be 
trusted to be 
responsible with 
sex, drugs etc; 
doesn’t love 
parents; no longer 
influenced by 
parents 
 
 
       ( W A   G o v e r n m e n t   1 9 9 5 )  
The provision of tables such as this provides an important link 
between the knowledge of developmental psychology to the role of 
parenting by making available - in an accessible form - the knowledge 
required by parents to monitor and guide their child’s progress.  As 
Rose points out, since the 1960s mothers have been assigned a vital 
role in the cognitive development of their child (Rose 1989: 182).   He 
notes that, in the years preceding formal education, the mother’s role 
is promoted as being vital in the preparation for the school years: 
Psychological theories of cognitive development and the 
importance of the ‘early years’ have transformed the 
everyday life of the household into a complex of educational 
opportunities.  The mother is to precede the teacher; her 
daily routines and response to the wants and troubles of her 
children are to be conducted in the interests of her child’s 
mental development.  If she plays her part well, the child’s 
future life chances will be immeasurably enhanced, if she  
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fails through ignorance or impatience to realize or to 
actualise such a learning scheme, woe betide her child when 
he or she enters school (Rose 1989: 182). 
 
Central to these preschool years is the concept of play as an educative 
tool and the importance of providing opportunities for children to 
develop social skills through contact with their peers.  Thus, play and 
early friendships have come to be seen as a necessary component of 
the developmental process. 
 
Play and friendship: for the future 
Virtually all early childhood educators espouse play as a 
sacred right of childhood, as the way in which young humans 
learn, as a major avenue through which children learn to be 
happy, mentally healthy beings (Cannella 1997: 124). 
 
The association between children’s play and learning can be traced to 
the development of the kindergarten and early education movements 
in the late 1800s and the early 1900s, and more particularly the work 
of Froebel and Montessori (Saracho & Spodek 2003: 2).  Saracho and 
Spodek note, however, that whilst these early educators used their 
observations of play to inform curriculum development, children’s 
play activities at that time were actually quite structured.  It was the 
‘experimentalist’ John Dewey’s work in the early 1900s that provided 
the basis for contemporary understandings of the role of play in 
children’s education (Saracho & Spodek 2003: 3).   Dewey and other  
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experimentalists argued that humans are ‘self-directing organisms’ 
who actively seek out “objects and experiences which will serve as 
instruments for the achievement of its purposes” (McNally 1973: 79).   
For Dewey then, education is about encouraging this natural process, 
and the teacher is the ‘guide’. 
 
The role of play in the cognitive, emotional and social development of 
young children is also central to Piaget’s work (Burman 1994; 
Cannella 1997; Saracho & Spodek 2003).  Piaget’s theories of 
assimilation and accommodation, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
also shaped his theories on play.  Here he argued that play, like the 
broader development of the child, passed through a series of stages.   
The first of these is sensory-motor play with a focus on physical 
activity; the second is symbolic play which starts at approximately 
eighteen months until age seven; and the third stage is games with 
rules (Piaget 1962).   Within this framework, the movement from one 
stage to the next sees a decrease in the previous mode of play; for 
example when a child starts to play games that have rules, symbolic 
play will decrease (Saracho & Spodek 2003: 10).  The movement 
through these stages reflects the cognitive development of the child 
(she cannot move onto the next stage until she is ‘ready’ to do so), but 
play is also a driving force for development (Dockett 1999: 32) as the  
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child learns by exploring the world and learning through 
experimenting with objects and situations.  
 
Saracho and Spodek argue that the importance of play is also central 
to Berlyne’s (1969) and Ellis’ (1973) adaptation of the biological basis 
of Piaget’s idea.  In Berlyn’s (1969) “Arousal Seeking/Modulation 
Theory” of play, later modified by Ellis (1973), the child is driven by a 
need in the central nervous system which maintains arousal at 
optimal levels.  Play, therefore, “lets the organism (sic) find sources of 
arousal to capture information” (Saracho & Spodek 2003: 8).   
According to this theory, children require stimulation to facilitate this 
process, to enable them to reach their potential. 
 
Theories of the importance of play in cognitive development are 
complimented by an equally strong emphasis on the role of play in 
emotional development.  These notions were initially developed by 
Freud (1938) and later taken up by psychoanalysts such as Erikson 
(1963) and Axline (1974).  Freud believed that play provided unique 
and important opportunities for children to relieve themselves of 
negative emotions and enable them to communicate their feelings – 
resulting in better emotional equilibrium (Saracho & Spodek 2003: 8).  
For these theorists, children can also utilise play to act out past, 
present and future events, thus helping them to understand and cope  
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with their lives and develop a ‘sense of competence’  (Saracho & 
Spodek 2003: 8).   One of the products of this conceptualisation of 
play is in ‘play therapy’ whereby children’s emotions are drawn out 
through play and children are encouraged to ‘work through’ difficult 
situations. 
 
A similar focus is applied to children’s friendships with them being 
seen as a necessary part of the developmental process.  The 
psychological interest in the peer relationships of children can be 
traced back to Parten who, in 1932, identified five levels of social play: 
solitary play, onlooker play, parallel play, associative play and 
cooperative play.  Within the developmental framework, progression 
through these types of play are linked to a child’s development, for 
example, very young children are not seen to have the skills or 
information necessary to engage in cooperative play (James et al 
1998: 94).  The main impetus for this interest is that relationships are 
seen to be important to a child’s social development, and conversely, 
the lack of peer relationships is considered a possible predictor of 
social problems in adulthood (Bukowski & Hoza 1989).  Thus, 
Bukowski and Hoza note: 
A fundamental and widely accepted premise of the social 
development literature is the proposal that childhood peer 
relationships contribute uniquely to social and emotional 
development (Bukowski & Hoza 1989: 15). 
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As this section has illustrated, over the course of the last century it 
has transpired that under the gaze of the experts (or by proxy, the 
child’s parents), no facet of the child’s life is left unscrutinised.  Even 
the children’s leisure time has been reconceptualised as a building 
block in the development of the future adult.  As Rose notes, 
“childhood is the most intensively governed sector of personal 
existence” (Rose 1989: 123). 
 
An Ideal Childhood of Innocence and Fun 
 
While much of the attention on children and the ‘formative’ years of 
childhood centres on the creation of good adults for the good of the 
nation, there is yet another influence that has shaped the way that 
children and childhood are perceived. As discussed earlier, 
Rousseau’s ideas on children’s innocence and goodness provided a 
contrast to the evangelical conception of original sin and evil residing 
in the child.  The projection of the child as ‘innocent’ also features 
heavily in later eighteenth and nineteenth century literature (for 
discussion see James et al 1998; James & Prout 1997; Archard 1993; 
Hendrick 1997; Sommerville 1982; and Mills & Mills 2000).  The 
poetry of Blake and Wordsworth contributed to a vision of childhood 
as a time of joy and wonder, the ‘seed-time of the soul’ (Archard 1993:  
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39), while the Victorian era brought a more sentimental image of 
childhood. 
 
In an intriguing discussion, Sommerville observes how Victorian 
authors were prone to ‘killing off’ children in literature to avoid the 
demise of their innocence.  Hence he writes: 
And so, to protect this vision of innocence from corruption, 
the child characters were killed and their purity embalmed.  
Authors could not think how to picture the transition from 
innocence to maturity without introducing the forbidden 
interests which dominated the adult world.  Real children 
would have been too frightening for these authors or their 
public.  For real children would have reminded them of the 
impulses they had helped to repress in themselves.  It would 
have raised anew their guilt at those desires and reminded 
them of their own part in suppressing them.  In short, it was 
too painful to face the fact that they had helped to murder 
the child within them.  They preferred to think that society 
alone was responsible, and that they had been innocent of 
all offense when it happened (Sommerville 1982: 172). 
 
As Mills and Mills note, “contact with the world would bring death of a 
different kind” (Mills & Mills 2000: 14): the death of innocence, and, 
therefore, childhood itself.  This perception – that childhood is 
innocence - is reflected in contemporary literature that laments the 
‘death’ of childhood with titles such as The Death of Innocence (Janus 
1981) and The Disappearance of Childhood (Postman 1982).  Postman, 
for example, claims that childhood is disappearing through the 
availability of adult information through the media and that children  
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“in having access to the previously hidden fruit of adult information, 
[they] are expelled from the garden of childhood” (Postman 1982: 97). 
 
The ‘proper child’ was (and still is) seen to be innocent and 
vulnerable, unworldly and in need of adult protection.  Such a 
conception has ramifications for the role of parents and educators 
who are charged with the responsibility of protecting the innocent 
child from the ugliness and violence that surrounds them (James et al 
1998: 14).  This notion was codified in Britain and Australia during 
the period from 1890 to 1930 through the introduction of numerous 
laws on issues such as custody, employment of minors, neglect and 
protection, child vagrancy, guardianship and education, and truancy 
(Burns & Goodnow 1979: 49), and continues to dominate 
contemporary discourses on children and childhood.  In her 
discussion of the ‘child question’, Alanen demonstrates how the 
notion of children as “problems or victims of the adult social order, 
with an associated focus on welfare and social policy” (Alanen 1994: 
27) takes its place directly alongside the focus on children as future 
adults. 
 
In her study of the discourse surrounding sexual abuse and children, 
Kitzinger (1997) claims that current notions of childhood innocence 
can have negative ramifications.  She analyses media coverage, books  
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and academic work on child sexual abuse to demonstrate that such 
abuse is often portrayed as a crime against the ideal, the fantasy of 
what childhood is, or should be.  The quality of childhood that is 
‘stolen’ by abuse, she argues, is innocence.  The use of innocence in 
such a manner is problematic for Kitzinger for several reasons, two of 
which are relevant to our discussion here.  Firstly, it stigmatises the 
‘knowing’ child in that abuse of a child who does not fit the model of 
innocence is somehow less of an offence than abuse of an ‘innocent’ 
one and secondly it has the effect of keeping knowledge and power 
from children, thereby increasing their vulnerability to abuse. 
 
Kitzinger’s critique of childhood innocence and vulnerability 
demonstrates the potentially negative consequences of the way that 
we conceptualise children.  Of course, the dominant way of seeing 
children, informed by developmental psychology and socialisation 
theory, has many positive consequences – it provides ample reasons 
why adults should treat children well and provide them with a good 
e n v i r o n m e n t  t o  g r o w  u p  i n .   B u t ,  a s  L e e  ( 2 0 0 1 )  a r g u e s ,  t h e  
pervasiveness of the dominant framework can conceal the fact that in 
attempting to provide a full and clear picture of what ‘the child’ is, we 
may lose sight of children as individual people (Lee 2001: 44).   In the 
following section some of the possible consequences of the dominant 
conceptions are briefly explored.  
  40 
Possible Consequences of the Dominant Conceptions 
 
The production of a dichotomy of adult/child? 
 
Childhood is defined as that which lacks the capacities, skills 
and powers of adulthood.  To be a child is to be not yet an 
adult (Archard 1993: 30) 
 
As noted throughout this chapter, the developmental model positions 
the child as a ‘work in progress’.  Adulthood is presented as the end-
state, the ideal, the goal, the job complete, the teleos (Archard 1993: 
33).   In Qvortrup’s famous terms, adults are ‘beings’ while children 
are ‘becomings’ (Qvortup 1994: 4).   This produces a adult/child 
dichotomy whereby the adult is the ideal (a being) and the child is 
lacking (becoming an adult).  As Smart et al note1, adults are seen as 
being independent, rational and competent while, in contrast, 
children are assigned characteristics such as dependency, 
irrationality and incompetency (Smart et al 2001).  Lee (2001) argues 
that this conceptualisation of the characteristics of children shapes 
the way that we interpret and understand their actions: 
The dominant framework carries a particular way of 
interpreting the things actual children do and say.  As long 
as children can be seen… as irrational, or as ignorant of the 
nature of society in which they live, then the things they do 
and say can be interpreted as reflections of their limitations 
                                                 
1 For further discussion on this topic see Archard 1993; Christensen 1998;  Mayall 1994; Oakley 1994; 
and Thorne 1987.  
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rather than as expressions of their own intentions, desires 
or opinions (Lee 2001: 44). 
 
Seeing children as a ‘work in progress’ also often forms the rationale 
and justification for the power that adults wield over children.     
Simply being adult (and, therefore, being rational, reasonable and 
competent) is regarded as justification in and of itself for the control 
that adults have over children’s lives.   While this is the case in 
varying degrees in different situations (e.g. home or school), Lee 
argues that the dominant framework is most evident when decisions 
regarding children are based on pervading assumptions on the ‘true’ 
nature of children, when adults must act as experts on children and 
justify their decisions (Lee 2001: 45). One good example of this is 
early intervention programs such as the Perry Preschool Project, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter.  The early intervention in 
the lives of children and their parents is justified in terms of expert 
knowledge of developmental outcomes. 
 
The marginalisation and silencing of children 
While often the dominant framework can produce overtly one-
dimensional understandings of children, at other times children are 
simply invisible, subsumed under categories such as the family or 
education (Alanen 1992; Qvortrup 1994; Smart et al 2001: 9).     
Qvortrup (1994) argues that children’s exclusion or marginalisation  
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can occur in a number of ways, for example: through being denied 
access to particular environments (usually justified in terms of 
protection of their physical and mental wellbeing); through their 
absence from social reporting; and through research.  Often this 
marginalisation is supported in terms of ‘protection’, however, 
Qvortrup argues, that, while such protection is often important, there 
is a risk associated with it: 
There is no doubt that this concept is very often extremely 
relevant, but there is at the same time an inherent risk of 
exaggerating it and to the extent this happens it may turn 
into its opposite, namely a convenient tool to protect the 
adult world against intrusion of children (Qvortrup 1994: 
21) 
 
Mason and Steadman argue that when children are recognised in the 
social policy arena it is not as individuals in their own right but as 
dependents of adult family members (Mason & Steadman 1997: 31).  
Alanen (1992) coins the term ‘familialization’ to capture this process 
whereby children are submerged within the family unit and parents 
are seen to represent the views of the children within that family.   
Until recently, the study of children within families which seeks to 
gain the voice of children as individuals has been rare, leaving a gap 
in understanding of the lives of children in families (Smart et al 2001: 
10).  
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Additionally, Rayner (1991) argues that children are often 
marginalised due to the trivialisation of their views - because children 
are seen to be less competent than adults their views are not taken 
seriously (Rayner 1991: 37).  Mason and Steadman assert that due to 
children’s competence they are believed to be dependent on adults 
(Mason & Steadman 1997: 33).  This dependency, Qvortrup (1994) 
argues, is seen as part of the ‘natural order’ whereby “adults are seen 
to have a “natural right to exert power over children” (Qvortrup 1994: 
5).  He goes on to state that it is the unsettling of this ‘natural order of 
things’ that is central to changing the way that children are perceived: 
History (also) shows that one of the problems of any 
liberation movement is the naturalness with which the 
subordinate groups are perceived.  Claims for the extension 
of rights to new groups have always involved a challenge to 
‘common sense’, to the ‘ordinary man’ or to the ‘natural 
social order’ (Qvortrup 1994: 85) 
 
The production of over-simplified understandings of children and their 
lives 
…normative descriptions provided by developmental 
psychology slip into naturalised prescriptions.  These are 
fuelled by the appeal to biology and evolution (Burman 1994: 
4) 
 
Situating children at the ‘nature’ end of the nature-culture spectrum 
has, as we have seen throughout this chapter, enabled the formation 
of theories appealing to biology for justification. While (from the 1970s 
on) more consideration was given to the social environment in which  
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the child lives, Burman agues that much of the child development 
research does not adequately combine the relationship between the 
social and biological, treating the social “as if it were a layer or coating 
over the biological” (Burman 1994: 46). 
 
James et al maintain that the developmental model has produced a 
‘deep seated positivism and rigid empiricism’ (James et al 1998: 19) in 
the way that children are studied and understood.  The ability to 
‘measure’ children and construct graphs, statistics and tables 
produces ‘normal’ parameters of academic ability, behaviour and 
growth.  Such comparisons produce what James et al term the ‘gold 
standard’ of the normal child against which researchers and 
professionals set their enquiries.  Such a framework also pushes the 
focus on to what is common to children, rather than what is different.  
As illustrated in the developmental table earlier in this chapter, data 
on children is often presented as if it were scientific ‘fact’ and not 
overlaid with political and cultural values. 
 
One example of the lack of consideration given to cultural or historical 
contexts is the phenomenon of ‘play’.  As we have seen, and chiefly 
through the work of Piaget, play has come to be seen as a vital 
element in the development of children.  Against this, a number of 
theorists critique the conceptualisation of play as ‘universal’ and  
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necessary for the ‘normal’ development of young children (e.g. 
Burman 1994; Cannella 1997; and Fleer 1999).  In this vein, and 
drawing on research from other cultures to illustrate their point, 
Cannella (1997) and Fleer (1999) point to the fact that our 
conceptions of play are western constructs.  By pointing to 
ethnographic work conducted in the rural Carolinas by Heath (1983), 
Cannella problematises Piaget’s emphasis on sensory-motor play, play 
in which infants explore the world and repeat actions with objects.  
Heath’s study describes how young children in a particular cultural 
community are constantly held and cuddled, leaving little opportunity 
for the activities that Piaget described (Cannella 1997: 125). 
 
In an Australian context, the differences between Indigenous and 
western childhood play practices have been commented on by 
Hamilton (1981).  Hamilton found that social pretend play was absent 
in the activities of the children at the Indigenous community he 
studied.  Instead, the children’s activities centred on exploring their 
environment and (especially for boys) developing physical skills.  Girls 
would often spend time gathering food and cooking (Hamilton 1981, 
quoted in Fleer 1998: 73).   Lyn Fasoli makes similar observations of 
experiences of taking a mobile playgroup to isolated families in 
Darwin in the early 1980s.   Her mission, she believed at the time, 
was to “bring developmentally appropriate activities, information and  
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support to parents and under-school-age children” (Fasoli 1999: 54).  
After very limited success with their brightly coloured construction 
toys, paint and playdough, Fasoli and her assistant accepted an 
invitation to go turtle hunting with a group of women and children.  
From then on her preconceptions were unsettled: 
From this point on Mary and I shelved our preconceived 
notions of parent support and education, and 
developmentally appropriate play agenda, and learnt as 
much as we could from these women and others who visited 
the hostel.  Each week we went hunting for different 
creatures or vegetation.  We hunted goanna, long bums (a 
kind of shellfish), rock oysters, mangrove worms, mud crabs 
and so on.   I have never learnt so much in such a short 
time.  I learnt the names of things; I learnt to see the 
potential for food in what had been in my eyes an empty, 
rather monotonous landscape; I learnt to wait for someone 
t o  s h o w  m e  w h a t  t o  d o ;  I  l e a r n t  t o  s t o p  a s k i n g  s o  m a n y  
questions.  In short, I learnt the way the children were 
learning – by watching, by being patiently shown, by paying 
attention and by doing myself (Fasoli 1999: 57). 
 
The way that Fasoli ‘learned to learn’ and its message for western 
practices is clear.  This point is underlined by Burman (1994) who 
looks at why our western notions of play as universal are problematic, 
arguing that they perpetuate racial and ethnocentric assumptions as 
well as diverting attention from the actual conditions of children’s 
local communities (Burman 1994: 56). 
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The obscuring of our vision of ‘real’ children 
The child of the dominant framework is problematic because 
it stands between us and actual children (Lee 2001: 44). 
 
One of the central critiques of the dominant framework is that it 
enables the production of stereotypes of children which can blur our 
vision of ‘real’ children.  James and Prout (1997) argue that by always 
seeking to understand children through the dominant developmental 
frame we may not be aware of situations when it may be misleading.   
This is exacerbated, they argue, by the fact that the normative 
assumptions produced by the developmental model are so established 
it is often difficult to see outside of them (James & Prout 1997).  As 
demonstrated in this chapter, this model has been reinforced by over 
a century of research that has, through the compilation of 
measurements and statistics, produced a notion of the ‘gold standard’ 
(James et al 1998: 18) of the normal child.  The existence of a ‘normal’ 
range of children’s growth, abilities and so forth at certain ages may 
in itself be innocuous; however this becomes problematic when real 
children are evaluated against this abstraction and, when found to be 
lacking, are seen to be deviant (James et al 1998; Burman 1994).  The 
myth or fiction (Burman 1994: 16) of the ‘normal child’ thus becomes 
somehow more real than the ‘in the flesh’ (Smart et al 2001: 8) 
children that they are seen to represent. 
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In  Making Better Children (1993) Deborah Tyler problematises the 
concept of the ‘normal child’ in relation to educational practices and 
contemporary school aims which endeavour to produce a particular 
type of child who is rational, autonomous and ‘class and gender 
neutral’ (Tyler 1993: 36).  She quotes the research of Steedman who 
found that: 
Teachers in English social priority schools regard few of 
their pupils as ‘ordinary’ or ‘normal’ children, so great is the 
gap they experience between the behaviours and attributes 
of these children and their training in how children ‘ought’ 
to be (Tyler 1993: 37). 
 
I t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  a s  t h e  b o d y  o f  o f f i c i a l  r e s e a r c h  o n  c h i l d r e n  h a s  
expanded and the idea of what constitutes ‘normality’ has been 
progressively defined and redefined, so have more actual children 
been excluded from these abstractions.  This point is demonstrated by 
Armstrong (1995) in his discussion of the emergence of the 
ADD/ADHD phenomenon.  These behaviour rating scales, he says: 
implicitly ask parents and teachers to compare a potential 
ADD child's attention and behaviour to those of a ‘normal’ 
child.  But this raises the question, what is normal 
behaviour?  Do normal children fidget?  Of course they do.  
Do normal children have trouble paying attention? Yes, 
under certain circumstances.  Then exactly when does 
normal fidgeting turn into ADD fidgeting, and when does 
normal difficulty paying attention become ADD difficulty? 
(Armstrong 1995: 1). 
 
Furthermore, in producing the notion of ‘the child’ we may be lulled 
into believing that we understand children and their lives.  Not only  
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may the abstraction of ‘the child’ lead us to wrong conclusions about 
certain situations (Lee 2001: 43), it may also prevent us from 
exploring different aspects of children’s lives.  In their discussion 
about children and work, James et al (1998) point out how the 
idealised notion of childhood as a time of play and learning has made 
work something that children do not – and should not - do and, in 
turn, limited our understandings of children and work (James et al 
1998: 101).    They note that in mainstream sociological literature, 
writings about children and work are rare and when they do appear 
they are dominated by “agencies intent on its reduction, control or 
elimination” (James et al 1998: 123) with work conceptualised as 
exploitative and damaging to children.   James et al’s discussion 
highlights the complexity of the issue and demonstrates how issues of 
morality can prohibit a full understanding of what work can mean in 
young people’s lives.   For example, what does work mean to the 
children involved in it?  Why do they do it? What effect does it have on 
their sense of identity and familial relationships? 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that while children may have been regarded 
as the ‘nation’s future’ since Spartan times, the past century has seen 
the development of ideals, theories and practices which have put an 
intense focus on children as representing the hope for a better  
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society.    A century of science has seen the development of a 
dominant teleological conception childhood as a series of stages that 
must be progressed through to reach the  ultimate goal of adulthood.  
The production of ‘better’ children (and thereby, in theory, ‘better’ 
adults) has become a scientific endeavour whereby children can be 
measured, predictions made and early interventions put in place.  The 
role of research has been central to this endeavour and it is this 
research that is the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Two:  The Shaping Of Research On Children 
 
The previous chapter explored dominant western conceptions of ‘the 
child’ and childhood and a number of their possible ramifications.  It 
was suggested that the way in which children are raised and educated 
have come to be seen as crucial elements in the production of an 
‘improved’ future generation and that science, in general, and the ‘psy’ 
sciences, in particular, have taken on the main role in providing the 
answers to this important task.  An essential component of this 
scientific approach is research.  Accordingly, this chapter looks at 
how mainstream conceptions of the child have shaped research and, 
in turn, the role that research plays in perpetuating dominant 
conceptions.  It then explores some of the ramifications of this type of 
research and how researchers working from a sociology of childhood 
framework have sought to address some of these concerns. 
 
The ‘Knowable’ Child 
In the previous chapter we saw that evolutionary theory enabled 
humans to be seen as improvable and thus presented small humans 
as an object of study, for they were, in a sense, the raw clay with 
which future adults could be moulded.  The way that children were 
reared and educated came to be seen as one of the keys to solving  
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societal ills and providing the blueprint for building the ideal child 
became the domain of the scientific expert.   
 
The development of definitive theories concerning the rearing and 
educating of children required that children first be known.  At the 
beginning of the twentieth century a leading childcare researcher, G. 
Stanley Hall, enlisted the help of mothers in the task of mapping the 
life of the child.  In the first instance, he sent out extensive 
questionnaires to parents, but later encouraged mothers to study 
their children and take notes:  
In Hall’s view, the truly scientific mother did not simply 
raise her child, she studied it, making notes which could 
serve as field data for the male academic experts 
(Ehrenreich & English 1979: 200). 
 
Hall’s method of using mothers to record the actions of their offspring 
was short-lived, however – the new generation of experts came to 
believe that only they had the expertise to gather the correct data.  
Thus the observation, categorisation and charting of children and 
their behaviour became the domain of a series of experts including 
those in the discipline of psychology (Rose 1989: 145).  
 
Psychologists came to adopt two main sites for their observations of 
children – institutions such as schools and hospitals and controlled 
sites such as the clinic or laboratory.  Institutions provided the  
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opportunity to observe large numbers of children simultaneously in 
what Rose describes as a ‘plane of sight’ (Rose 1989: 133).  Within 
such a plane of sight children could be compared – their similarities 
and differences isolated and documented.  This recording of attributes 
and the reformulation of large groups of children into statistics, 
charts and graphs enabled trends to be determined and a range of 
‘normality’ to be constructed.  By removing individual children from 
the picture and replacing them with measurable and recordable data, 
science could ‘know’ the child.  While the individual child was 
generally the object of study in the laboratory, the child in question 
was not Sally, Tom or Mary, but the ‘6 month infant’, the ‘12 month 
infant’ or the ‘four year old child’.  By removing the child from their 
normal environment and observing them at set tasks within a 
laboratory the complexities or randomness of children’s behaviour 
could be minimised.  In the early 1920s Arnold Gesell at the Yale 
Psycho-Clinic struck upon a methodology that further removed ‘the 
child’ from the reality of actual children.  Gesell recorded the actions 
of the children he observed and produced still photographs that could 
be analysed in contrast with one another (Woodhead & Faulkner 
2 0 0 0 ;  R o s e  1 9 8 9 ) .   I n  t h i s  w a y ,  S a l l y ,  T o m  o r  M a r y  w e r e  a b l e  t o  
reproduced as scientific phenomena: observable, measurable and 
calculable. 
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In research terms, the links between developmental psychology and 
the biological sciences has led to positivist methods that seek to 
measure and test the child subjects, both in the laboratory and in 
‘naturalistic’ settings.   The laboratory environment has provided the 
opportunity to create experiences for the child and then monitor their 
responses.  Woodhead and Faulker (2000) describe a well-used 
example of this:  the “Strange Situation” which is based on Bowlby’s 
attachment theory.  In this procedure the young child and her mother 
sit in a laboratory playroom, are joined by a stranger who attempts to 
engage with the child and then, on a signal, the mother leaves the 
room.  The child’s reaction to being left in the room with a stranger is 
observed and recorded “according to a well-defined set of behavioural 
criteria” (Rolfe 2001: 235), as is the child’s reaction when the mother 
returns.  This process is then repeated (Woodhead & Faulkner 2001: 
18).  Children are then classified as “securely or unsecurely attached” 
(Rolfe 2001: 235). 
 
Some of the early experiments, in a supposedly ‘controlled’ 
environment, would now be disallowed on ethical grounds, but it is 
nevertheless worth recalling one such study performed by Watson and 
Rayner in 1920.  This research sought to demonstrate that children’s 
fear of animals was not innate but shaped by the environment.  A 9-
month-old child was initially given toy animals to play with.  In the  
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second phase of the study, the researchers hit a steel bar above the 
child’s head every time he or she reached for the rabbit – a loud noise 
that made the child cry.  After repeating this several times, the sight 
of the rabbit was enough to upset the child and their fear was 
generalised to other furry objects (Watson & Rayner 1920).  
 
The influence of the natural sciences is also evident outside the 
laboratory.  For example, ethology, which involved detailed recording 
of the behaviour of animals such as chimpanzees, was adopted for the 
study of children and play in the 1970s (Woodhead & Faulkner 2000: 
15).  This technique is still evident in research such as the Rolfe and 
Crossley (1997) study of Australian pre-school children’s play and 
social behaviour.  Here, observation of the children’s movements and 
events is broken down into categorised “molecular units of behaviour” 
which refers to movements and “molar” categories such as 
“aggression” or “jealousy” (Rolfe 2001: 234).  The authors argue that 
the advantage of these methods and the data they obtain is the 
“objectivity, accuracy and the ease with which they could be 
communicated between observers” (Rolfe 2001: 234). 
 
The assumption that children can be understood, and understood 
best, through the scientific study of biological and physiological 
processes is also demonstrated in the fact that extrapolations are  
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made from animal based research to children.  This has not solely 
concentrated on physical factors (e.g. the links between certain foods 
and disease), but also on the conditions in childhood and the later 
ability to cope with stress, as illustrated by the following quote.  This 
information was cited in the well known Early Years Study (Mustard 
& McCain 1999) in a discussion regarding the relationship between 
“maternal handling” and the ability to handle stress in later life: 
In one study, new born rat pups were gently handled for 15 
minutes a day for the first 21 days after birth (this is 
equivalent to the first two years of a human’s life span).   
Compared to non-handled rats, the handled rats developed 
more stress hormone receptor cells which allowed them to 
control through the feedback pathways, the amount of 
cortisol (a stress hormone) produced.  The rats were 
therefore better able to regulate their response to stressful 
events.  The changes in these animals were permanent and 
the handled rats were better able to learn and had fewer 
age-related cognitive impairments (Diorio et al 1997 quoted 
in Mustard & McCain 1999: 33). 
 
Research that utilises the measurement of neurological responses to 
stress is not confined to the laboratory.   Thus, for example, research 
measuring cortisol levels has been used to show that babies and 
toddlers who receive “consistent positive responses and responsive 
care” from their parents will develop into socially competent 
preschoolers (Gunner 1998).   A current research project at the 
Gunner Laboratory of the University of Minnesota in the United States 
demonstrates how this type of research is being used to research 
such things as the social relationships of preschool children.  It is  
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interesting to note that the same type of language, and the same 
kinds of assumptions regarding measurement and precision codified 
knowledge used in the biochemical testing of cortisol in the 
laboratory, are also present in the description of research on the 
social relations of the children. 
To assess social support and competence, we will take 
pictures of each child in each preschool classroom.  Each 
child will be invited to a room near his/her classroom to 
play “The Picture Game.”  He/she will first be asked to 
identify the children in his/her class and then asked to 
point and sort pictures in response to questions such as 
with whom he/she plays at school.  The session will last 
about 15 minutes per child. 
 
Cortisol levels will be determined by asking the children to 
play “The Tasting Game.”  The children will be offered a 
taste of Kool-Aid/Sweet Tart crystals, after which they will 
be asked to hold a cotton rope in their mouths to absorb 
saliva.  This process takes about 5 minutes per class and 
will be performed on 5 different days each semester during 
the transition from playtime to snack. 
 
Social interactions within each class will be examined by 
observational work using the Peer Relations Observation 
Inventory, wherein the experimenters will code in the 
classroom after the children have habituated to his or her 
presence.  Observers will be in the classroom approximately 
5-8 weeks each semester (Gunner Laboratory 2004). 
 
The close connection between the research methods and assumptions 
of the natural sciences and social research conducted on children 
indicates that science has traditionally been regarded as the best way 
to ‘know’ children – not only in terms of physiological development  
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but also in terms of their social and emotional development.   
Developmental psychology, which sees children progressing through a 
series of necessary stages to reach adulthood, provides a link between 
childhood as ‘cause’ and adulthood as ‘effect’, encouraging a form of 
research that again mimics some of the assumptions and methods of 
the natural sciences.  
 
Using science to make predictions regarding future adults 
One of the objectives of the natural sciences is to make predictions 
through research techniques which allow laws to be generalised 
across populations.  While child-based research cannot hope to make 
clean ‘cause and effect’ relationships between childhood conditions 
and adult states, it does nevertheless proceed to establish or suggest 
associations in the same research gestalt.   Longitudinal studies have 
been influential in the identification of those ‘risk factors’ in childhood 
which ‘disrupt’ the developmental process and thereby potentially 
cause the future adult to be either less effective than they could be, or 
to develop disorders such as mental he a lt h p rob le ms  o r to bec o me 
involved in antisocial activities such as criminal behaviour (e.g. Bates 
et al 1991; Moffitt 1990; Farrington 1995; Serbin et al 1991; Silburn 
& Zubrick 1996). 
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One recent example of a study in this genre is provided by the 
Western Australia Child Health Survey conducted in 1993 and 1994 
(Silburn & Zubrick 1996).   This study aimed to establish the nature 
and extent of mental health problems over a sample of over 2,700 
children aged 4 – 16 years, using an ecological view of child 
development (Silburn & Zubrick 1996: 2).   Using a particular 
statistical technique the researchers found that it was possible to 
classify 83% of children with mental health problems “solely on the 
knowledge of three questions: What is the child’s family type; what is 
the parental disciplinary style, and is there a significant level of family 
discord present?” (Silburn & Zubrick 1996: 7).   The presumed 
relationship between such research and the ability to make 
predictions is quite clear, and indeed this is included in the study 
with predictions such as: 
It can be seen that if the population prevalence of adverse 
parenting (i.e. coercive, detached, and inconsistent 
parenting) was reduced by 20% we could theoretically 
decrease the number of significant mental health problems 
by about 2,000 (Silburn & Zubrick 1996: 9). 
 
Parenting styles is only one of many potential risk factors which are 
identified in such cause-effect type studies.  The following table 
summarises those factors which have been linked to negative 
outcomes: 
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Table 2 
 
Child factors 
 
Family Factors 
 
School Context 
 
Life Events 
Community & 
Cultural Factors 
 
Prematurity 
Low birth weight 
Disability 
Prenatal brain damage 
Birth injury 
Low intelligence 
Difficult temperament 
Chronic illness 
Insecure attachment 
Poor problem solving 
Beliefs about 
aggression 
Attributions 
Poor social skills 
Low self esteem 
Lack of empathy 
Alienation 
Hyperactivity/ 
disruptive behaviour 
Impulsivity 
 
 
 
 
 
Parental 
characteristics: 
Teenage mothers 
Single parents 
Psychiatric disorder, 
especially depression 
Substance abuse 
Criminality 
Antisocial models 
 
Family environment: 
 
Family violence and 
disharmony 
Marital discord 
Disorganised 
Negative 
interaction/social 
isolation 
Large family size 
Father absence 
Long term parental 
unemployment 
 
Parenting style: 
 
Poor supervision and 
monitoring of child 
Discipline style (harsh 
or inconsistent) 
Rejection of child 
Abuse 
Lack of warmth and 
affection 
Low involvement in 
child’s activities 
neglect 
  
School failure 
Normative beliefs 
about aggression 
Deviant peer group 
Bullying 
Peer rejection 
Poor attachment to 
school 
Inadequate behaviour 
management 
 
Divorce and 
family break up 
War or natural 
disasters 
Death of a family 
member 
 
Socio-economic 
disadvantage 
Population 
density and 
housing 
conditions 
Urban area 
Neighbourhood 
violence and 
crime 
Cultural norms 
concerning 
violence as 
acceptable 
response to 
frustration 
Media portrayal of 
violence 
Lack of support 
services 
Social or cultural 
discrimination 
     
     (National  Crime  Prevention  1999:  136) 
  
  61 
The World Bank Group has taken this predictive stance a step 
further, providing on their web site a ECD (Early Childhood 
Development) Calculator which: 
calculates the Net Present Value of a proposed or existing 
Early Childhood Development program. Worth is measured 
in the degree to which such a program increases a sample of 
1,000 newborns’ chances for survival; their enrollment, 
attendance, and performance in school; and their future 
earning potential (World Bank 2004). 
 
Within the context of the World Bank Group initiative, such programs 
usually focus on one of four areas, namely: services to children, 
training teachers, educating parents or educating through the mass 
media (World Bank 2004). 
 
Such calculations illustrate how, with the benefit of such research, 
childhood can be seen as a site of investment.  The belief that 
childhood is not only formative, but also causally linked to wellbeing 
and safe living in adult life, promotes the calculation of a ‘return on 
investment’ for early intervention programs.  In the High/Scope Perry 
Preschool longitudinal study conducted in the United States, for 
example, a monetary “return on investment” was explicitly calculated: 
Adults born in poverty who participated in a high-quality, 
active learning preschool program at ages 3 and 4 have half 
as many criminal arrests, higher earnings and property 
wealth, and greater commitment to marriage, according to 
the latest findings of the High/Scope Perry Preschool Study.  
Over participants’ lifetimes, the public is receiving an  
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estimated $7.16 for every dollar originally invested 
(High/Scope Educational Research Foundation 2001). 
 
However, as noted in the Pathways to Prevention report, predictions 
from risk factors are in fact statements of (an almost even) 
probability: 
Although factors such as early troublesome behaviour are 
highly predictive of later offending, more than 50% of 
vulnerable individuals may not progress to such outcomes 
(National Crime Prevention 1999: 8 emphasis added). 
 
Given this, research has now turned to the task of determining why 
some individuals appear to succeed notwithstanding the fact that 
their childhood was in an environment where one or more of the risk 
factors were present (e.g. Garmezy 1991; Howard & Dryden 1999).   
Such fortitude is theorised in terms of ‘resilience’.  These studies 
escape the rather strict cause/effect sequence characteristics of much 
of the risk factor literature.  Instead of suggesting that X leads to Y, 
they intimate that factors A, B and C will help to prevent Y.  In this 
way, they are a more open-ended genre of studies than the risk factor 
research, and, although not explicitly stated, undermine its 
assumptions (i.e. X will not necessarily lead to Y if A, B and C are 
present).  In this respect, they are friendlier to the actualities and 
variabilities of children’s lives.  In the central teleological sense of 
seeing children as the foundation of adulthood, however, they remain 
similar.  
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The developmental conception of the child, whereby the child must 
work successfully through a series of stages, clearly underpins this 
causal type of research.   However, in areas such as Early Childhood, 
research is conducted purely to record and understand developmental 
factors.   This is evident in texts such as Introducing Research to Early 
Childhood Students (Lambert 2003) where, in providing an example of 
an observation exercise, the types of questions that the students are 
asked demonstrate the developmental approach (and the Piagetian 
influence).  In one research exercise, ‘Identifying ‘good’ play 
behaviours’, the students are asked to observe behaviour with a view 
to answering questions such as: 
•  Is this child actively exploring and investigating ideas, 
expressing them symbolically and through creative mediums by 
o   actively exploring ideas, or passively following others? 
o  Confidently expressing ideas symbolically, and through 
different creative mediums? 
•  Is this child beginning to take an increasingly responsible role 
in her/his own learning by: 
o  Persisting?  Or giving up readily? 
o  Willingly using resource material, or only if suggested by 
staff? (Lambert 2003: 55-56) 
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Indeed, in the following observation and subsequent analysis made of 
a 3 year old child in a nursery (which is not included in its entirety), it 
would appear that there is little that is not of interest to the 
developmental researcher: 
 
Harry came outside carrying his snack tag (a ticket with his 
name on and an elastic loop to hang up in the snack area).  
He hung it on the handlebars of the large yellow bike and 
rode around outside with his tag dangling.  Harry then 
found the large yellow trailer, which goes with the bike.   
Harry carefully reversed the bike and attached the trailer to 
the back of the bike.  This took a lot of struggling and 
patience.  A few minutes later, he disconnected the trailer 
and walked up the slide, sliding down on his belly.  Harry 
ran up the slide, balancing at the top of the slope and 
saying “Look at me! Look at me!”  He went indoors to tell his 
mummy something.  He came out again and ran up the 
slide and down again carrying his snack tag, then took the 
tag inside (Arnold 2003: 36). 
 
The author notes that the observations provide important clues to 
Harry’s “vital interests”, which can be tied back into theories and 
theorists of child development, for example, his interest in 
transporting objects, which sheds light on which schemas or patterns 
Harry is exploring, his wellbeing (he is seen to have a positive sense of 
self in that he says “Look at me” several times) and his learning style 
(Arnold 2003: 37).  The half hour observation of Harry provides a 
wealth of information for the nursery staff, namely that he: 
 
•  Is involved at level 3 indoors and level 4 out of doors 
•  Has a high level of well-being 
•  Is currently exploring ‘trajectories’, ‘transporting’ and 
‘connection’  
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•  Is covering personal, social and emotional development 
(“Look at me!”), mathematical development (‘increasing 
length by adding trailer to bike’ and ‘using his body as a line 
to reach the brush’), creative development, physical 
development, communication, language and literacy, and 
knowledge and understanding of the world 
•  Uses his body to explore the environment 
•  Is making links with adults 
•  Is curious and uses humour (Arnold 2003: 37-38) 
 
This information is then used to develop an action plan that will 
extend Harry’s learning. 
 
While Charlesworth (2004) notes that the very nature of recording 
observations of children is a very selective process, she also believes 
that it is the observer who has an understanding of child development 
who will make the right selections: 
From the diary record, we learn what a parent or other adult 
believes is important enough to write down.  Thus, the 
information is very selective.  However, an adult who 
understands and applies a thorough knowledge of child 
development to making selections can learn a great deal about 
what is happening with children as individuals and as a group  
(Charlesworth 2004: 27). 
 
Research conducted within such a framework provides little 
opportunity to see children in anything but their developmental 
stages, accomplishments and deficits.  It is this domination of a  
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particular conceptualisation in research that has been problematised 
within the sociology of childhood. 
 
The sociology of childhood and research 
Scientific discourse demands that young warm-blooded human 
beings are transformed into depersonalized objects of systematic 
inquiry, their individuality evaporated into a set of measurable 
independent and dependent variables, and then condensed into 
general laws of behaviour (Woodhead & Faulkner 2000: 12). 
 
In the previous chapter I drew on work from the sociology of 
childhood to discuss some of the possible ramifications of the 
dominant conception of the child.  These included: the production of a 
dichotomy of adult/child, the marginalisation and silencing of 
children; the production of over-simplified understandings of children 
and their lives; and the possible obscuring of our vision of ‘real’ 
children.  The arguments outlined during that discussion are also 
pertinent to the issue of research on children and for similar reasons 
theorists working from a sociology of childhood framework take issue 
with the positivist research that has dominated the study of children 
for the past century.   In particular, they posit that such research 
positions the child as the ‘object’ of research, arguing that such 
objectification enables the ‘universal child’ to replace living and 
breathing children, thereby enabling the complexity of children’s lives 
to be evaded.  For example, Graue and Walsh (1998) argue that the  
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deficiency of mainstream research on children is not so much its 
research techniques but the dominance of a perspective that utilises 
research on children in the effort to determine universal psychological 
laws and/or to evaluate treatment effects.  In neither case is the goal 
to understand children, but rather to “pursue the lofty academic goals 
of the absolute universal law and the ultimate treatment” (Graue & 
Walsh 1998: 1).  The goal of providing universally applicable 
knowledge requires that the complexity of the ‘warm-blooded’ small 
humans must be discarded and that they be seen solely in terms of 
the framework in which they are being studied.  As Woodhead and 
Faulkner (2000) state: 
For generations, aspiring developmental researchers have 
been exhorted to be objective, dispassionate, and adopt the 
technical jargon of hypothesis testing.  Scientific discourse 
demands that young warm-blooded human beings are 
transformed into depersonalised objects of systematic 
inquiry, their individuality evaporated into a set of 
measurable independent and dependent variables, and then 
condensed into general laws of behaviour (Woodhead & 
Faulker 2000: 12). 
 
The observations of Harry cited earlier in the chapter provide an 
illustration of this point.  Harry’s actions that were deemed worthy of 
recording were those that related to his individual physical and 
psychological development – there was nothing recorded about his 
interactions with other children, his mood that day or any emotions 
that he displayed (other than ‘curiosity’ and ‘humour’). Within such a  
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framework there is no room for the perspectives of individual children 
to be heard, or the complex lived experiences of children to be 
studied. 
 
In their seminal work, Construction and Reconstructing Childhood (2nd 
ed 1997), James and Prout identify what they regard as the key 
features of the ‘new paradigm for the sociology of childhood’.  The 
following three relate specifically to empirical research: 
•  Children’s social relationships and cultures are worthy 
of study in their own right, independent of the 
perspective and concerns of adults. 
•  Children are and must be seen as active in the 
construction and determination of their own social 
lives, the lives of those around them and of the societies 
in which they live.  Children are not just the passive 
subjects of social structures and processes. 
•  Ethnography is a particularly useful methodology for 
the study of childhood.  It allows children a more direct 
voice and participation in the production of sociological 
data than is usually possible through experimental or 
survey styles of research2 (Prout & James 1997: 8). 
 
The following section discusses the last two of these in more detail: 
the reconceptualisation of children as social actors and the use of 
ethnographic methods to get closer to children’s worlds. 
 
                                                 
2 In the preface of the 1997 second edition of this book James and Prout acknowledged that 
ethnography was only one of the many possible ways that children could be included in research 
(James & Prout 1997: xv).  
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Children as social actors 
It is now much more common to find acknowledgement that 
childhood should be regarded as a part of society and culture 
than a precursor to it; and that children should be seen as 
already social actors not beings in the process of becoming 
such (James & Prout 1997: ix). 
 
In their discussion on approaches to childhood research, James, 
Jenks and Prout (1998) argue that the conceptualisation of ‘the child’ 
is framed by two questions: how childhood is constituted in society 
and how the child is to be understood.  Within each approach a 
customary sociological choice needs to be made: does one emphasise 
childhood as structure or children as agents.   Each of these, they 
argue, “makes some commentary on children’s abilities as social 
actors and their status as social subjects” (James et al 1998: 172).   
In response to the developmental, teleological model which positions 
children as incompetent, the sociology of childhood has favoured the 
view of children as social actors in their own right.  For example, 
Hutchby and Moran-Ellis claim that children should be seen as: 
“Social agents in their own right, rather than as apprentice versions of 
adults” (Hutchby & Moran-Ellis 1998: 1).    Here social competence is 
seen as: “something that children work at possessing in their own 
right, the display of which is an active, agentic achievement” (Hutchby 
& Moran-Ellis 1998: 14), a view that challenges the developmental 
conception of the ‘lacking’ child.  Thus, social competence is not a  
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possession, something that can be progressively accomplished 
through the developmental stages and finally achieved at adulthood, 
but rather is “something that is established in situ, for this particular 
here-and-now occasion” (Hutchby & Moran-Ellis 1998: 14-16).   
According to this way of looking at things, the focus should be on how 
children negotiate their relationships, rules and roles in different 
social contexts.  Introducing children as competent social actors does 
not, however, ignore the structure of their lives for, as James and 
Prout remind us, “childhood is a social institution that exists beyond 
the activity of any particular child or adult” (James & Prout 1997: 21).  
In its turn, valuing children as children rather than for the adults that 
they will become,  prioritises their “present, lived and collective 
experiences” (Hutchby & Moran-Ellis 1998: 14). 
 
This approach provides a more comprehensive understanding of the 
lived experiences of children than those previously discussed and has 
a number of ramifications.  As Smart et al (2001) argue, seeing 
children as social actors has revealed them as different types of actors 
from those traditionally associated with the ‘childhood’ role: as 
soldiers, workers, carers, consumers and so on (Smart et all 2001: 
12).  Further, rather than concentrating on what children cannot do, 
the focus becomes on what they can and are doing (Smart et al 2001: 
13; Mayall 1994: 10).  Under this approach, children’s views are  
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solicited by researchers where they would have traditionally been 
explored through their adult caregivers (James & Prout: 1997: 2).  For 
example, until relatively recently children’s experiences of living with 
domestic violence were not solicited – their experiences were treated 
as an ‘add on’ to those of their mother and she was the one who was 
asked how the experience had affected her children.  Research that 
has now been undertaken with children themselves reveals that 
mothers often underestimated their children’s knowledge of the 
conflict and its effects on them (e.g. Blanchard et al 1992; Mullender 
et al 2000; Peled 1998). 
 
Ethnography and the sociology of childhood 
Within the subdiscipline of the sociology of childhood, and also within 
other disciplines such as educational research, ethnographic 
methodologies have become more commonplace in the researching of 
children. Exactly what ethnography is, however, is unclear.  In their 
book  Ethnography: Principles in Practice (1995) Hammersley and 
Atkinson find that there is much diversity in both the definition and 
practise of ethnography.  They also suggest that because much of the 
interest in ethnography has come from a dissatisfaction with positivist 
methods with its proponents agreeing more on what they are resisting 
than what they are embracing (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995: 1).  
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Lutz stresses the difference between ethnography and ethnographic 
methods, arguing that true ethnography involves participant 
observation of a culture or society “through a complete cycle of events 
that regularly occur as that society interacts with its environment” 
(Lutz 1981: 52).  While there is room for disagreement as to what this 
might involve in practical terms, there is consensus that ethnographic 
r e s e a rc h  n e e d s  t o  b e  d o n e  i n a  ‘ n a t ural’ setting.  This ‘naturalism’ 
discourages the use of artificial settings and techniques such as 
laboratory tests or formal interviews and sees the primary source of 
data as the naturally occurring events that the researcher can observe 
(Hammersley & Atkinson 1995: 6).  But more than this is involved.  
Over and above the choice of location, Matza (1964) argues that it 
involves “a philosophical view that remains true to the nature of the 
phenomenon under study” (Matza 1964: 5).  This points to the origins 
of ethnography in anthropology where the task of the researcher is to 
describe different cultures rather than impose a western 
interpretation or imposed explanations: 
The task becomes cultural description, anything more is 
rejected as imposing the researcher’s own arbitrary and 
simplistic categories on a complex reality.  The centrality of 
meaning also has the consequence that people’s behaviour can 
only be understood in context (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995: 
9). 
 
Ethnography – or indeed any research method which makes claims to 
naturalism – is thus an inductive method.  In other words, the  
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researcher needs to believe that the data will come from the 
observations in the field and avoid any a priori propositions or 
assumptions about the phenomenon under study (May 1993: 112). 
 
The movement away from positivistic methods of researching children 
has not been limited to the sociology of childhood.  Ethnography has 
been used broadly in educational research over the past twenty years 
(Anderson 1989: 250) and Woodhead and Faulkner note that 
qualitative research methods are now appearing more frequently in 
psychology textbooks (Woodhead & Faulkner 2000: 30).  
 
This shift in academia has happened within a wider context of a 
revaluation of the status and role of children internationally with the 
ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) 1989 (Woodhead & Faulkner 2000: 10).   The remainder 
of this chapter will look briefly at the development of the CRC and the 
associated shifts at a policy and practice level. 
 
Giving children a ‘voice’ in policy 
The CROC was developed by the United Nations in 1989 to recognise 
that children’s rights “require special protection” and to ban 
“discrimination against children and [provide] for special protection 
and rights appropriate to minors” (CROC 1989).  By April 2005, 192  
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countries had ratified the convention; the United States and Somalia 
are the only countries not to have done so.  Australia ratified the 
convention in 1996. 
 
In general terms, the 54 articles of the Convention: reinforce 
fundamental human dignity; highlight and defend the family's role in 
children's lives; seek respect for children – but not at the expense of 
the human rights or responsibilities of others; and endorse the 
principle of non-discrimination (UNICEF 2005). 
 
As Sinclair Taylor (2000) notes, the CROC was a landmark legislation 
that, through delineating rights for children, expressed “vision and 
hope in terms of both their protection and participation  in society” 
(Sinclair Taylor 2000: 24).  This participation is addressed in Article 
12 of the convention which states that: 
 1. State Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of 
forming his or her own views the right to express those 
views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of 
the child being given due weight in accordance with the age 
and maturity of the child.  
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided 
the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and 
administrative proceedings affecting the child, either 
directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, 
in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national 
law.  
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The period since the enactment of the convention has seen the 
establishment of Children’s Commissioners in many of the signatory 
countries of the Convention and organisations have been established 
to provide advice to, and lobby on behalf of, children (Sinclair Taylor 
2000: 24). 
 
Within this context local authorities and voluntary organisations are 
seeking to find ways of consulting children and young people (Roberts 
2000: 225; Stafford et al 2003).  In Australia, all of the state 
governments have produced information on consulting children and 
young people and many have established programs designed to 
encourage the participation of children and young people on boards 
and committees3.  For example, the West Australian government’s 
Office for Children and Young People situates the consultation of 
children under a wider policy and practice framework of this 
government which seeks increased consultation with all citizens, 
including children.  Accordingly they have developed several 
publications such as Conversations with Children (2004) and Telling 
the Emperor (2002).  These types of publications provide advice for 
adults wishing to consult children and young people and for young 
people who wish to become involved in decision-making processes. 
 
                                                 
3 Listed on the Victorian Government website ourcommunity.com.au January 2005 .  
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While such moves would appear promising in terms of the 
participation of children and young people in research and 
consultative processes, as Roberts (2000) notes, there is a danger that 
children can become “a tool in the adult armoury, with no opportunity 
for genuine participation” (Roberts 2000: 225).  Research conducted 
by Stafford et al would indicate that Robert’s concerns are valid.   
Stafford et al (2003) spoke with 200 Scottish children and young 
people between the ages of three and 18 on what they thought about 
consultation.  Their research showed that the children and young 
people they spoke to were often disappointed and disillusioned with 
the consultation process.  Some believed that it often tended to be 
tokenistic and that not much was achieved, stating: “There’s a lot of 
listening, but not much action” (Stafford et al 2003: 372).   It was 
stressed by the authors that: 
Care is needed to ensure genuinely open communication 
rather than seeking confirmation of what adults think or 
want.  This means allowing children to talk about what 
matters to them and dismissing as trivial, children’s priority 
concerns (Stafford et al 2003: 372). 
 
This is an important point which not only has relevance for the 
consultation of children but is also an important issue in regard to 
research with children and will be returned to later in the thesis. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how the dominant conception of the child 
has shaped research over the past century.  Driven by a desire to 
‘know’ the child, research has been dominated by positivist 
methodologies which enable the child to be measured, codified and 
translated into statistics.   Such statistics can then used to make 
causal predictions about the future adult, linking the conditions of 
childhood with future psychoses and problems.  Interventions can 
then be implemented during childhood to obstruct these problematic 
pathways. 
 
Within such research the child is positioned as the object of the 
research.  Research is done on rather than with  children and their 
perspectives are seldom sought.  The sociology of childhood has taken 
issue with the domination of this type of research, arguing that 
children should be seen as social actors in their own right – as the 
subjects of research, not objects.  This challenge to the traditional 
positivist forms of research has seen the move towards research that 
seeks children’s perspectives, often by adopting qualitative methods 
which seek to observe or speak to children in natural settings.  The 
academic push towards seeking the perspective of children has been 
paralleled by a similar push at a broader community level to consult 
children and involve them in decision making processes.  
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Chapter Three: Researching Children And 
‘Difference’ 
 
In this chapter I examine research on children in one particular area, 
namely the early development of racism and prejudice.  While my 
initial research topic was concerned with children and ‘difference’, I 
soon found that while issues of identity and difference are subjects of 
philosophical concern, ‘difference’ in itself is not the subject of 
empirical research.  Rather, researchers are interested in the 
development and manifestation of prejudicial attitudes and/or 
treatment of others on the grounds of particular types of difference 
such as gender, disability and race/ethnicity.  As questions of 
race/ethnicity tend to dominate the literature on prejudice and 
difference, it was this issue that informed much of my early reading. 
 
In discussing this material, this chapter serves two purposes.  Firstly, 
it provides an illustration of the central points made in the previous 
two chapters.  These relate to the desire to ‘fix’ social problems by 
understanding their development in children; the influence of notions 
relating to the universal, ‘developmental’ child and its associated 
positivist research techniques; and the critiques of this type of 
research and the alternatives to it.  Second, this chapter provides a 
background to the empirical research that will be discussed in Part II 
of the thesis.  It is important to note, however, that my own empirical  
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study did not seek to build on the theoretical frameworks of previous 
work on children and prejudice.  Thus, my focus on research and 
children in this chapter is on the methodologies used rather than the 
theories developed. 
 
Fixing the social problem of racism and prejudice – from the 
bottom up 
 
American children can be saved from the corrosive effects of 
racial prejudice.  These prejudices are not inevitable; they 
reflect the types of experiences that children are forced to 
have.  Such prejudices can be prevented – and those already 
existing can be changed – by altering the social conditions 
under which children learn about and live with others.  When 
human intelligence and creativity tackle the problem and 
bring about the necessary changes in the society, then these 
prejudices and their detrimental effects will be eliminated 
(Clarke 1963: 130) 
 
As discussed in the previous two chapters, the period at the end of 
the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th saw an upsurge of 
interest in research on children in an attempt to understand – and 
hopefully solve – the roots of social problems.  Various appropriations 
of Darwinism had provided a framework which suggested that 
humans were ‘improvable’ and the secret to this was often seen to lie 
in the way that children were reared and educated. 
 
During the last century one of the social problems that captured the 
attention of social scientists, in particular social psychologists, was  
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the issue of racism and prejudice.  The quest to understand the roots 
of this problem generated an enormous body of research which has 
informed the development of policy and practice.  In the following 
discussion I look briefly at how, within the academic community, the 
judging of others by virtue of their race went from being seen as 
natural and/or justified to being positioned as a social problem 
urgently requiring a solution and, further, how children came to be 
the focus of much of the resultant research.  The discussion draws 
heavily on the work of Milner (1975) and Samelson (1978). 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century the mistreatment of 
colonised peoples was often justified in terms of the natural, more 
civilised superiority of the white colonisers.  For example, Milner 
points out that the ‘justification’ of slavery was offered in terms of the 
inferiority and savagery of the slaves.  This perception was enshrined 
in law in the code of South Carolina in which ‘negroes’ were described 
as being “of barbarous, wild, savage natures” (Milner 1975: 14).   
Evolutionary theory and notions of the ‘survival of the fittest’ provided 
scientific justification for the claim to superiority (Milner 1975: 19).  
Further, this way of looking at humankind enabled the classification 
of humans into a typology of ‘races’.  People of different races were 
then deemed to have particular characteristics – not just physiological 
but also moral and intellectual (Dummett & Nicol 1990: 95).  
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In tracing what they describe as pyschology’s ‘profoundly racist past’, 
Hopkins, Reicher and Levine (1997) describe how, during the latter 
stages of the 19th century and in the early decades of the 20th, the 
view of the superiority of whites over blacks was supported by 
psychologists.  Samelson describes how, in 1895 the Psychological 
Review reported empirical evidence of this superiority.  A study of 12 
whites and 11 ‘Africans’ showed that the whites had slower reaction 
times than the blacks, a result that was interpreted to mean that 
“quickness of automatic, reflexive action was obviously a mark of 
primitiveness and inferiority, inversely related to intelligence 
(Samelson 1978: 265).  By 1910 a new psychological tool, the 
intelligence test provided further ‘proof’ of white supremacy.  While 
the intelligence test was originally designed to determine differences 
between individuals, some researchers used it to ascertain differences 
between races and as Samelson states “ … found differences – or, if 
they did not, insisted that further research would” (Samelson 1978: 
266). 
 
By the 1920s the race data was beginning to be challenged from 
outside the profession (Samelson 1978: 266) and, to a limited extent, 
within it.   Research conducted by Floyd Allport (one of the founders 
of the discipline of social psychology) in 1924 remained firmly rooted  
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to the premise of black inferiority, noting that research had rated the 
intelligence of black people at between two-thirds and three-fourths of 
whites.  Allport was one of the first social psychologists to contend 
that white people’s treatment of blacks might not be justified (Milner 
1975: 21).  According to Milner, Allport’s work was also influential in 
the discipline’s shift away from seeing black’s attributed inferiority as 
purely innate towards acknowledging the influence of social causes 
and therefore susceptible to change: 
If ‘the Negro’ was more a product of his environment than 
his race, and his environment was a product of the white 
man, then it was quite clear where the responsibility for the 
Negro’s degraded positon lay.  Not only was the white man 
vulnerable to this moral censure, but, in the context of the 
idea of potential equality, his prejudice  against the Negro 
could now be seen as totally unfair (Milner 1975: 22). 
 
Thus, with the scientific basis for prejudice partially undermined and 
discredited, prejudicial attitudes came to be seen as unjust and 
irrational from the mid 1920s on.   Within a relatively short period of 
time social psychology had shifted from ‘explaining’ racial differences 
to seeking to understand attitudes about them (Hopkins et al 1997: 
306).  As Samelson notes, the discipline had moved from seeking to 
identify the objective  mental differences between races to the 
subjective issue of attitudes of racial groups to each other (Samelson 
1978: 268).  The social problem of prejudice would become a 
cornerstone of the fledgling discipline of social psychology with  
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attention now focussed on the description and explanation of the 
problem in an attempt to contribute to a solution (Samelson 1978: 
268).   
 
A pioneer in the empirical work on racial attitudes in the 1920s was 
Bogardus (1928) who conducted research into immigration and race 
attitudes (Milner 1975).   Milner summarises this work, highlighting 
Bogardus’ argument that racial prejudices originate in personal 
experiences, either ‘direct’ (physical repulsion due to things such as 
appearance, habits or living environment) or ‘indirect’ (second-hand 
experiences and attitudes from sources such as friends, family or the 
media).  The theories put forward by Bogardus provided a firm link 
between the prejudicial attitudes of adults and their origins in 
childhood: 
Antipathy against the Negro is due to differences in 
biological appearances and forms, variations in cultural 
levels, and to widespread propaganda … [it] often begins 
with prejudice caught by children from their parents 
(Bogardus 1928 cited in Milner 1975: 25). 
 
This line of reasoning was taken up by Lasker in his study Race 
Attitudes in Children (1929).  Lasker’s study involved the collection of 
adult opinions on these issues, leading him to identify the central 
socialising role of parents in transmitting prejudical attitudes and the 
role of institutions such as the school or church in perpetuating them  
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(Milner 1975: 26).  The first research that actually targeted children 
on this issue was a doctoral thesis by Eugene Horowitz in 1936 which 
was followed up in a subsequent study by Horowitz and Horowitz in 
1938.  However, arguably the most influential early work in this field 
(due both to the methodology it employed and also to its influence on 
policies) was conducted by Clark and Clark in 1947 (Nesdale 2001: 
58). 
 
The Clark and Clark study, which will be discussed in more detail 
later, provided the basis for a submission to the United States 
Supreme Court in the case of Brown v Board of Education of Topeka 
1954  which ruled that segregation in public education was 
unconstitutional (Schuman et al 1985: 19).  Both this submission and 
Clark’s report outlined the potential damage that segregation, 
discrimination and prejudice could have on the personality of all 
children, not just minority group children.  Aggression and hostility, a 
lowering of personal ambitions and anxiety were among the damaging 
effects that Clark and Clark’s study had identified (Clark 1955).  In 
Clark’s view, social science could not only provide an understanding 
of prejudice, it could also provide advice on how to solve the problem: 
Social scientists must continue to offer their skills, 
knowledge, insight and techniques to a society in desperate 
need of an effective approach to the solution of many and 
complex social problems.  Pure, applied and action research 
findings must be made available to those forces in our  
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society which are working towards the goals consistent with 
scientific facts and the values of human dignity and justice 
(Clark 1964: 234). 
 
The link between childhood and the development of prejudicial 
attitudes continued to be cemented by research that directly involved 
children and also research whose primary focus was adults.  For 
example, in Adorno’s (1950) studies of the ‘Authoritarian Personality’, 
attempts were made to find the origins of prejudicial attitudes in 
children through investigating parents’ attitudes and practices 
concerning child rearing.  Authoritarian methods of childrearing were 
seen to produce a personality type predisposed to prejudical attitudes 
alongside other traits (Milner 1975: 29).  Milner suggests, however, 
that during the 1950s there was a shift away from locating prejudice 
within the individual towards viewing it as a widespread social 
problem.  In 1975 Milner himself saw the problem as the “almost 
inevitable result of the socialisation of the child within an 
environment in which prejudicial attitudes are commonly held” 
(Milner 1975: 31). 
 
Since the first studies in the 1930s, a large volume of research has 
been directed to the issue of the development of ethnic and racial 
prejudice in children4 with Nesdale identifying more than 30 studies 
based on one technique alone (Nesdale 2001: 58).  The following 
                                                 
4 See reviews by Aboud 1988; Brown 1995; Davie 1983; Nesdale 2001)  
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section provides an illustration of the types of methods that have been 
employed in this respect. 
 
The ‘Knowable’ Prejudiced Child 
The idea of measurement of attitudes, of locating a person’s 
sympathies and antipathies on a numerical scale of intensity, 
brought an atmosphere of objectivity to a very personal and 
subjective issue (Milner 1975: 26). 
 
In his review of research studies in this area, Nesdale (2001) identifies 
two techniques that have dominated the field: the ethnic preference 
technique and the trait attribution technique (Nesdale 2001: 58-62). 
 
Ethnic Preference Technique 
The methods used in the Horowitz (1936) and Clark and Clark (1947) 
studies have shaped generations of similar research studies on 
children and prejudice.  Believing that young children did not have 
the cognitive ability to deal with the questionnaires and attitude 
scales used on adults, these researchers chose to use concrete 
examples to represent race, for example dolls or pictures (Milner 
1996; Nesdale 2001).   In the Clark and Clark study children aged 
between three and seven were presented with four dolls – two brown 
and two white.  In order to determine racial awareness or ‘racial 
identification’ the children were asked to choose between the dolls in 
response to the following requests:  
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1.  “Give me the white doll” 
2.  “Give me the colored doll” 
3.  “Give me the Negro doll” (Clark 1955: 19) 
 
The same children were then asked a series of questions which 
sought to determine their ethnic preferences: 
1. “Give me the doll that you like to play with” or “the doll 
you like the best. 
2.  “Give me the doll that is the nice doll”. 
3.  “Give me the doll that looks bad”. 
4.  “Give me the doll that is a nice color” (Clark 1955: 23). 
     
This measuring of ethnic awareness and/or preference using dolls,   
photos or pictures has remained so popular that Nesdale identifies 
over 70 studies that have utilised some variation of it.  
 
Trait Attribution 
Again, Nesdale (2001) traces the origins of this technique back to the 
early work of Horowitz and Horowitz (1938).  In this technique 
children are asked to assign positive or negative traits to one or two 
dolls or photos representing ethnic groups.  For example a child is 
shown a photo of a black boy and a white boy and asked “which child 
is the dirty boy” or “which is the smart boy?”  (Nesdale 2001: 60).  
Aboud argues that while this forced-choice question format shocked 
people into “realizing that even very young children could experience 
prejudice toward other groups as well as aversion toward their own”,  
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it also had limitations in that the children could not express degrees 
of negativity (Aboud 1988: 9).  ‘Multiple-item’ tests such as the 
‘Preschool Racial Attitude Measure’ (PRAM) developed during the 
1970s were seen to address the limitations of the previous methods.   
Aboud explains the rationale and method behind these multiple-
measure tests: 
The PRAM presents the child with 24 racial and 12 filler 
gender items.  Each item describes a positive or negative 
quality.  One item reads: ‘Here are two girls.  One of them is 
an ugly girl.  People do not like her.  Which is the ugly girl?’  
Another item is: “Here are two boys.  One of them is a kind 
boy.  Once he saw a kitten fall into a lake and he picked up 
the kitten to save it from drowning.  Which is the kind boy?’  
The child is shown a picture of a Black and a White person 
and must decide which one fits the description.  The 
intensity of a child’s positive or negative attitude is 
determined by summing the number of pro-White and anti-
Black choices made, or the reverse.  Unfortunately because 
each response is a forced choice, rejection of one group is 
confounded with acceptance of the other (Aboud 1988: 9). 
 
Interviews 
While in-depth interviews with children have been used in exploring 
racial prejudice, Nesdale reports that they tended to fall out of favour 
after the 1960s (Nesdale 2001: 62).  He attributes this to their ‘well-
documented’ disadvantages, namely: the fact that they are time 
consuming and therefore do not lend themselves to large samples 
(and the associated issue of generalisability); the fact that interviewers 
had to deal with children’s developing cognitive and linguistic 
abilities; the possibility of social desirability responses by the children  
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due the presence of the interviewer; as well as practical issues such 
as the difficulty in coding (Nesdale 2001: 62).  A further discussion of 
interviews and other more qualitative methods will be returned to 
later in this section. 
 
Theoretical influences 
Nesdale (2001) identifies four major theoretical frames which have 
been used to account for the development of racial and ethnic 
prejudice in children (Nesdale 2001: 64).  While their details are not 
particularly relevant here, one of them - Aboud’s (1988) sociocognitive 
theory  is useful in that it illustrates the prevalence of the 
developmental model discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
This theory posits that a child’s attitude towards other groups 
depends upon the child’s developmental level at two over-lapping 
sequences: the process and the focus of attention.  Thus, with the 
process: 
The child is initially dominated by affective-perceptual 
processes associated with fear of the unknown and 
attachment to the familiar.  Perceptual processes 
subsequently dominate, preference for the (similar) ingroup 
and rejection of the (different) outgroup being determined 
primarily by physical attributes.  Thereafter, cognitive 
processes take ascendancy with the advent of the concrete 
operational stage of cognitive development around 7 years of 
age and, later, formal operational thinking (Nesdale 2001: 
79). 
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The second sequence – the focus of attention – relates to the child’s 
focus of attention from self to group to individual (Aboud 1988: 125; 
Nesdale 2001: 79).   Aboud argues that, based on these sociocognitive 
developments, prejudice peaks at around seven years of age (Aboud 
1988: 128). 
 
The greater part of research exploring the development of prejudicial 
attitudes in children has been undertaken in North America, Canada 
or Europe (Targowska 2001).  The generalisability of these studies to 
an Australian context, Targowska argues, is therefore difficult to 
assess (Targowska 2001: 4).  While Targowska may query the 
reliability of importing the results of overseas studies, the methods 
these studies employed have certainly been transported.  Thus, the 
limited number of Australian studies (for example Palmer 1990; 
Black-Gutman & Hickson 1996; Targowska 2001; and Pedersen & 
Walker 2000) all employ variations of the techniques described earlier, 
altering the questions to take account of the cultural context.  Thus, 
Pedersen and Walker (2000) used the PRAM II instrument in their 
study of ‘ingroup preference of Aboriginal and Anglo children’.  Care 
was taken that this study was appropriate for Aboriginal children 
including factors such as sport, parental relations, sense of 
achievement and relatives.  The children were shown twenty ‘stimulus 
figures’ – ten Aboriginal and ten Anglo figures and asked questions  
  91 
such as “One of these men is really good at sport.  He plays for a team 
on the weekend that usually wins.  Which is the man who is really 
good at sport?” (Pedersen & Walker 2000: 187). 
 
Such research would appear to reflect a practice which Burman 
( 1 9 9 4 )  a r g u e s  i s  i n h e r e n t  i n  m u c h  r e s e a r c h  o n  c h i l d r e n  w h e r e  t h e  
‘social’ or cultural aspects are treated as if they were a ‘layer or 
coating’ over the biological models on which they rest (Burman 1994: 
46).  While not explicitly stated, the importation of research 
techniques seems to infer that the phenomenon under study 
(children) are homogenous while the culture they grow up in is not.  
To be reliable techniques such as the PRAM therefore only need to be 
‘tweaked’ to reflect the local culture.  This lack of recognition of the 
social context of the study of racism is returned to later in the 
chapter. 
 
Critiques 
While positivist research methods have dominated the study of 
children and prejudice since those first early studies, they have not 
been without their critics (Connolly 2001: 219).  This section explores 
the main critiques and some of the research that has been conducted 
which illustrates some of the problems. 
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In a comprehensive review of the critiques of the ethnic preference 
and trait attribution techniques, Nesdale (2001) identifies the main 
problems that have been identified.  The first of these is that the 
ethnic preference technique forces children to make a choice between 
a limited number of options.  Research conducted by Katz (1976) and 
Brand et al (1974) indicated that the rejection of a stimulus figure (a 
doll or photo) may demonstrate an ingroup preference bias rather 
than prejudice against members of ethnic outgroups (Nesdale 2001: 
61).  Furthermore, by leaving skin colour as the only differentiating 
cue, it is argued that these techniques unrealistically enhance the 
salience of this category (Nesdale 2001).  Troyner expresses this 
concern more strongly: 
Quite apart from the dubious ethical and political premises 
of this strategy it seems almost inevitable that ‘racial’ and 
‘ethnic’ characteristics will be used by children in their 
responses; after all, it’s the only resource available to them! 
(Troyner 1991: 431). 
 
Nesdale points out that this is especially problematic in view of a body 
of research (e.g. Boulton 1995; Goldstein et al 1979) that indicates 
that, in the absence of intergroup tension or conflict, race is not a 
salient category until children reach the age of 9 or 10.  Before this 
age, determinants such as gender, physical disability or even 
cleanliness have been shown to be more important (Nesdale 2001: 
61). 
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An incident recorded during research conducted by Van Ausdale and 
Feagin (2001) on young children and racism illustrates the force of 
these concerns about focusing on skin colour as the primary indicator 
for preschool children.  In this incident a group of children were 
involved in a teacher-led activity in which the children were required 
to choose, from a selection of photos of children of different ethnic 
groups, the child that looked most like them.  During the exercise the 
following incident occurs: 
One boy, Joey (3, Asian), selects a photo of a dark skinned girl 
wearing a red robe and announces “Here’s me!” at the top of his 
lungs.  The teacher looks over to him and smiles, remarking, “No 
honey, that’s a little Black girl.  Which people look like you?”  Joey 
stares at her for a moment or two then returns to his perusal of 
the photos.  He offers no challenge to the teacher’s decision, nor 
does he provide an explanation for his choice (Van Ausdale, Feagin 
2001: 52). 
 
Only one of the four children doing the activity got their selection 
“correct”, causing the teacher to remark to the researcher “Well, they 
sure don’t know much about that do they?  I mean, they really can’t 
pick out what group they belong to.  They’re way too little” (Van 
Ausdale & Feagin 2001: 53). 
After the group had gone on to something else, the 
researcher was able to get a closer look at the photos and in 
particular the photo that Joey had first selected and was 
able to understand the logic behind his decision.  In the 
photo the dark skinned girl was wearing a deep red robe 
and Joey was wearing a bright red jumper – he had been 
using a different criteria for “same as” than the teacher who 
assigned the task (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001: 54). 
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In an ethnographic study conducted during the 1990s, Chin (1999) 
demonstrates a similar point in relation to older children. This study 
looked at the marketing of ‘ethnically correct’ Barbie type dolls that 
featured different skin colour and slightly different facial features 
than the standard Barbie.  When talking with young black girls from a 
low socio-economic black neighbourhood, Chin discovered that the 
colour of a doll’s plastic did not touch on the issues that were 
important to these girls.  Take, for example, the response from this 
ten year old girl: 
ASIA: OK.  What I was saying that Barbie … how can I say 
this?  They make her like a stereotype.  Barbie is a 
stereotype.  When you think of Barbie you don’t think of fat 
Barbie … you don’t think of pregnant Barbie.  You never, 
ever think of abused Barbie (Chin 1999: 306). 
 
Chin went on to comment: 
These toys were designed and marketed specifically to 
reshape a territory dominated by an assumption of 
whiteness, but paradoxically, they have integrated the toy 
world while at the same time fixing racial boundaries more 
firmly.  These boundaries are based upon racialized 
markers: hair type, facial features, and skin color; 
toymakers like Mattel assiduously avoid delving into the 
social issues that Natalia and Asia identified as being 
central to their perspective.  Ethnically correct dolls do not 
address Natalia’s and Asia’s questions about abused, 
pregnant, fat or dope Barbies any more than their white 
counterparts did (Chin 1999: 306). 
 
For the older girls like Asia, the problems of the focus on skin colour 
were different from those illustrated in the incident with Joey.  While  
  95 
Asia was clearly aware at ten years that race was an important issue 
in the United States, in her day to day life the issues were different, 
and arguably deeper, than an issue of colour. 
 
Another important critique relates to the correspondence (or lack 
thereof) between the findings of such research and the choices 
children actually make in regard to playmates (e.g. Boulton & Smith 
1993; Fishbein and Imai 1993).  Troyna argues that, in light of the 
tenuous relationship between the attitudes expressed by children in 
artificial conditions and actual behaviour, the belief in the predictive 
powers of these studies has been misplaced (Troyna 1991: 431).   
Troyna (1991) also argues that these methods are problematic in that 
they focus primarily on how people look, ignoring other important 
forms of categorisation such as what people do.   Further, they infer 
that children will make friends based primarily on group categories: 
In interpreting the rationale underpinning the structure of 
friendship groups in multi-ethnic settings sociometrists 
constantly place ‘race’ or ethnicity in the driving seat.  Their 
results are presented and analysed primarily in relation to 
these variables.  In so doing, interpersonal behaviour is 
explained in terms of group characteristics.  Put another 
way, the children’s motivation for selecting friends is seen in 
relation to group categories not personal attributes.  This 
seems a dubious, if not entirely invalid interpretation 
(Troyna 1991: 433) 
 
Connolly (2001) notes that many critics in the 1980s (e.g. Billig 1985; 
Reicher 1986) pressed home the point that quantitative studies did  
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not take account of the social context in the influence of racial 
attitudes (Connolly 2001: 219).   Such critics argue that one of the 
consequences of ignoring the social context has been the reification of 
‘race’.  Thus, rather than exploring how children construct and make 
sense of racial categories in their day to day lives, the research takes 
the categories for granted (Connolly 2001: 220). 
 
In response to this issue, a small number of researchers (e.g. Chin 
1999; Connolly 1998; 2000; 2001; Denscombe et al 1986; Troyna 
1991; 1992; Van Ausdale and Feagin 2001) have argued for, and 
adopted, more qualitative methods such as ethnography and/or 
unstructured interviews to study children and racial attitudes in 
natural settings.   Much of this research is conducted in schools; 
however, the following section examines two studies that used 
ethnographic methods to study racial attitudes specifically with 
preschool children. It is the methods that these studies used which 
was most relevant to my own study.   
 
The use of qualitative methods to study prejudice 
In their study of preschool children and racism, Van Ausdale and 
Feagin (2001) contend that many adults, including researchers, 
refuse to acknowledge that young children are capable of 
understanding racial terminology and using racial epithets.  When  
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faced with evidence to the contrary, such researchers, Van Ausdale 
and Feagin argue, take refuge in the assumption that children are 
simply mimicking adult behaviour.  They describe such attitudes as 
‘adultcentric’, meaning that “adults interpret children’s activities in 
comparison to adult conceptions of what children should  be doing, 
rather than what they are actually  doing” (Van Ausdale & Feagin 
2001: 4).  Therefore behaviour that does not fit within this adult 
preconceived framework is either rejected or ‘explained away’.  In the 
argument surrounding their study, Van Ausdale and Feagin also 
supported a number of the concerns examined in Chapter One – the 
problem of the child being seen as deficient and the importance of 
seeking to understand the child’s perspective. 
 
Van Ausdale and Feagin’s study employed an ethnographic approach 
which sought to understand the day to day lives of children directly 
(Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001: 11).  It was conducted in preschool 
settings within the United States where the researcher observed fifty-
eight preschool age children.  Van Ausdale, who conducted the 
observations for nearly a year, used an approach adapted from 
Mandell’s (1988) ‘least-adult’ role where an effort is made by the 
researcher to downplay the adult/researcher role and to maintain a 
“non-sanctioning playmate-adult” position.   By adopting such a 
position Van Ausdale believed that she would be able to develop trust  
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with the children and would also “ensure that her observations of 
their activities recorded the most natural behaviour possible” (Van 
Ausdale & Feagin 2001: 45). 
 
The study investigated issues such as the use of racial-ethnic 
distinctions to define self and others and in the formation of play 
groups, and how children learn about racial and ethnic issues.  One 
of its key findings was that children not only quickly learn the racial-
ethnic identities that surround them but that they experiment with 
them in interactions with other children and adults in a sophisticated 
manner (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001: 182). 
 
Robyn Holmes is another researcher who has challenged the typically 
‘contrived’ research designs that have dominated the study of racism 
in children.  Like Van Ausdale and Feagin, she employed an 
ethnographic method of participant observation, this time in 
conjunction with informal conversations and collection of the 
children’s artwork (Holmes 1995: 3).  Holmes’ research also focussed 
on American preschool children – she spent a day at each of the five 
kindergartens under study for an academic year.  Holmes chose to 
use the term ‘ethnic group’ rather than ‘race’ or ‘culture’, believing 
that these terms were problematic: 
Some researchers view race as a biological construct useful for 
defining and categorizing populations of a species on the basis  
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of differing gene frequencies.  Other researchers view race as an 
arbitrary social and cultural construct useful for categorizing 
and distinguishing one group from another on the basis of some 
criterion – for example, skin color, language or customary 
behaviour. 
 
Because of the arbitrary and imprecise nature of the existing 
biological and cultural definitions of race, I have abandoned 
this concept; it appears to have no utility.  Rather, I have 
elected to focus on the “ethnic” group (Holmes 1995: 4). 
 
However she also acknowledged that “these terms are constructs 
devised by scholars and researchers and were never once uttered by 
the children” (Holmes 1995: 5). 
 
As with the Van Ausdale and Feagin study, Holmes looked at 
conceptions of self and others and the role of ethnicity in friendships.  
She also explored how the children discussed the issue of procreation 
and race.  Her key findings, however, differed from Van Ausdale and 
Feagins in that she argued that the children she studied did not use 
race as a criterion for deciding who would be their friend (Holmes 
1995: 86). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a brief exploration of the methodologies 
that have been employed in the study of racism and/or prejudice 
since it came to be seen as a ‘social problem’ in the 1930s.  The body  
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of literature on this topic is considerable but my focus has not been 
on the theories that have been developed but on the way that the data 
has been collected.   Reading through this literature I often found the 
techniques such as the ethnic preference technique where children 
were forced to choose hypothetical ‘friends’ from photos of strangers 
problematic.   Alternative methods such as the ethnographic methods 
employed in the studies by Van Ausdale and Feagin and Holmes 
appealed to me in that they sought to understand children’s social 
worlds in their natural setting and conceptualised children as social 
actors in their own right.  While I would come to question some of the 
questions they asked and the findings they made, before beginning 
my empirical study their approach appeared most aligned with my 
own.  
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Introduction to Part II 
As will become evident throughout Part II, the empirical component of 
my study altered during the course of the PhD candidature in terms 
of the central focus of inquiry and its ultimate role in the final thesis.  
What did not alter was my deep-seated interest in the lives of the 
children who were the participants in my study and a desire to better 
understand what it was like to be a three or four year old child at day 
care.  Part II therefore serves two roles.  Firstly, it provides an 
exploration of my empirical research in terms of the methodological 
and conceptual issues, and questions that were raised as a result.  
These issues provide the basis for the arguments in Part III of the 
thesis.  Secondly, it stands alone to provide a glimpse into the world 
of children in an Australian day care centre.  Throughout my 
fieldwork I believed it was important that this aspect was not lost, and 
while it is secondary to my main argument, it still serves this 
important role.   
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Chapter Four:  Research, Researcher And Ethics 
 
Introduction 
This chapter falls into two main sections.  The first, entitled 
Methodology,  discusses those aspects of the study that were 
addressed before the actual empirical work began.  This includes the 
research question, the setting and the method chosen for the study.  
The second section, In the Field, explores the issues confronted while 
in the field, including those relating to method, my research role and 
ethical considerations. 
 
Methodology 
 
The Research Question 
My preliminary reading had been predominantly on children’s 
prejudice in terms of race and ethnicity, and to a lesser extent, 
disability.  However, I wished to avoid restricting my research to these 
concepts as it would narrow my focus.  Therefore, I formulated two 
primary research questions that sought to identify the children’s 
patterns of social interaction.  These were: 
•  What patterns of inclusion and exclusion exist in the 
playground? 
•  Who gets left out and is it evident why?  
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By recording the patterns of inclusion and exclusion I hoped to 
ascertain if the same categories that were important to adults shaped 
the way that the children interacted or if the choices the children 
made in terms of playmate were influenced by different factors. 
 
The Research Setting 
The day care centre selected was one those suggested by the City of 
Fremantle (one of the industry partners of the project).  I chose it 
because it seemed ‘average’ in terms of the children that attended, the 
staff and program.  There were other possible centres, which I could 
have attended, with a larger range of cultural and physical diversity in 
the attending children.  However, selecting such a centre (which also 
had staff that was more aware of such issues) would possibly have 
fore grounded particular patterns and practices of ‘inclusion’ from the 
outset. 
 
Fremantle is a port city that is part of the Perth metropolitan area.  
According to the last census (2001), the local government area has a 
population of 25,199 (ABS 2001).  The area has a large population of 
migrants from Europe (Italians and Portuguese, for example), with 
30% of the population being born overseas (ABS 2001).  However, the 
children attending the centre in which I conducted my research were 
mostly born in Australia of second or third generation Australian  
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parents.  The Indigenous population in Fremantle is very low (0.1% 
compared with the average for Western Australia of 3.2%), with a total 
population recorded in 2001 of only 321 people.  There were no 
Indigenous children at the centre. 
 
At the Centre, the children were allocated rooms based on age group.  
I decided to spend approximately six months observing the class of 
older (3 and 4 year old) children in the ‘Koalas’ room.  For each age 
group, the staff to child ratio differed in line with the Australian 
accreditation standard; in Koala room it was 10:1 with an upper limit 
of twenty children.  I observed the children for approximately two 
hours a day several days a week during the period; between 9 – 11am 
when they had ‘free’ play outside (a more comprehensive discussion of 
the routine and activities of this period is included in the following 
chapter). 
 
In the mornings the children would have morning tea at 9am, don 
hats and sunscreen and, weather permitting, play outside.  During 
this period the carers would take turns for a tea break and then one 
staff member would set up inside for the children’s after lunch nap.  
This meant that for the majority of the outdoor play period 
supervision was minimal, often only one carer would be watching the 
twenty children.  While at times structured activities would be  
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organised for the children – for example, painting – most days 
equipment was provided and the children were free to play as they 
liked.  This allowed me to observe the children in unstructured time. 
 
The Method 
In many ways, my methodology was shaped by Van Ausdale and 
Feagin’s (2001) ethnographic research.  Like them, I believed that an 
ethnographic methodology was the best way to actually see the 
children as social actors in their own setting.  I also wished to keep 
the children at the centre of the study and to avoid a priori 
propositions and assumptions about the children I would be studying. 
 
The ‘least-adult’ method adopted by Van Ausdale and Feagin (a 
method that was developed by Nancy Mandell (1988) in the early 
1970s) also appeared to suit my general methodology.  In the role of 
‘least adult’ the researcher positions themselves simply as a playmate 
and does not engage in those activities that are usually aligned with 
being an adult – intervening in fights, telling children to be careful 
and so on.  Mandell draws on Mead’s (1938) ‘philosophy of action’ to 
defend her position that adult-child differences can be abolished 
within the research setting.  In terms of research with children these 
methodological principles involve:  
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Minimising the social distance between adult and child by 
avoiding assumptions of adult superiority. 
Viewing children as social actors, and treating them 
seriously. 
Developing mutual understanding between the researcher 
and the children through joint action.  (Mandell 1988: 436) 
 
In retrospect, these methodological principles informed my research 
in an abstract and rather general manner.  Nevertheless, by 
employing them I hoped to view the children interacting with each 
other in an uncensored manner.  I also drew on other research 
techniques such as Corsaro’s ‘reactive strategy’ (Corsaro 1985) 
whereby the researcher does not initiate contact but simply reacts 
when a child makes contact.   In his study of peer relationships 
among young children, Corsaro made himself available in ‘peer 
dominant’ areas and waited for children to interact with him.  Unless 
a child addressed him directly he remained silent (Corsaro 1985: 28). 
 
I knew that writers such as Fine and Sandstrom (1988) and James, 
Jenks and Prout (1998) expressed doubts about the ‘least-adult’ role, 
but believed that, in principle, the role of non-authoritative friend was 
possible to some extent.  Mandell (1988) and Van Ausdale (2001) had, 
by all accounts, achieved such a status and I thought that I could as 
well.  This was not to say that I believed it would be easy.  Mandell 
had reported that she needed to actually teach the children her ‘least  
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adult’ role: if a child asked her to help tie shoes, for example, she 
would refuse, telling the child that she was not a teacher and that 
they should ask a teacher for help (Mandell 1988: 442).  She records 
that at the beginning the children protested and posits that this is an 
issue that reflects how adults relate to children in general, rather 
than an issue that is specific to the research situation: 
The main reason children have difficulty in accepting an 
adult as nondirective stems from their lack of experience of 
adults as participatory, enjoyable and non-judgemental 
(Mandell 1988: 442). 
 
She goes on to say that until she could demonstrate what she could 
offer the children (an ever available playmate) “in exchange for being 
accepted into peer exchanges” (Mandell 1988: 442), the children 
treated her as simply another uninterested adult.  However, by 
playing on the swings or sitting on the climbers, Mandell displayed 
that she was not like other adults.  Once she had done that, as she 
notes the ‘children’s initial responses to being taken as serious and 
worthy playmates were ones of joy and incredulity’ (Mandell 1998: 
443). 
 
Mandell found that both the children and the teachers tested her 
commitment to her least adult role and the teachers would often get 
annoyed at her when she did not intervene if children were ‘rule 
stretching’ (Mandell 1988: 452).  To test her resolve the children  
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would violate rules by hiding in forbidden areas or urinating outside 
to test her resolve.  In such instances Mandell reports that she would 
leave the scene, but in less extreme cases she would simply tell the 
child to get a teacher, as illustrated by the following excerpt: 
14/11/78N  Crystal is dressed up in black shoes and is 
carrying a purse.  She wanders into the lunchroom, drops 
her purse and puts on a plastic apron for printing.  She 
starts to paint all over Kyle’s painting and on the actual 
paint board.  Kyle turns to me and says, “She’s painting my 
picture”.  I shrugged and replied “Tell Pam (the teacher) if 
you want her to stop.  I can’t stop her.  I’m not a teacher”.  
Kyle repeated his request.  I repeated my reply.  Finally he 
went and got Pam (Mandell 1988: 452). 
 
My primary concern during the pre-research time centred on how the 
children would react to me – how long would it take before I was 
‘accepted’?  Would they eventually act as if I was not an adult so that 
I could see the uncensored behaviour that often adults did not see?  I 
felt that if I was to see this uncensored behaviour – the behaviour that 
was not ‘stage managed’ for adults - that it was important that I 
should become accepted as an non-authoritative adult, a friend or 
playmate, so that the children would act as if I was simply one of 
them. 
 
I also acknowledged that I could face surprise or resistance from the 
staff at the childcare centre.  Therefore, before entering the centre I 
spelled out in a letter to the staff exactly what they could and could  
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not expect from me while I was in the centre.  The letter stated that 
the carers were to regard me as a big kid and expect no more from me 
than if I was one – I could not be relied on to supervise children or to 
intervene in disputes and so on. 
 
As normal practice, a condition of my fieldwork was that I gain 
permission from Murdoch University’s Human Research and Ethics 
Committee.  Murdoch University is guided by the Australian National 
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans.  One of 
the issues for the Human Research and Ethics Committee was that 
consent was gained from the parents of all of the children who would 
take part in the study.  As Morrow and Richards (1996) note, this is 
almost invariably the practice when researching young children where 
informed consent usually relates to the consent of the ‘adult gate 
keepers’.  In addition, the right of parents to be informed and make 
choices about their children’s participation in any research, rather 
than the decision being taken by those with vested interests and/or 
established ‘experts’, is, of course, central.  Therefore, a letter was 
sent home with each of the children asking parents whether they 
consented to the involvement of their children in the project.  Carers 
at the centre were also asked if they would sign a consent form.  On 
the first day at the centre I told the children that I would be playing 
with them and watching what they did and if that was OK with them.   
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In principle, this felt far from ideal – this is a far cry from ‘informed 
consent’ by the actual research subjects.  However, in practical terms 
there did not appear to be any other options for this age group. 
 
As part of my commitment to research in a naturalistic setting, I 
wanted to make data collection as unobtrusive as possible.  To this 
end I purchased a small digital recorder with a clip-on microphone 
that I would put in a pocket.  I hoped that this would allow me to 
make verbal notes to myself without interrupting the process of 
observation and also enable me to record short conversations with the 
children. 
 
In The Field 
Interestingly, the issues that concerned me before going into the field 
turned out to be relatively unimportant once I actually started the 
research and things that I had thought little about were pushed to the 
forefront.  Some of these hurdles I confronted early in the research, 
some were a slow shift in my perception, while others emerged after 
the fieldwork was completed and I needed to analyse and code the 
material that I had collected. 
 
On the first day at the centre I was surprised by how easily the 
children accepted my presence.  At times I was a bit of a novelty and a  
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potential playmate, at others the children basically ignored me, 
especially if I was not doing anything interesting.  Later I came to see 
that the appearance of new women in the centre was commonplace – 
carers changed rooms, volunteers helped out for a day or so, students 
would do placements and so on.  Interestingly there was only one 
male employed at the centre, a man in his early twenties who drove 
the ‘fun bus’ (a bus that took activities for preschool children into the 
community), and whenever he entered the room the children would 
flock around him, wanting to speak to him.   
 
The children were also used to being observed.  During the outdoor 
play time the carer/s would position themselves so that the majority 
of children were within their sight.  Whether it was a matter of this 
unstructured supervision type observation, or whether the carers 
were doing child assessments that required detailed observation, the 
children were always within an adult’s gaze.  Unless the children 
noted that they were being directly observed, they did not noticeably 
respond to the presence of a watching adult. 
 
Similarly, the staff members in the centre were quite used to students 
being there and within a few weeks they appeared to be quite 
comfortable with me observing, especially once they accepted that I 
was not observing or evaluating them.  
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Being there as an observer, then, was relatively easy.  It was the ‘least 
adult’ role that gave trouble almost immediately.  Even by the second 
day the difficulties had started to surface, as the following diary entry 
illustrates: 
I find it difficult not to tell the children not to do something – 
if they are fighting or if one child takes something from 
another – they look to me to fix it.  I either look away or 
move.  Today some kids were drinking water out of the 
water play bin and I said “yukky water” but I didn’t tell them 
to stop.  I think they were doing it more to see if I would say 
something.  I chose to leave the area so that the carers 
would perhaps be more likely to look, or at least it made me 
feel better! (Author’s research diary)5 
 
The difficulties escalated on day three when I was having morning tea 
with the children outside.  A three-year-old girl, whom I shall call 
Clara, looked at me with big watery brown eyes and said, “I want my 
mummy”.  I tried talking to her but when she continued crying I 
asked her if she wanted to play with me when we went inside.  Which 
she did.  For the rest of the day.  This was the first of many such 
incidents where I was torn between what I felt I should do in my 
status as ‘researcher’ (and, moreover, ‘least adult’ researcher) and 
what I would normally have done outside a research situation.  Surely 
to offer Clara support in this way went against my role as ‘least 
adult’?  By abandoning my ‘method’ I felt that I risked placing the 
                                                 
5 With the benefit of hindsight, this dilemma was also evident in Mandell’s accounts.  However, before 
starting the research the situations she described were not uppermost in my consciousness.  
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validity of my research under question.  Against this, by not 
responding in an adult way to a distraught child, I undermined the 
ethical core of my research that sought to see children as people, not 
research objects. 
 
Over the next week or so I was often confronted by similar incidents 
whereby I was torn between the needs of a child and my research role.  
Eventually my conflict was resolved by putting the philosophy of the 
research over and above the research process I had set myself.  Over 
the course of the first few weeks I abandoned my rules and did not 
wait for a child to come up and express their unhappiness.  If I saw a 
child crying on their own, I went up to them and asked them what 
was wrong.  Often a cuddle or a lap to sit on was what was required.  
Instead of attempting to fit the reality of doing this form of research 
into my preconceived plan of how it should work, I adapted a flexible 
attitude whereby I wore several hats – the researcher, the carer, the 
playmate – that could be changed as required.  Ironically, on day ten 
of my observations as the following journal entry shows, for one little 
boy at least, I was a long way from being ‘least adult’ – for him I was 
‘best adult’: 
Day 10:  Blake also wanted to go home and kept asking me if I 
was going to stay all day and look after him.  He said I was the 
best.  He kept asking when I was going and when I was nearly 
leaving he started crying (Author’s research diary). 
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As I had found it extremely difficult to both ‘play’ and observe after 
approximately four weeks, I started to spend less time playing with 
the children and instead turned to sitting and observing with a 
clipboard.  Furthermore, when playing, I was only able to observe the 
children with whom I was playing, which was not giving me the 
opportunity to ascertain more general patterns.  In research terms, I 
was essentially changing my method from ‘participant observation’ to 
just ‘observation’.  Prior to doing the research, I would have thought 
that this would have fundamentally changed my relationship with the 
children.  In practice, it made hardly any difference.  A couple of the 
older girls at first asked me what I was doing, others would come and 
sit by me now and then to talk, others would come up to tell on 
someone else or to ask for help with shoes and so on.  However, while 
the children’s perception of me did not appear to alter, the transition 
to sitting behind the clipboard changed the way I felt towards the 
research.  I felt that the boundaries of my role were somewhat clearer 
and as I was now attempting to systematically record most of what I 
saw, in essence, I felt more emotionally removed from the children. 
 
For the remainder of the time in the centre I thus recorded the 
activities of the children – who played with whom, for how long and 
what they were doing.  I also traced the activities of two children each 
day while still attempting to be aware of what the other children were  
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doing.  I did not physically follow the children I was observing but 
generally observed them from afar from several spots in the play area.  
This meant that I only heard what they were saying to each other if 
they came within earshot.    This level of data collection suited my 
research in that I was seeking trends rather than attempting to record 
the minutiae of the children’s interactions. 
 
Nevertheless, recording the activities of up to twenty children was 
always a challenge – the children seldom spent long doing any one 
activity or playing with the same playmate.  Take, for example, the 
following observations of about half an hour of the two hours that I 
observed Emma: 
In sandpit with Rebecca and Amber – sitting slightly apart 
Jack joins them with truck 
Michael joins 
On platform near sandpit with Steven and Jordan 
Looking around for something to do 
Sitting in sandpit alone 
With Annabel behind kitchen cabinet, making something 
with sand on plate 
Emma & Annabel on sand underneath shade cloth 
Lying on mat under climbing frame 
Talking with Annabel 
On bike 
Michael bumps her on bike 
 
Before and during my research I frequently encountered questions 
from academics on this issue of method.  How was I conducting my 
research? What method was I using? How was I going to analyse my 
data?  Before I started my research and during the early stages, such  
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issues were of prime importance in my quest to conduct valid 
research.  I knew that when validity is called into question, it is often 
the method that is under scrutiny and, conversely, that when the 
method is considered shaky, validity will almost automatically be 
questioned.  But, and as we have already seen, my method in fact 
changed quite considerably over the course of the research – I 
modified my stance on the ‘least adult’ role and switched from 
‘participant observer’ to ‘observer’ (although these labels do not really 
describe what changed and what did not).  I believe my methodology 
was more important than the role I assumed or how I recorded my 
data was.  By methodology I refer to the philosophy that shaped my 
research rather than simply the method I chose to adopt.  This was 
an insight that I gained through the process of conducting the 
research, but is an insight also recognised by Leena Alanen: 
Choices of focus and concrete research methods vary, of 
course, but so do the metatheoretical and methodological 
commitments with which researchers have come to the field.  
These commitments, I would argue, are also far more 
significant and consequential for the understandings of 
childhood resulting from sociological work, than the 
particular topics that are studied or the research methods 
that are used (Alanen : 1999 : 1). 
 
From this perspective – which is the one that I intuitively took with 
me to the field – the researcher and their ethical framework are 
central to how the research is conducted.  In the remainder of this 
section I examine the researcher and their role in more detail, before  
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turning, in the next part, to the ethical framework.  As I have just 
inferred, these two factors are in reality intrinsically intertwined, but 
for analytic purposes I deal with them separately. 
 
The Researcher 
At the time of conducting this study I was 36 year old mature-age 
student.  I had returned to study at the age of thirty when my 
children (two boys) were, respectively, two years and five weeks old.  
During my undergraduate degree in sociology and politics, I had 
developed an interest in policy issues relating to women and children, 
and my honours thesis explored the issue of children’s rights.  My 
experience of empirical research up to this point had been limited to 
interviews and observations of adults.  
 
At the time of the research, my own children were aged six and eight, 
a few years older than the children I was observing.  However, when 
they were younger they had attended day care and I had felt the 
distress of them crying and holding on to my leg when I left.  Did such 
memories impact on the emotions that I felt when I watched children 
crying after being dropped off at day care?  Were my feelings as I 
watched a child sitting alone for two hours related to how I would 
have felt if that was one of my boys sitting there like that?  I imagine 
they were.  One thing, I learned during this project, is that one cannot  
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simply strip away other parts of one’s persona to leave the ‘researcher’ 
in situ, observing and collecting data.   Indeed, Broch-Due (1992) 
questions the very distinction between the researcher-as-researcher 
and researcher-as-person (Broch-Due: 1992).  While I had dismissed 
the notion of the objective researcher prior to commencing the 
research, the ramifications of this did not become truly apparent until 
I was in the field. 
 
The Legacy of the Objective Researcher 
Recall the incident with Clara on the second day of my research when 
I needed to make a choice between staying an ‘objective researcher’ or 
becoming a ‘caring adult’.  My internal conflict about what I should be 
doing in this situation, which was repeated in similar episodes with 
other children, was indebted to one of the legacies which sociology 
has inherited from the natural sciences – the model of the objective 
and/or distant researcher.  To be sure, much has been written, 
especially within feminist literature, questioning the very notion of 
objective research.   In more general terms, Tim May (2002) puts the 
anti case neatly: 
Particular ideas of neutrality, such as the maintenance of 
objectivity through positioning the researcher as nothing 
but a passive instrument of data collection, are now exposed 
as falsehoods that seek to mask the realities of the research 
process (May 2002: 2). 
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That being said, as my experience illustrates, the belief that the 
professional researcher should remain, to a certain extent, ‘distant’ or 
removed from both the research topic and those being researched still 
sticks.  My reading suggested that others felt conflicts similar to mine.  
Robyn Leavitt (1998), for example, describes her internal conflict in 
her study of a child-care centre when she watched a child – Rory - in 
distress and wondered if she should intervene:  
The scene with Rory was very painful for me to observe.  I 
was paralysed by conflict.  Should I have intervened at the 
moment I observed the caregivers ignoring Rory’s distress? 
(Leavitt: 1998 : 64) 
 
The notion of the objective researcher essentially involves a separation 
between the researchers and researched.  As I have discussed, this 
can involve emotional distance.  However, it also involves a notion of 
difference in kind:  the researcher and the researched belong to two 
different worlds.  In my research I tried to counter this by choosing a 
method that did not objectify the children, but saw them as small 
people in their own right.  I sought to see things from their level, in 
their context – to observe this group of children as a social group - not 
just a social group of children.  The least-adult role appeared to offer 
this – while the researcher could obviously not become  a child; it 
perhaps went some way towards making the researcher less  adult 
and hopefully less distant. 
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In hindsight I realise that attempting to become ‘more like’ the 
children I was studying by no means addressed all the possible 
elements of the legacy of this distant researcher model.  Another 
expectation is that the researcher will remain ‘outside the data’, that 
they will not directly influence the course of events that they are 
studying.  This, I now see, was directly reflected in Corsaro’s ‘reactive 
strategy’ whereby the researcher does not initiate contact with the 
children, but responds if contact is made.  As well as the ethical and 
practical difficulties inherent in this strategy, it is actually 
problematic at heart.  Whether I intervened to stop a child taking 
another’s favourite toy or looked away and pretended not to notice, I 
was still influencing the data.  The children expected me to intervene, 
this is what adults in their frame of reference generally do, and if I did 
not, the actions that followed were not necessarily the same as if I had 
not been there at all. 
 
Emotional Issues 
During the planning process of my research I would meet with my 
advisory group to explain my approach.  During these sessions, and 
sessions with my supervisor at the time, we often talked about ‘Gaye’s 
time in the sandpit’ and how it would be fun.  I certainly thought it 
would be interesting.  However, a good deal of the time spent at the 
day care centre was neither fun nor interesting.  There are only so  
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many times you can make a sand birthday cake before you feel like 
squashing it with your foot.  Most of the days at the centre were much 
the same as the previous, and recording the minutiae of the children’s 
actions, for the most part, was not particularly interesting. 
 
The assumption that the time with the children would be fun taps 
into the adult idea discussed in Chapter One – that childhood is a 
time of fun, innocence and play.  While the children did play and have 
fun, they also experienced a myriad of different emotions that this 
ideology obscures – sadness, loneliness, angst, anger and boredom.  
As a researcher in this environment I also experienced emotions such 
as these. 
 
I also started to feel very upset about what I was seeing after about 
the first week of my observations.  Seeing children sitting crying on 
their own or sitting for an hour or more sucking their thumb, or 
watching Joseph who could not speak English, attempting to get out 
of the gate when it was left open, left me angry and frustrated.  On 
some days I would be quite upset and angry when I left the centre and 
I required frequent ‘debriefing’ sessions with my supervisor.  The 
following dairy entries illustrate my feelings at the time: 
Day 9:  I came away feeling very angry today.  A new girl 
started and she didn’t get any emotional support at all.  Do 
the carers learn not to make a fuss of children when they  
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are upset when they do their training?  Apparently it is valid 
to cry if you hurt yourself but not simply because you are 
upset. 
Day 12:  I came away feeling sad and angry again today.  I 
felt that my research was really secondary today because I 
spent a lot of time pacifying children (Author’s research 
journal) 
 
In reflecting on the question of emotions and research, I found that 
the emotions of the researcher are seldom included in research 
accounts.  When they are discussed it is often away from the research 
report itself, in articles (for example, Harris: 1997) or in edited 
volumes (for example, Hobbs and May: 1994: Shaffir and Stebbins: 
1991) in which researchers discuss the more personal demands they 
faced during fieldwork.  In their discussion of the lack of research that 
explores the lived experiences of children in childcare, Graue and 
Walsh (1998) make the observation that those who do (Leavitt: 1994, 
Wolf and Walsh: 1998) are “discomfiting to read”.  Indeed they are, 
and one would assume that if this discomfort shows through in the 
researchers’ accounts, a similar discomfort was experienced in 
recording them.  However, this rarely comes through in the texts 
themselves.  Karen Ramsay argues that this reluctance to 
acknowledge emotions may be “part of the legacy of the masculinist 
research agenda which shaped sociology” (Ramsay: 1996: 141).  She 
is insistent, however, that emotional involvement in research cannot 
be avoided.  
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Ethical issues encountered in the research 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, before starting the research I had 
addressed the University ethics conditions.  This involved providing a 
police clearance, assuring the committee that my research would not 
harm the children and collection of parents’ permission for their 
children to be involved in the study. 
 
The texts discussing research ethics (for example, Masson: 2001; 
Morrow and Richards: 1996; and Stanley and Sieber: 1992) tend to 
deal with the ‘big picture’ moral issues and the guiding principles 
such as ‘do no harm’.  In many respects, these guidelines have clear 
important implications (for example, painful experiments, withholding 
treatment or practising deceit).  Indeed, given the power imbalance 
between adults and children, these ‘protective’ type ethics may have 
particular implications for protecting children as research subjects 
from physical, psychological or emotional injury.  However, my own 
experience suggested these ‘protective’ forms of ethics did not address 
other ethical issues that are particularly important in research on 
children - namely adult responsibility and issues of trust and privacy. 
 
Adult Responsibility 
When a scared child looks at you for help because another 
child is hurting them, or taking their toy, whilst it might fit 
within the non-authoritarian model to pretend not to notice, 
it certainly does not feel right.  Watching how children in  
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such situations ‘work it out’ might make for interesting data 
but must be somewhat confusing for a child – especially one 
who is new to the big world of day care and the often 
increased independence that that entails (Author’s research 
journal) 
 
There is an important limitation in the research guidelines that 
attempt to ensure that research subjects do not suffer harm.  While 
they exist to prevent the participant being harmed by an element of 
the research (Fine and Sandstrom: 1988: 22), they do not indicate 
whether this responsibility means that a researcher should intervene 
if a child (or any other vulnerable subject) might be harmed in some 
way by elements within  his or her own setting but outside  the 
research process per se. 
 
During my fieldwork, I never witnessed events that involved a child in 
physical danger.  However, as the journal entry above illustrates, this 
did not prevent me from feeling it was wrong not to intervene when I 
witnessed a child being unfairly treated by another.  This feeling that 
‘I should do something’, notwithstanding my ‘least adult’ role, was 
influenced by the low adult-child ratio in the centre during the ‘free-
time’ period.  As I have already noted, the ratio for the centre for this 
age group was 10:1, but during the outdoor play period one of the 
carers would be away having morning tea or getting the indoor area 
ready for lunch and nap time, leaving only one carer supervising the 
children.  
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Mandell (1988), in describing her experiences with the least adult 
role, states that in exchange for being accepted into peer exchanges, 
she had to demonstrate that she had something to offer – and what 
she had to offer was her availability as a continually available 
playmate (Mandell: 1988: 442, 443).  However, I felt that the last 
thing the children needed were more ‘playmates’; what they were 
really missing was the attention of adults.  While of course (in theory 
at least) it was not my responsibility to provide this, if the children 
asked me for help it did not feel right to refuse.  After all, whilst it was 
my desire to minimise the differences between them and me for the 
sake of the research, was it fair to expect them (especially those new 
to the centre) to understand that this particular adult would not act in 
the same way as any other adult in the centre?  As Graue and Walsh 
note, while research on children should not be curtailed by 
assumptions about child/adult relationships being problematic; 
“pretending that they do not exist in the hope of getting the juiciest 
data possible may not be the best approach either” (Graue & Walsh 
1998: 79). 
 
In her discussion of ethical conflict in classroom research, Hatch 
(1995) describes a similar issue.  In her case, the conflict was pressed 
on her after the research was completed.  During a presentation of  
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her research findings – in particular, excerpts from conversations that 
demonstrated the stigmatisation of a child – Lester, a teacher, asked 
Hatch why she had not intervened to help the child.  
As I was answering, I knew I was not just throwing up a 
smoke screen to cover my escape.  My reasons made sense 
within the research framework I had learned and taken as 
my own.  What this teacher’s question ultimately had done 
i s  f o r c e  m e  t o  c r i t i q u e  t h a t  r e s e a r c h  f r a m e w o r k .   N o t  
intervening was problematic, but what frightened me was 
that I had never even considered such an intervention.  That 
my way of thinking about and doing research would lead me 
to such a position was a troubling realization (Hatch 1995: 
217). 
 
Hatch’s reflections raise an important issue in relation to research 
with children in that researchers must often look beyond the ethical 
guidelines and research framework to determine what is acceptable 
for them.  This is not something that can be learned from a textbook, 
but rather requires researchers to continually assess their position.  
Davis (1998) makes a similar point, stating that: 
By associating ethical considerations with problems of gate 
keeping and issues of access, researchers may overlook the 
notion that ethical considerations depend on the 
researcher’s ability to understand and respond to the 
feelings of the children who they work with (Davis: 1998: 
330). 
 
Dealing with Trust and Privacy Issues 
Most male and female fieldworkers who engage in participant 
observation with children adopt the “friend role” …Such a role 
allows the researcher to gain the children’s trust and 
attenuates the researcher’s authority that is implied 
inherently in the social status of grown-up.  It is a role I  
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employ when working with children of all ages, and I believe 
this role is partly responsible for the ease with which I am 
able to gain and earn children’s trust.  (Holmes: 1998: 23) 
 
A number of researchers (for example, Holmes: (1998); Mandell: 
(1988) and Fine and Sandstrom: (1988)) believe that adopting a 
friendship role with children may enable the researcher to gain access 
to the children’s “hidden culture” (Fine and Sandstrom: 1988: 17).   
However, my fieldwork, and my subsequent reflections on it, has led 
me to conclude that adopting the role of ‘friend’ so as to gain better 
access to the world of children (especially young children) involves 
deeply problematic issues. 
 
In comparing research with children and with women, Ann Oakley 
(1994) argues that the major issues that relate to the adult 
researcher-researched relationship also relate to children.   
Significantly, one of the ethical issues she raises is that of the 
“exploitation of ‘pseudo friendship’” (Oakley: 1994: 26).  While her 
discussion relates primarily to such friendships in the interview 
situation, a similar concern is applicable to the friendship role often 
adopted in ethnographic work with children.   I would argue that such 
a position is less than honest, for the researcher is essentially playing 
a role in an attempt to gain information to which adults would not 
normally be privy.  Bruce Jackson’s (1987) framework provides a good  
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base from which to determine whether such a practice might be 
ethical: 
When you’re in doubt about whether an action on your part 
is ethical or not, a good starting place is to put yourself in 
the subject’s position and consider how you would feel if you 
learned what that friendly person was really up to.  If you’d 
be annoyed and offended that you made a sample in a study 
you didn’t want to be part of …, don’t do those things to 
others.  If you’d feel betrayed because things you said in 
confidence were made part of a public report, then don’t 
betray confidences – or at least tell people who think they 
can trust you that you can’t keep secrets.  Hemingway once 
defined the good as “what you feel good after.”  Think how 
you’ll feel later – perhaps how you’ll feel if you ever see that 
person again.  If the answer is “not so good”, then don’t do it 
(Jackson 1987: 278-279). 
 
On this basis, one might not feel so good, if as a child, one had been 
misled into thinking that a friendship with an adult was there for its 
own sake, whereas it was actually there to serve that adult’s research 
purposes.  Furthermore, the ‘friendships’ whereby the adult 
researcher plays down their adult status (such as the least-adult role) 
to earn the trust of children, can never be equal in that the researcher 
has chosen to take on the child role, whereby children cannot choose 
to make the equivalent role switch (Graue & Walsh: 1998: 79).  For 
example, when I adopted the role of ‘least-adult’ I was pretending to 
be a child.  I chose  to drop my authority and at any time I could 
choose to reinstate it.  Furthermore, if one of the children had put 
themselves in a dangerous situation and I had intervened, I would 
have expected them to obey me as an adult.  
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Much is written about the ethical problems of ‘covert’ research 
whereby the researcher pretends to be a member of a group without 
declaring themself as a researcher (Quinn Patton 2002: 269).  This 
almost invariably pertains to research with adult groups.  But, does 
not pretending to be part of the group of children so that we can see 
their uncensored world display the same level of dishonesty or lack of 
respect?  For example, several of the girls I was observing went to 
lengths to position themselves away from the gaze of the adults, 
myself included.  One day they were sitting in a big concrete pipe at 
the edge of the sandpit, the opening of which was visible to all.   
Between the two of them they pulled a large plastic ball across the 
entry so that they would not be seen.  At this stage I was sitting with 
a clipboard, well defined as a researcher.  However, if I had continued 
to play the role of least-adult and had been able to join these girls, 
should I have done so?  My intuition was that this basically would 
have been spying. 
 
The danger of a researcher invading children’s privacy is evident in 
the following excerpt from Corsaro’s (1985) study of pre-school 
children peer relationships.  I have quoted it at length given that the 
nature of Corsaro’s account, as well as the actual train of events, are 
instructive.  
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The two girls, whom I will just refer to as A and B, had been 
playing in the outside yard.  We were videotaping their play, 
which involved climbing up on a large wooden spool and 
jumping to a mat on the ground below.  I was sitting near 
the spool holding a microphone.  After several jumps to the 
mat, A walked behind the spool and then called out: “B, hey 
B! Look here!”  B came around to look and I followed close 
behind with my microphone.  W h en we f ou nd  A , s h e w as  
ducking into a small opening in the back of the spool.  She 
then sat down inside the hollow centre of the spool.  “Come 
on in,” she said to B.  B quickly joined her and, as I 
appeared in the opening, A said: “Not you! Go away and 
leave us alone.”  I said: “Ok, but can I leave my 
microphone?”  B responded: “Ok, but you get out of here!”  I 
set the microphone inside the spool and quickly left to join 
my assistant, who was operating the camera and monitoring 
the audio.  I was anxious to hear what the girls were talking 
about, so I motioned for my assistant to let me use one half 
of the headset and we listened together.  The first thing I 
heard was a banging of the microphone as A picked it up 
and said: “I’ll talk first”.  She then said “you!!XX, XX,XX!!  
!!XX, !X!X ------!”  The string of curses was 14 words long 
and contained some words I had heard only a few times, 
and two or three I had never uttered in my life. ….. When A 
finished, B said: “let me talk to the dummy!”  B, who seemed 
to be referring to me, took the microphone and said: “You 
!X!X, XXX!” (Corsaro 1985: 261). 
 
After the exchange, which continued on for a few more minutes, 
Corsaro ponders whether the girls knew that he could hear them, and 
concludes that they probably could not.  His analysis of the event was 
that the girls were producing a ritual “which symbolizes one of 
children’s most cherished desires: to defy and challenge adults, share 
the experience and not be detected” (Corsaro: 1985: 261).  But in 
saying this, could Corsaro have essentially missed the point?  Could 
the girls simply have wanted him to leave them alone, but felt that in 
telling him to leave they could not also deny his request to leave his  
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microphone?  It is hard to imagine a similar happening between a 
researcher and adult research subjects.  If adults asked a researcher 
to leave, one would presume that the researcher would simply do so, 
acknowledging that those concerned wished to discuss something 
they did not want her to hear or simply wanted ‘time out’ from being 
observed. 
 
Christensen and Prout (2002: 478) argue that the answer to such 
ethical dilemmas may lie in what they term “ethical symmetry”.  This 
framework has implications for researchers who conduct research 
with children. Namely, that whether the researcher is conducting 
research with adults or children, they employ the same ethical 
relationship and that the same ethical consideration is given to 
children as is given to adults.  Using ethical symmetry as the starting 
point therefore requires the researcher to react to concrete situations 
with the children that arise during the research process, rather than 
attempting to develop a particular set of ethical standards that are 
determined before the research begins (Christensen and Prout: 2002: 
482). 
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Concluding Reflections 
Students often ask us about the “right way” to do this kind of 
research, and we meet much frustration when we cannot give 
them a recipe for the perfect study.  The singular focus on 
methodology – on proper observation techniques, valid field 
notes, unbiased interview questions and reliable coding – is 
seductive.  It allows researchers to lull themselves into 
thinking that they can get it right by being a technician rather 
than a caring person who has responsibilities to her 
participants (Graue & Walsh: 1998: 78). 
 
Prior to starting the empirical component of my study, I, like Graue 
and Walsh’s students, had been keen to get it ‘right’.  My focus on 
getting it ‘right’ prior to entering the field centred on issues such as 
methodology, the clarity and relevance of my research question, and 
fulfilling the ethics criteria as set out by the university guidelines.  In 
planning the research, I was lured by the promise of a reasonably 
orderly process whereby I secured the research question, organised 
my method and site of study, collected the data and returned to my 
desk to analyse and write up.  The reality was quite different. While I 
had not noticed them before entering the field, there were warnings in 
the literature.  For example, James, Jenks and Prout (1998: 167) 
state, “research is a messy affair, as dependent on negotiation, 
adjustment, personal choices and serendipity as on careful and 
meticulous preparation”. They draw on Bulmer’s distinctions between 
general methodology (the general principles guiding the investigation), 
research strategy and research techniques, and posit that it may be  
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only the general methodology that remains constant in our research 
(James, Jenks and Prout: 1998: 167).  Indeed, during my own 
research, the factor that remained constant and guided my decisions 
regarding method and ethics was my methodological principle of being 
true to the phenomenon that I was studying – the children – and 
treating them like people, not research subjects. 
 
Central to this approach was the need to be flexible and reflexive.  For 
a neophyte researcher of children, the decision to adapt my research 
to fit the reality was not easy.  As Lee (2001) states, there is a level of 
confidence gained from adhering to established standards: 
Social research is never just about concepts and facts.  It is 
also about feelings, especially feelings of confidence.  One 
can often try to gain confidence in oneself and one’s actions 
by trying to live up to a socially recognized standard.  The 
more standard one can appear, the less questionable one is 
and the more confident one can be (Lee: 2001: 122). 
 
It was not until long after my empirical research was finished that I 
was able to regain confidence about my time in the field and could 
appreciate that flexibility and reflexivity had allowed me to appreciate 
factors about the children’s social worlds that I might not otherwise 
have noticed.  These form the topics of the following chapter.  
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Chapter Five:  Observing The Children 
 
Introduction 
This chapter also comprises two parts: ‘The children in their context’ 
and ‘Constant movement: the social world of the children’.  In order to 
provide a context for the observations discussed later, the first section 
introduces the day care centre and the children who spent their days 
there.  It also explores the routines and institutional norms that the 
children were expected to adhere to, and some of the possible 
implications of these in relation to the children’s behaviour.  In the 
second part the children’s interactions are examined in more detail 
and how the focus of my research changed is discussed. 
 
The Children in their Context 
In traditional research on children, the context in which the 
child acts is irrelevant beyond its specification as a variable 
in a research design.  Indeed, the goal is to standardize the 
context as much as possible, thus the popularity of 
laboratory or laboratory-like rooms – the contextless 
context.  There, children are supposedly buffered from 
history and culture. 
We propose that researchers think of children as living in 
specific settings, with specific experiences and life 
situations.  We suggest that researchers spend less time 
attempting to develop grand theories and more time learning 
to portray the richness of children’s lives across the many 
contexts in which children find themselves (Graue & Walsh: 
1998: 5) 
 
During the course of my research I increasingly came to realise how 
important the childcare centre was as the context of my observations.   
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To take the children’s interactions out of the environment in which 
they were happening would be similar to taking a piece of jigsaw out 
of the larger picture and seeking to understand it on its own.  The 
conditions of the centre: the lack of adult support, the number of 
children, the strict routine and how the children felt about these 
factors on any particular day influenced their moods and their 
interactions with other children and adults. 
 
I provide my discussion of the centre, both as a means to frame the 
observations of the children, but also as an end in itself.  As Graue 
and Walsh (1998) note, many children spend a great deal of their lives 
in child care and while debate flourishes on the quality of child care 
in terms of developmental opportunities, food standards and 
inclusiveness, few adults really have a sense of its day to day world.  
This section provides a glimpse into that world.  While my account 
only describes the day care centre where I conducted my research, my 
observations and experiences are interspersed with accounts from one 
of the few people who have done ethnographic research on day care, 
Robyn Leavitt (1994; 1995; 1998).  Leavitt spent extended time in day 
care in the United States and her observations indicate that some of 
the issues I raise may be similar across cultures and centres. 
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I wish to stress that my observations are not in any way intended as 
an evaluation or criticism of the carers.  As the title of Wolf and 
Walsh’s article (1998) stresses, “If you haven’t been there, you don’t 
know what its like”.  In this context, Leavitt discusses the emotional 
labour of working in day care centres and the demands of this kind of 
work.  While my focus was on the children, I acknowledge that any 
proper understanding of the context would need to equally take the 
world of the caregivers into account. 
 
Adhering to routine and institutional expectations 
The standards set by the Australian National Childcare Accreditation 
Council identify ten ‘quality areas’ which include factors such as 
relationships between staff and children; partnerships with families; 
planning and evaluation; learning and development; and health and 
safety (National Childcare Accreditation Council 2001: 4).  Each of 
these core areas contain a set of principles, for example, in Quality 
Area 5: Planning and evaluation, the following principles are 
identified: 
Principle 5.1:  Programs reflect a clear statement of centre 
philosophy and a related set of broad centre goals. 
Principle 5.2:  Records of children’s learning and well-being 
are maintained by the centre and are used to plan programs 
that include experiences appropriate for each child. 
Principle 5.3: Programs cater for the needs, interests and 
abilities of all children in ways that assist children to be 
successful learners.  
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Principle 5.4:  Programs are evaluated regularly. 
               (National Childcare Accreditation Council 2001: 4) 
 
Meeting such criteria and attending to the daily care of up to twenty 
small people each day requires a high level of organisation, resulting 
in a rather strict routine.  Children joining the centre are required to 
learn that it is this routine, not their own inclinations, that 
determines when they may eat, drink, go inside or outside, or paint a 
picture. 
 
My observations at the centre were between 9am and approximately 
11.45am.  I therefore did not observe the early morning routine (the 
centre opened at 7am), or what happened in the afternoon.  The 
majority of the children I observed arrived from approximately 8.30am 
onwards.  The morning routine consisted of the following activities:  
9.00am:  Morning tea time. 
The children would go and wash their hands and sit at 
the table in the undercover area outside.  Children could 
then help themselves to the plates of food on the table – 
fruit or toast, for example - in an orderly fashion while 
sitting quietly at the table.  When finished they could go 
and wash their hands. 
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The children were then required to sit on the mat inside.  
The carers would say good morning and the children 
would be required to say hello back.  If there were ‘new 
friends’ (new children) at the centre they would be 
introduced.  The children were not required to say good 
morning to new small friends, only to adult visitors. 
The carers would then lead the children in a song or read 
a book while the other children were still arriving.  The 
children were to sit quietly on the mat and not talk or be 
silly with other children – if they did they would often be 
moved to another part of the mat. 
 
It was then time to go outside. 
 
The carers would bring out the tube of sunscreen and the 
children were required to put up their hands to get some 
squirted on and they would then apply it to their face. 
 
Shoes were then to be taken off (it was summer during 
my observations).  If a child was wearing sandals with 
Velcro they were to join them together by their straps. 
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When the carer gave permission, a group of children 
would put their shoes in the shoe box, put their hat on 
and go outside (there was usually a system to this – all 
those with a yellow t-shirt can go, all those with red on 
their shorts, and so on). 
9.45 – 11.30am 
Outside play time (if it was raining this period was moved 
inside; however, this only happened once during my 
observations). 
 
Equipment was taken out of the shed – bikes, climbing 
frames, mats etc - for the children to play on, which met 
the requirements of developmentally appropriate play. 
 
The children were not allowed inside during this time 
other than to go to the toilet. 
 
There were numerous activities that the children could do 
during the outside play period on a day-to-day basis.   
These involved playing on the available equipment either 
by themselves or with others, or simply playing in groups.  
Thus, they might play in the sandpit, ride bikes around 
the bike track, play on the climbing frames, jump off  
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climbing equipment on to mats, play ‘chasey’ or play 
pretend games such as ‘families’ or ‘going to the zoo’.   
There were also such things as toy animals and blocks 
provided in the undercover area. 
 
At times special activities such as painting were 
organised and children were given a turn to paint at one 
of the two easels provided.  Such activities were always 
greeted with great enthusiasm, but to be allowed a turn 
the children had to wait patiently, as illustrated by the 
following diary entry: 
 
Day 21: There is a new activity organized today.  Susan (carer) is 
tracing around the children’s bodies and then the children draw 
on them.  You have to sit quietly and wait and not shout out or 
you won’t get a turn. 
 
11.30am Story  time. 
The children were called to sit on the mat while a carer 
read them a story while lunch was prepared.  As with the 
other times where the children were required to sit on the 
mat it was necessary for them to sit quietly unless they 
were asked a question by the carer. 
 
In the centre, children’s lack of adherence to the procedures was often 
met with impatience by the staff, as illustrated by the following  
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instance describing Phoebe and her drink.  For health reasons, the 
children each had a bottle assigned to them with their name written 
on the side.  When the children went outside to play these bottles 
were filled with water and placed on a tray near the door outside. 
Day 18: Phoebe tells me that she is thirsty.  I tell her to go 
and get a drink.  “I don’t have a bottle” (the children all have 
a bottle with their name on it).  She goes off, then when 
Karen (carer) reappears she says again: “I’m thirsty”.  Bec 
replies: “I just told you to wait till I had the water bottles, 
now go and play or you won’t be having anything”. 
 
A similar level of control was required during activities such as 
listening to a story (do not interfere with others, do not sit too close to 
others, sit quietly); music sessions (play your instrument when it is 
your turn); or when waiting to do a special activity. 
 
The high level of organisation and regimentation required to look after 
twenty children was especially apparent during special events and 
outings.  Just before Easter an outing into town was planned to buy 
Easter eggs and hotcross buns.  Such an outing required the written 
consent of all the children’s parents; enough adults were required to 
attend so that the ratio was one adult to four children; care needed to 
be arranged for those who could not go, and so forth.   In the 
following diary entry I describe the outing and the children’s 
reactions: 
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Day 17:  Today we took the children on an excursion to the 
supermarket to buy hot cross buns and Easter eggs.  I was 
responsible for four children to begin with but Amber 
started crying when we went out and she had to be taken 
back.  Lisa’s mother had not signed the consent form so she 
was not able to go. 
Each adult had to watch four children – two children would 
hold the carer’s hands and then the other two children 
would hold their hands. 
The children had seemed pretty unaffected by the coming 
event – some mentioned it but otherwise did not seem 
excited about it.  Some got in trouble because they had 
taken their shoes off again so time was wasted putting them 
on before we could set off. 
When we got back from the outing everyone just started 
doing what they normally did outside.  Blake said he just 
wanted to go home. 
Did the children enjoy the break from routine?  My 
impression was not overly.  It actually seemed to upset 
some. 
 
I had been surprised that the children had not looked forward more to 
the break from the routine, for tedium was quite often the order of the 
day at the centre.  Indeed, many would start hanging around the 
outside table up to half an hour before lunch was due.  Often I would 
sit on my little stool and wonder what it must be like to come to the 
same enclosure, surrounded by a wire fence, with the same people, 
and the same routine, day after day. 
 
Managing emotions 
As we have seen, learning the routine and structure of the centre was 
an important part of learning to manage at day care.  While I did not 
know the latitude available to the children at home, I believed that the  
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need to fit to a firmly set routine where basic activities such as eating 
and drinking were determined by time of day rather than desire, must 
have involved a considerable adjustment for many.  Another 
important lesson for new children was the need to manage their 
emotions.  Leavitt (1995) describes this as one of the ‘regulative 
norms’ whereby through experience the children learn what is 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. She provides the following 
vignette to illustrate how an expectation that children should not cry 
unless for physical pain operates as a regulative norm in day care: 
The toddlers were playing, except for Kyle (15 months) who 
was crying.  As the toddler approached her, the caregiver 
knelt down, put her hands on Kyle’s shoulders and said, 
“ Y o u  m u s t  l e a r n  t o  s m i l e .   Y o u ’ r e  a l w a y s  c r y i n g .   I ’ m  n o t  
picking you up”.  She walked away from Kyle.  He followed 
her and reached out to hold onto her leg.  The caregiver, 
exasperated, said, “Will you just go away?  Turn it off.  I 
don’t want to hear it”.  The child continued to stand there 
and cry (Leavitt: 1995: 11). 
 
Similarly, during my observations, the carers did not readily accept 
crying for anything other than physical injury.  When a child was 
upset by the departure of a parent they might, at times, get a hug but 
were generally left to ‘get on with it’.  It often appeared that the carers 
believed that if they responded to a child’s emotional distress it would 
simply prolong the episode and teach the child to be ‘dependent’. The 
belief that ‘giving in’ to a crying child was simply prolonging a  
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dependency that could not be tolerated in a day care environment is 
prominent in Leavitt’s observations: 
As I entered the room, Clarke (12 months) toddled over to 
me crying, tears streaming down his face.  The caregiver was 
a few feet away, standing over the other five children playing 
on the carpet.  I knelt to talk to Clarke.  He reached out his 
arms to me, still crying.  I said, “I think you need a hug”, 
and held him.  He quieted and clung to me.  This was our 
first meeting – we were strangers.  As I held Clarke, the 
caregiver matter-of-factly told me that he had been crying all 
morning.  She explained that he recently had been to his 
grandmother’s, who, she believed, “held him all the time”.  
She suggested that this was why he wanted to be held.  But, 
she told me, she was not going to hold Clarke.  When I left 
for the day I put Clarke down and he began to cry 
vehemently again, despite my efforts to comfort him (Leavitt: 
1995: 11) 
Kara (4 months) was crying.  She lifted her arms up to me, 
her eyes brimming with tears.  As I reached down to her, the 
caregiver said to me “don’t pick her up.  She does that to 
everyone at first.  We don’t need to spoil her.”  Kara 
continued to cry.  I hugged her briefly and then tried to 
interest her in a toy.  She continued to cry.  The caregivers 
ignored her (Leavitt: 1995: 12). 
 
Leavitt (1995: 7) argues that within the day care environment the 
management of the children – especially their physical needs – takes 
precedence over their emotional needs.  During my own observations 
this certainly appeared to be the case.  Therefore, the management of 
emotions fell to the children themselves, as evidenced by the following 
account of a new child at the centre. 
 
Justine (3 years) started at the centre when I had been there for 
several months.  On the first few days her father would come in with  
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her and play for a while before leaving.  Every day Justine would get 
very upset when she realised her father had gone and such episodes 
were met with frustration by the carers.  On one of these occasions 
she was told to ‘use her words’: “when we are at day care we use our 
words”.  As time passed it was evident that Justine was learning the 
‘don’t cry’ rule – while she might still be distressed when her parents 
left, she would soon be quiet and even if she was not joining in, would 
sit quietly and watch.  Other children such as Cory also had learned 
the rule.  I would often find him around the corner out of the direct 
gaze of the carers, quietly crying and holding his bottle.  Other 
children would sit for an hour or more at a time, quietly watching 
while sucking on a thumb or a blanket. 
The phrase ‘use your words’ was one of the ways that carers 
operationalised the ‘regulatory norm’ that crying for anything other 
than physical pain was unwelcome at day care.  The following two 
diary entries illustrate other ways that this message was 
communicated to Cory and had been internalised by Phoebe: 
Day 12:  When I first got there today Cory was standing with 
his bottle, crying.  I picked him up and gave him a cuddle.  
After a while I got him to play in the sandpit with some 
others.  Later when Melissa (carer) told him off for fighting 
with one of the other boys he started crying again.  She said, 
“you’re OK” and walked off.  Later in the morning I 
overheard her talking to another carer about how he had 
been sensitive that morning and was taking any opportunity 
to cry and that the best way to deal with it was just to say 
“you’re OK”.  
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Day 1:  One of the children who had just arrived was 
screaming and the other children sat quietly watching her.  I 
asked one of the children why she was crying.  One said she 
didn’t know.  Phoebe said it was because she didn’t want 
her mummy to go.  She went on to tell me that she didn’t 
like being there some days but she wasn’t going to cry 
because she had turned three. 
 
For Leavitt’s study, the issue about the management of emotions was 
a finding in and of itself.  It was for mine too, but it also had a clear 
bearing on my interest in children’s relations with one another.  This 
was evidenced in two ways.  First, the lack of adult support shaped 
how the children dealt with certain incidents.  Often I would witness 
instances such as one child stealing another’s toy.  At times the 
injured party would go and tell a carer.  However, more often than not 
they would simply accept the situation and get on with it.  Second, 
when the children felt bereft, this influenced their behaviour.  I soon 
came to dread Mondays as the children needed to ‘resettle’ after a 
weekend at home and many of them would be upset and grumpy.  If 
they were feeling this way they would often be nasty to the other 
children or would refuse to play.  Similarly, an event early in the 
morning could influence children’s moods and the way they were with 
the other children into the rest of the day.  Indeed, it was often the 
moods of the children that influenced if they were ‘unkind’ to each 
other, rather than any long-standing dislike.  This was well illustrated  
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during my observations of Blake who started at the centre while I was 
there. 
 
Blake was four, an only child who had never been to day care before.  
At first he appeared to enjoy the experience of having lots of play 
equipment and numerous potential play partners.  He was very social, 
involving other children in his games and so on.  However, towards 
the end of the second day Blake seemed to realize that a day at day 
care was a long time and his mood began to change – and so did his 
interactions with the other children.  He became surly and unkind to 
the children he had been previously playing with and also spent more 
time on his own.  This continued for several more weeks – often he 
might be quite friendly at the beginning of the day, but as the day 
progressed and he wanted to go home he became more reserved and 
sullen.  By the time I had finished my study he had settled into day 
care and his ‘moody’ times had decreased. 
 
The Children 
Often in research on children we are provided with no more detail 
than their age, gender and, if relevant, their ethnicity.  In this section, 
to help contextualise the children’s actions6, I introduce the children 
who were at the centre for the majority of the time of the study. 
                                                 
6 The children’s names have been changed to ensure confidentiality.  
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As discussed earlier, Koalas room was for the older children of the 
centre – the three and four year olds – however, some of the children 
were just under three.  The balance between boys and girls was 
generally quite even. While the following list includes seven boys and 
ten girls, on any given day the balance was relatively even. 
 
The majority of the children attended the centre on a part time basis – 
only three of the children were there full time.  ‘Part time’ might mean 
one or two days a week or, as in Joseph’s case, only the mornings 
every day of the week. 
 
Sam:  (3.6 years).  Sam had been at the centre for several years and 
attended five days a week.  He generally appeared quite content7.  He 
was quite a social boy who, while belonging to the ‘boys group’ (which 
will be described later), played with a variety of children, both boys 
and girls. 
 
Joseph:  (3.6 years).  Joseph started at the centre at about the same 
time I started my observations.  Joseph’s mother and father were 
                                                 
7 Throughout these descriptions I use the word ‘content’ to describe children who were, at least on the 
surface, not demonstrably distressed or obviously unhappy during the time at the centre.  However, I 
believe that one of the skills of ‘doing’ childcare is the ability to get on with it, even if you are not 
happy about being there.  The children would generally not get a lot of sympathy from the carers if 
they showed distress when their parent’s dropped them there, so the children appeared to learn quite 
quickly that there was not much point crying.   It is therefore not an unproblematic description but 
helps to distinguish the children who had obvious problems fitting in and those who did not.  
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recent migrants to Australia and his mother was attending English 
classes nearby. He was only at the centre in the mornings, four days a 
week.  Joseph spoke no English when he arrived and was only using a 
few English words when I left.   He often kept to himself and was often 
obviously unhappy being at the centre.  Towards the end of my time 
there I often saw him put his bag on his back at about 10am and go 
and sit near the fence waiting for his mother who would pick him up 
at noon. 
 
Cory:  (3.1 years).  Cory only attended the centre one day a week and 
had only recently come up from the room that housed the younger 
children.  He never looked very happy when he was there and spent 
most of his time alone playing with a set of plastic dinosaurs.  He 
rarely made attempts to play with the other children and if other 
children joined him to play with his dinosaurs he became quite 
possessive of his toys.  He would often cry. 
 
Lauren:  (3.4 years).  Lauren also spent just one day at the centre and 
she has Downs Syndrome.  She generally seemed quite content and 
p l a y e d  o n  h e r  o w n  m o s t  o f  t h e  t i m e .    S h e  w o u l d  o f t e n  h o l d  b a c k  
playing on equipment until other children had left.  She did not talk 
and it was not until her therapist came to the centre to do an  
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assessment that I (and, I believe, the carers) learnt that she used sign 
language to communicate. 
 
Emma:  (4.5 years).  Emma was one of the older children and 
generally appeared quite content during the one day a week she spent 
at the centre.  Emma spent the majority of her time with Annabel and 
they kept to themselves a great deal of the time. 
 
Lisa:  (3.1 years).  Although Lisa was only three she was quite tall, so 
looked as if she was older.   She would spend a lot of time on her own, 
often playing with inanimate objects or running around squealing.   
She was at the centre five days a week. 
 
Amber:  (3 years).  Amber was also one of the group of younger 
children who had recently come up from the younger room.  She 
spent two days a week at the centre and was very quiet and would 
often sit with her blanket just watching what was happening around 
her. 
 
Michael:  (3.5 years).  Michael only came to the centre once a week.  
He was quite quiet, but was generally observed playing with one of the 
other boys. 
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Steven:  (3.1 years).  Although one of the younger children Steven, 
whose mother worked in one of the other rooms, had obviously spent 
quite a bit of time there.  He was one of the louder boys and was often 
in trouble for fighting or being rough with other children. 
 
Jordan:  (4.1 years).  Jordan was away on holiday for about the first 
six weeks of my study.  However, the children would often talk about 
him and point to his photo which was in a collage on the wall.  When 
he returned it appeared that he was quite popular, with the children 
all milling around wanting to talk to him.  He was the ‘leader’ of the 
boy’s group and did not spend much time with children who were not 
part of that group. 
 
Rebecca:  (4.1 years).  Rebecca was also one of the older children and 
would often be the organiser of games, especially those of a role-
playing nature (for example, mums and dads).  She would often seek 
the attention of adults – the carers, me, or volunteers in the centre - 
sitting or standing near them and telling stories or singing. 
 
Bridget:  (4.7 years).  Bridget was one of the full-time children and 
while generally ‘content’ she would at times get angry with the carers 
or other children and would shout and stamp her feet.  She did not 
really form any close bonds with any of the other children, moving  
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from one group to the next but she and Lisa would often end up 
together. 
 
Kelly:   (3 years).  Kelly started at the centre about half way through 
the study.  She was frequently upset during the first few weeks of her 
time there and would often spend time with me.  Towards the end of 
my observations she appeared to have settled in and was generally 
observed playing with one of the other girls. 
 
Annabel:   (3.11 years).  Annabel spent four days a week in the centre 
and most of her time was spent playing with Emma if she was there.  
She was a quiet girl who, other than a few times when she was upset 
when her father dropped her off, appeared quite content when she 
was there. 
 
Phoebe:   (3.8 years).  Phoebe was one of the more dominant children 
of the group.  She was full-time at the centre and appeared to have 
been there since quite young.   She liked adult attention and would 
spend a lot of time with new adults who came into the room – she 
would often get told off by the carers for showing off in front of adult 
volunteers and visitors.  Phoebe moved through the group and played 
with most of the other children.  She had quite a temper and would  
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quite often display it by shouting at other children or sulking (for 
example, lying on the ground and not letting anyone near her). 
 
Joanna:  (3.1 years).  Joanna attended the centre one day a week.  
She was one of the younger children who had come up from the 
younger room during the early stages of my study.  She was quite 
social compared to some of the other younger children. 
 
Blake:  (4.2 years).  Blake started at the centre approximately half 
way through my study.  He had not been to day care before and 
attended the centre two days a week.  He was generally a social, 
chatty boy. 
 
These were the core children of the group.  During the accounts one 
or two children may be mentioned that have not been included here, 
as they may have started towards the end of the study or were only 
there intermittently. 
 
Constant movement: the social world of the children  
As discussed in the chapter on methodology, I started my empirical 
research with the questions: what patterns of inclusion and exclusion 
exist in the playground?  Who gets left out and is it evident why?  By 
asking these questions I hoped to be able to ascertain if the same  
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categories that were important to adults also shaped the way that the 
children interacted.  After the first month, in an attempt to ascertain 
patterns of interaction, I started to track one or two children a day, 
recording their actions (what did they do and who did they do it with). 
 
While this approach gave me a clear research purpose, the actual 
recordings left me with a lot of dense and detailed data that was 
difficult, if not impossible, to interpret.  The following tracings of 
Joanna and Lisa are good examples of the kind of data collected: 
Day 14: Tracing Joanna 
Joanna is dropped off crying.  I ask her if she wants a 
cuddle.  She stays with me for a few minutes and then goes 
to play on bike 
Bridget following her and bumping into back of bike 
Annabel in car behind her 
Looking for shoe box to put her shoes in it 
Takes shoes off 
Carer asks her if she wants to put on knickers because “she 
is a big girl” 
Goes to get changed 
In sandpit 
Rolling blue barrel with Rebecca 
In concrete tube with Emma 
Sitting with Emma and Rebecca 
Playing in sandpit with Annabel 
Making pancakes in sandpit with Rebecca 
Playing on music mat with Rebecca 
Wants Rebecca to come back to sandpit 
Running around grass shouting ‘oh no’ covering ears 
Sitting by fence watching toddlers in next room 
On swing with Emma 
Follows Emma when she leaves 
On bike 
Looking for Jordan 
Driving bike around behind Jordan saying “Jordan I hate 
you” 
Playing with chalk on pavers  
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Playing with blocks 
On bike 
Sitting near fence with Emma 
Sitting in toy car, head on hands, looking bored 
Steven tells her to get out of car 
On bike 
Playing on the plank with Bridget 
On the mat with Bridget - they appear to have had a 
disagreement about something 
Bridget tells her to go away 
She comes to me and tells me that Bridget called her names 
and she wasn’t her friend 
Playing in sandpit 
Playing with blocks 
Playing with Steven with the blocks 
 
 
Day 4: Tracing Lisa 
Upset when Mum left 
Carer takes her for a cuddle and she calms down 
On bike 
Running, screaming (screaming in a high pitch squeal kind 
of noise) 
Has dummy, holding it 
On bike, screaming 
Standing on bike, hitting tree 
Phoebe puts hoolahoop over her, she screams 
Phoebe pulls her off bike, carer sees, Phoebe exits 
Lisa crying 
Sitting on plank 
Playing in trolley 
On climbing frame 
Joanna joins her 
Lisa and Joanna jump off planks 
Joanna joined by Emma 
Lisa leaves on bike 
Playing with car 
Runs, screams 
Up slide, sits at top of slide 
Sitting watching girls doing craft 
Runs, screams 
Up slide, screams 
Playing with tractor 
Bridget says “go away” loudly to Lisa three times 
Bridget pushes Lisa, carer intervenes 
In tree in sandpit  
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Taking shoes off to get sand out.  Gets frustrated and starts 
crying because she can’t do it.  Carer helps. 
Sitting on bike 
Got plastic toy out of sand toy bin, puts leaves in it 
On bike 
Standing alone by shed playing with leaf and stick 
Hoola hoop 
Sitting on ‘bus’ 
Trying to hoola 
On scooter 
Sitting by fence 
Joins group in sandpit, shovels sand but does not interact 
with group 
Wandering around 
Running 
Standing on chair 
Jumps off plank onto mat 
Rolling on mat 
High pitch screaming 
By fence under trees 
Sitting on tree stump, looking into park 
Chloe talking to her, Tim trying to put hoop over her 
Chloe in tree, Lisa interacting 
Playing in sand with shovel under trees 
 
What could these observations tell us other than the fact that these 
little people seemed to do an awful lot of things and not a lot of pre-
thought appeared to go into what they did?  Reading through 
Mandell’s (1988) study after finishing my own empirical work, it was 
evident that she had also grappled with this issue: 
I quickly discovered that the pattern of children was one of 
scatter.  To me, this constituted chaos.  My adult conception 
of an orderly entry and passage from one activity to the next 
was of no use in guiding or ordering my attention.  The 
following comment from my second day illustrates my 
difficulty in grasping this pattern of roaming: 
28/4/77E  It is too difficult to keep track of what happened 
to whom because the group disintegrated.  The children flit  
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from one activity to another so quickly that it is difficult and 
confusing to find a pattern (Mandell: 1988: 448) 
 
It often appeared that the children were just filling in the two hours of 
the outdoor session with whatever and whoever was available.  While 
two of the girls and four of the boys spent most of their time together, 
the rest generally moved from activity to activity and playmate to 
playmate.  Some children appeared to favour particular playmates to 
others, but this was in a semi-pragmatic fashion only – that is, if 
these favoured children were available they were the playmate of 
choice, but others were welcomed if they were not.  The only pattern I 
could ascertain was that girls generally preferred to play with girls 
and boys with boys, but this is what I had already expected (informed 
by both the literature and general observations of children playing 
together).  To make matters more difficult, the children’s actions were 
further complicated by their prevailing mood, which could vary by the 
hour let alone the day, and further by the day of the week (as I have 
already discussed, Monday was a particularly unsettled day). 
 
Making sense of what I was observing was thus a frustrating process 
– often there appeared to be no predictable patterns of interaction at 
all.  Such frustration is illustrated by the following diary entries: 
Day 6: I feel like I am not getting anywhere.  I go in with a 
hunch – perhaps the ‘boys’ gang’ does exclude others and 
that day they mix in with everyone else!  
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Day 7:  I am getting constant confirmation that you cannot 
think in generalised terms with children – their lives, their 
personalities etc make them all react differently to different 
things on different days.  Some of those who have been in 
childcare for a long time are quite social and get in there no 
matter how young they are – others don’t.  Many of the 
younger ones have trouble including themselves, others 
don’t.  Some of the older ones have much more noticeable 
‘play’ skills (formulating structured role playing games etc) 
while others, like Bridget, don’t (Author’s research journal) 
 
This observation made on day 7 was mirrored in similar diary entries 
throughout my time in the field.  While one could always see evidence 
of the research on young children and play during any two hour 
period, there was also a lot of activity that simply did not fit the neat 
explanations of development or socialisation theory. 
 
In my many attempts to write this chapter, I was frequently tempted 
to leave these confusing details out completely.  Not only were they 
hard to interpret, but I also felt that they did not make for interesting 
reading – the blow-by-blow accounts of the movements of three and 
four year olds were hardly absorbing.  However, I persevered as I still 
wanted to provide an account of what the social lives of these children 
were like - ‘warts and all’ - with all the complexities intact.  In 
addition, as I wrote and rewrote, certain things became clearer.   
Initially I had presumed, as I did in the field, the transient, ever 
moving nature of the children’s interactions had got in the way both of 
my research and my capacity to write it up.  How could I ascertain  
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patterns if most of the children did not form permanent or even semi-
permanent groupings or if, as illustrated by the diary entry earlier, 
they kept upsetting the hunches that I had?  How could I see past the 
often practical, pragmatic factors that appeared to shape the 
children’s choice of playmate to what was really going on?  Slowly, 
however, I came to a realisation.  In searching for patterns to the 
children’s interactions, in looking for the deeper meaning (and 
wishing to discard the empirical observations because I could not find 
it), I was in real danger of imposing an order that did not exist. 
 
Against this, I came to the conclusion that the children’s actions and 
interactions  were  of a transient nature, and their interactions were 
often based on pragmatic concerns.  If this was the case, then these 
were the foundations to understanding the social worlds of these 
young children.  I had found my ‘fit’ and in the process realised that I 
had come dangerously close to reproducing the kind of mistakes 
described in Part One of the thesis.  In research that is driven by 
adult perspectives and adult agendas there is a very real danger that 
our vision of ‘real’ messy, complicated children may be obscured, or 
even deliberately hidden, resulting in us missing important issues in 
children’s lives. 
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Following this realisation, the focus of my interest also changed.  It 
became less about issues of ‘difference’ and more about the gulf 
between the complex and unpredictable actions and interactions of 
the children in the study and the children presented in research 
accounts.   I increasingly asked myself how traditional research had 
been able to reduce children’s social lives to a level of simplicity 
indicated, for example, by the selection of one photo of a potential 
playmate over another?  While I had been concerned about this type 
of research before I had started my empirical research, now it 
appeared even more troublesome. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter I have selected certain themes in 
which to record my own observations and juxtapose them with some 
of the mainstream research and/or theory on the issue. These themes 
were chosen for the way that the observations discussed under them 
‘jarred’ during my observation period.  This ‘jarring’ often occurred 
because the observations did not correlate with the assumptions I had 
made before the research began.   The themes discussed are: being 
with others (and on ones own) at day care; the fleeting nature of play 
and playmates and a discussion of ‘difference’. 
 
Rather than providing detailed logs of a number of children, the 
tracing logs of Joanna and Lisa reproduced earlier are referred to with  
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the aim of illustrating different points that require an extended time 
frame.  In other cases, excerpts of other logs are used. 
 
Being with others (and on one’s own) at day care 
Adult notions of friendship are central to our understandings of 
children’s interactions.  The very questions of inclusion/exclusion are 
built upon the premise of this special bond.  Indeed, my own research 
was driven by a belief that children’s ‘happiness’ in day care would be 
more influenced by having friends to play with than issues such as 
the nature of the food they had at lunch or whether they had to wear 
their shoes or not.  As we saw in Part I, this assumption is shaped 
both by ideals of what childhood is – or should be (a time of fun, 
friendship and play) - and also by developmental models which 
position friendship as being important to a child’s successful 
development.  Further, as the following quote illustrates, young 
children’s social interactions are generally seen in terms of their 
development from the ‘primitive’ towards the more developed, adult 
type interactions. 
To be sure, these early peer interactions are still quite 
primitive.  Most of the time, toddlers ignore one another’s 
bids for interaction, and when they play together it is mostly 
around common toys (Bee: 1998: 196) 
 
Against all this, during my observations I was surprised by how many 
children spent time on their own.  At any one time during my  
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observations it would not be unusual for four or five children to be on 
their own, either involved in an activity such as playing in the sandpit 
or with toys or simply watching other children.  While there were a 
group of children that spent more time alone than others, these 
children did not spend all of their time on their own and appeared to 
be able to initiate interaction if they got bored or found someone doing 
something that interested them. 
 
Five of the children at the centre (Lisa, Bridget, Cory, Lauren and 
Joseph) regularly spent most of their time during outside play on their 
own.  These children were often of interest to me – especially at the 
beginning of the research when I was attempting to determine who 
was being ‘excluded’ in my initial terms of reference.  In the early 
stages of the research I had assumed that a child on their own 
signified exclusion, thinking that if a child was on their own it was 
because they were being ‘left out’, not due to their own choice.   
However, after observing these five children over a period of four 
months I came to realise that this was an oversimplification – each 
child spent time on their own for different reasons.  A closer look at 
four of these children: Lauren, Lisa, Cory and Joseph, will help to 
illustrate this. 
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As already noted, Lauren has Downs Syndrome and spent just one 
day at the centre a week.  She would spent the majority of the time on 
her own – at times she might position herself quite close to other 
children and observe them, but when others joined the activity she 
was doing she would leave, as the following diary entry illustrates: 
Day 12: Tracing Lauren 
Playing on platform near sandpit 
Sitting in sandpit 
Playing with kitchen bench in sandpit 
Three children enter sandpit and Lauren leaves 
 
And later: 
 
Standing on bottom of climbing frame 
Climbing up ladder – Phoebe, Sam, Jordan and Steven at 
top 
Waited for them to go and then carried on up 
 
Lauren appeared quite content to play on her own – she just got on 
with it and played on the swings or in the sandpit.  At times she 
would interact with others by sharing toys and so on, but on the 
whole the other children more or less ignored her.  When the other 
children did interact with her it was often in a paternalistic manner, 
for example, I observed Susan, a new girl at the centre, patting 
Lauren on the back like a baby.  This type of relationship seemed to 
be fostered by the centre staff.  On several occasions I witnessed a 
child being told to go and get Lauren for morning tea with the 
instruction ‘take her by the hand and lead her’.  Thus the children did 
not actively exclude Lauren, it was more that she kept herself out of 
their way.  
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Lisa was full time at the centre and during my periods of observation 
she also spent the majority of the time on her own.  At times she 
would interact with others but usually only with one child at a time 
and this was usually Bridget.  Although Lisa was at times unhappy 
when she was dropped off, the rest of the time she appeared to be in 
her own little world.  At times she would run from one area to the 
other (often squealing), at others she would play on the equipment, 
ride a bike, jump off planks and so on.  She would also spend a lot of 
time playing with inanimate objects.  For example, one day I observed 
her pushing a stick through a leaf for approximately ten minutes.  I 
only witnessed one incident in which she was actually ‘excluded’ and 
this was by Bridget who shouted at her to go away.  One of the carers 
expressed concern to me one day about Lisa’s behaviour and her 
perceived lack of social skills.  Lisa, though, appeared to be quite 
content doing her own thing. 
 
Joseph started at the centre at about the same time as I did and as 
we saw earlier, he could speak no English.  Joseph also spent most of 
his time on his own.  At times he would initiate contact – generally 
through the use of a common object - but he would never spend long 
in these interactions before going off to ride his bike or do something 
else on his own.  When Blake started at the centre he and Joseph  
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would quite often play together.  However, even when Joseph looked 
like he was enjoying himself he would often distance himself and play 
on his own for a while.  Although I saw Steven and Phoebe being 
unkind to Joseph on several occasions – taking his toys or shouting 
at him - these two often did that to other children. Unlike Lauren, 
though, Joseph was obviously not happy at the centre.  At times he 
would attempt to dash out the gate if an adult opened it and often he 
would sit with his pack on his back near the fence waiting for his 
mother who would come to collect him at 12noon. 
 
Cory started at the centre at about the same time that I started my 
observations and was one of the youngest in the room.  He only spent 
one day a week at the centre and during the time I was there he did 
not ‘settle in’.  After a couple of weeks, though, he settled into a 
pattern of playing with a box of plastic sea creatures or dinosaurs – 
predominantly on his own, but at times other children would join 
him.  When children did join him he was often upset that he had to 
share his dinosaurs and would get into trouble with the carers for 
trying to bundle them all up to take them somewhere else.  For him, 
the two hours of outside play appeared to be a matter of passing the 
time until he could go home again – on several occasions I observed 
him saying “Mummy will be back later” to anyone who cared to listen.   
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The other children were not excluding Cory – he simply did not make 
approaches to play and seemed to prefer to play alone with his toys. 
 
The differences between these six children in terms of age, 
temperament, and social and language skills make it difficult to 
generalise about why they were on their own, illustrating just how 
hard it is to fit ‘real’ children into the schema of ‘normal’ behaviour.  
And it also points to something else.  While developmental theory 
probes the social skills of the non-socialising child (for example, 
Putallaz and Gottman: 1981), it forgets to ask, centrally, how the 
child is when they are alone.  Does she appear to be alone by choice?  
Is she content to be alone?  Such questions return the focus to the 
here and now of the individual child rather than the ideal of the adult 
that they might become in the future. 
 
Recognising that children might actually choose to play on their own 
was an unsettling finding for my research for, as discussed, I had 
assumed that the interaction between peers was going to be a primary 
factor in influencing children’s experience of day care.  It also marked 
a larger conceptual dilemma whereby I felt I had to choose between 
acknowledging the complexity of the children’s day to day lives in all 
its chaos and uncertainty, or ‘filtering out’ the chaos to try and find 
the patterns which were more amenable to orderly research findings.   
  168 
My decision to stay with the complexity inevitably makes it harder to 
present research ‘findings’ in any quick and easy way.  One of the 
ways in which much of the research into children’s worlds imposes 
order is through the use of ‘snapshots’ of the children’s interactions – 
the interactions are decontextualised from the children’s daily lives 
and presented as if they stand alone as illustrations of the author’s 
point.  However, a more detailed consideration of the lives of the 
children involved, and the contexts in which their actions take place, 
may well reveal a much more complex picture.  This is illustrated by 
the following two incidents. 
Day 19:  Kelly and Blake climbed to the top of the climbing 
frame.  When Connie tried to join in Kelly told her to go 
away and actually forced her hands off the ladder so she 
fell. 
Day 11:  Jordan is not letting Michael play with the boys 
group.  Jordan and Sam are playing with the kitchen 
cabinet in the sandpit and will not let Michael open the 
doors etc (Author’s research journal). 
 
At first glance these two incidents appear similar: a child is being 
excluded from what Corsaro calls ‘an ongoing peer interaction’ 
(Corsaro: 1985) with Kelly going to some lengths to keep the ‘imposter’ 
out.  What were the contexts within which these actions took place?  
In what sets of relationships and circumstances were they embedded? 
 
In the first incident, the following considerations are noted.  Connie 
was actually Kelly’s stepsister and they would spend a good  
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proportion of their time playing together at the centre.  They had also 
incorporated Blake into their games after he arrived at the centre.   
Before this incident the girls had been playing chasey with him for 
approximately ten minutes and then for some reason Kelly had 
decided that she did not want to share her ‘friend’.  This was not so 
much an ‘act of exclusion’ as two sisters having a disagreement over 
sharing their friend. 
 
What of the second incident?  Here I note that on the day it occurred 
Jordan had returned to the centre after a long holiday (he had not 
been there since I had started).  My observations then, and in the 
days to come, suggested that he, Sam and Steven were friends who 
liked to play together.  Crucially, though, while Sam and Steven 
would also play with others, including Michael, Jordan normally 
played with only Sam and/or Steven.  During the incident quoted, 
Jordan appeared to be reinstating the boundaries of the ‘boys group’ 
which only included himself, Sam and Steven.  On this occasion, 
Michael was indeed being excluded from ‘the group’ but during the 
next day, when Jordan was not there, I observed Sam playing with 
Michael. 
 
If I had videotaped the children for an hour and observed those 
interactions stripped of their wider context I could have reached 
similar conclusions about straight exclusionary tactics.  However, as  
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soon as the wider context to these ‘snapshot’ events is registered it 
becomes evident that two incidents which could have been read as 
similar acts of ‘exclusion’ were actually quite different.  I return to the 
issue of ‘including complexity’ later in the chapter. 
 
Playmates – a fleeting thing? 
As noted earlier in the chapter, approximately one month into the 
research I had started to trace the activities of two children at each 
session.  This was always more challenging than it might appear, 
given that the children were rarely involved in a particular activity for 
more than a few minutes.  If I was distracted by the activities of other 
children, by the time my attention returned to them, the children I 
had been tracing might have moved on to something else – with 
someone else.  During the course of the ninety minutes that I 
observed Joanna she moved 33 times (which is an average of three 
minutes per activity).  She interacted with six children, but not the 
same child for extended periods, and she also spent time on her own.  
All of the children I traced were involved in between thirty and forty 
activities (Lisa, also quoted earlier, had the most ‘moves’ at 43) during 
their outside play time and would interact with up to seven children 
over the course of the period.  However, as with Joanna and Lisa, 
these interactions were generally not for extended periods of time – 
the children would play or talk to someone, move to something else,  
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spend time on their own and perhaps interact with the same child 
later in the session. 
 
This transient nature of the children’s interactions – the constant 
movement from one interaction or action to the next – challenged any 
notion that children of this age gave the choice of their playmates a 
great deal of preplanning.  My research question about who got 
included and excluded only made sense in the context of permanent 
or at least semipermanent groupings within or from which an 
individual could be included or excluded - the transient nature of 
children’s activities ensured that this was rarely the case.   
Furthermore, the children’s choices of ‘playmates’ appeared to be 
made primarily on practical grounds, for example, on who happened 
to be riding a bike around the bike track, who was in the sandpit, and 
even who was simply available  (i.e. not playing with someone else).  
For the majority of the children, the choice of playmate was often 
shaped around an activity rather than vice versa8, as illustrated by 
the following excerpt from the diary entry. 
Day 20:  Tracing Emma 
With Rebecca and Kelly in sandpit 
Sitting in tyre with Rebecca 
Joins group by fence bordering toddlers area 
Back into sandpit 
Playing totem tennis with Chloe 
Play with Cory and John on block table 
                                                 
8 My observations about this type of behaviour corresponds with the psychological literature on 
playing (for example, Bee 1998) which speaks of interactions around common toys.    
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Joined by Sally 
Talking to Rebecca 
Emma, Rebecca and Kelly run to sandpit. 
 
While Emma is often drawn back to play briefly with Rebecca and 
Kelly, she also spends time on her own or with others doing a variety 
of activities.  Generally her primary focus appears to be on the activity 
and she interacts with anyone who is also involved in the same 
activity – for example, Chloe at the totem tennis or Sally at the block 
table. 
 
This is not to say that all children played with all children in the 
centre – there were definitely playmates of choice if the game was one 
that required others – for example, chasey or a role play game such as 
‘families’.  Even so, if these playmates of choice were not available or 
willing to play, they were readily replaced with someone who was.  
 
Furthermore, being ‘someone’s friend’ was often quite a provisional, 
transient status.  Children could be quite happily playing together 
until something would happen and I would be informed that “I am not 
their friend”.  The following account of Phoebe illustrates this: 
Day 13: Tracing Phoebe 
Emma, Rebecca and Chloe with buckets picking leaves off 
the tree 
Rebecca to Phoebe: “we’re not playing with you, we’re not 
your friend” 
Approximately 10 minutes later: 
Rebecca takes Phoebe to share frozen drink in cylinder with 
Chloe and Emma  
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Thus, ten minutes after shunning Phoebe, Rebecca initiates contact 
with her and asked her to share a frozen drink.  This was a 
noteworthy invitation because sharing drink bottles was not allowed, 
hence the girls hid in the large cylinder out of the gaze of adults to 
drink it. 
 
It often required only a minor infringement for someone to lose their 
‘friend’ status, as illustrated by the following diary entry: 
Day 9: Today Steven yelled at Joseph “I hate you” and then 
said to me “I hate that boy”.  When I asked why he said “Cos 
he bumped into my bike”. 
 
I was also on the receiving end of this ‘loss of friend’ status: 
Day 8:  Phoebe comes up to me and tells me that I am no 
longer her friend 
I ask why “Because you left the picnic” 
 
Against these transient patterns, certain children did spend the 
majority of their time together.  Those concerned were two four year 
old girls, Emma and Joanna, and three boys, Jordan, Steven and Sam 
(Emma and Joanna would generally only play with others if one of 
them was not at the centre; the boys would often float in and out of 
the group).  These groupings were also noticeable because as well as 
spending extended amounts of time in each other’s company they 
would also physically distance themselves from the other children.    
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The girls played behind objects such as the toy oven in the sandpit 
while the boy’s group spent a good deal of time by the perimeter fence.  
 
The children’s generally pragmatic choice of playmate was cause for 
me to stop and reflect on two counts.  Firstly, as already discussed, it 
highlighted how my research question did not fit the children’s social 
interactions.  This was of immediate concern in terms of the research 
itself (how was I going to deal with it?), but it also caused me to reflect 
on why this disjuncture had happened in the first place.  For while I 
had been watching the children I had been quickly reminded that 
indeed this was what the actions of children of this age were like.   
Only several years previously I had spent a great deal of time with 
children of this age (my own and friend’s children, at playgroup, 
kindergarten and so on).  But as a researcher preparing for fieldwork 
it was the literature on children that I drew on and my own lived 
experience had been pushed to the background.  The predictable 
children of the research literature had become my frame of reference 
and my memory of noisy, unpredictable children had been 
superseded by academic knowledge. 
 
My second line of reflection concerned the methodologies whereby 
children are asked to choose between hypothetical playmates.  While I 
had queried this before doing my fieldwork, now I began to question  
  175 
its very starting point and a priori assumptions.  A crucial point had 
emerged, namely that any claim that research had about informing 
our understanding of the development of prejudice was based on 
assumptions about the permanence, or at least semi-permanence, of 
children’s attitudes revealed or ‘caught’ by the researcher.  Against 
this, the ethnographic picture I was building up was all about the 
essentially pragmatic and transient nature of children’s social lives. 
 
Different to what? 
While I had decided not to restrict my definition of ‘difference’ to the 
colour of skin or racial features, it was not until I was well into my 
research that I realised that I still conceptualised difference primarily 
in terms of physical markers.  Here I included such things as the 
clothes children wore as well as ethnic difference.  But I began to 
realise that the children’s attention was not necessarily caught by the 
same factors as mine, and thus shifted my focus to what interested 
them. 
 
Here I noted that many of the children were very observant as to what 
might be perceived as minor changes in people’s appearance or 
behaviour.  For example, if one of the children or adults had had a 
haircut it was usually instantly commented upon by a number of the 
children.  
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Day 9:  When Emma arrived at the centre, Sam went over to 
her and said “you’ve had a haircut”.  He then came over to 
me and told me “Emma has had a haircut. 
Day 16:  Three children came up to me during the course of 
my morning at the centre today and commented that I had 
had a haircut.  
Day 20:  One of the children’s mother came in today (she 
works at the centre in another room).  She had dyed her 
hair pink and a group of children gathered around her to 
look and comment on it.  Joanna said: “I don’t like it” 
(Author’s research journal). 
 
In instances such as these the children’s attention was caught 
because something was new to them or, more frequently, different 
from what they had seen before or come to expect.  Interestingly, the 
children were more likely to comment upon differences in adults (both 
in terms of physical appearance and behaviour) than those of other 
children. 
Day 24:  The man who drives the fun bus came through the 
play area today and the children gathered around to talk to 
him.  Rebecca saw that he had an earring and she said:   
“men don’t wear earrings – my daddy doesn’t wear an 
earring (Author’s research journal). 
 
One boy who came only once or twice while I was at the centre wore a 
brightly coloured cape and a hat with his hair sticking through the 
top.  He struck me, as an adult, as being ‘different’ and I watched the 
children to see if they commented on his attire or treated him 
differently because of it. They did not.  On reflection, the children’s 
acknowledgement of diversity in adult’s rather than children’s dress is 
not surprising.  Children of this age often ‘dress up’ and a four year  
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old in a Spiderman or fairy costume out in public would not garner 
much interest while an adult in the same attire might. 
 
However, the children’s observations of difference were not limited to 
physical matters.  Different behaviour was also noticed and 
commented on.  Again, adult behaviour that differed from what the 
children were used to was more likely to elicit a response from the 
children than the behaviour of other children.  For example, during 
my first day at the centre I was ‘playing’ on some of the climbing 
equipment (I was, after all, to be ‘least adult’) and my actions left 
some of the children looking at me bemused, as the following journal 
entry illustrates: 
Day 1:  Sat on the mat near the climbing frame.  Bridget 
asked me to watch her run and then I had a turn.  Several 
others then joined in.  I had a turn on the climbing frame 
and when they said “watch me” I also said “watch me”.   
They were slightly bemused that I was climbing on the 
equipment.  Bridget said that it was for little people 
(Author’s research journal). 
 
This demarcation of what was acceptable for adults was evident on 
further occasions: 
Day 16:  Phoebe is playing monsters, putting a rubber mask 
on.  I put on a scary face and she said I didn’t have a mask 
on so proceeded to put one on me.  After she had taken it off 
she muttered something about masks being for “kids, not 
adults” (Author’s research journal). 
 
Interestingly, what were distinguishing markers were also different 
from what adults might usually notice.  For example, as the following  
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journal entry indicates, it is a carer’s (Jill) red shoes that Blake uses 
to identify her – for him, this is her defining characteristic, not hair 
colour or height or even something perhaps more obvious like the 
colour of her shirt. 
Day 23:  Blake is sitting in a car, face on hand, looking 
bored.  “Where is the lady with the red shoes?” (He was 
referring to Jill – a carer) 
 
Thus, although I had sought to get away from issues such as race and 
ethnicity and to look for patterns of inclusion and exclusion that were 
shaping the children’s interactions, my definition of ‘difference’ was 
still a limited one that focussed primarily on physical difference and 
then behavioural difference.  It was only over the course of time that I 
came to see that children’s perception of ‘difference’ was more fluid 
than that – that it was about different from before, different from what 
I have seen before.  For many children of this age their categories of 
‘normal’ or ‘usual’ are not as structured as an adults – many things 
are different from what they have seen before. 
 
Concluding reflections 
At the beginning of my research I had set out with two clear questions 
that I believed, once answered, would help to provide some insights 
into the types of difference that might influence young children’s 
choice of playmate and provide a better understanding of the  
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children’s social worlds.  However, as I observed them, I realised that 
while I had attempted to move away from adultcentric 
understandings, my reconceptualisations had still occurred outside 
the reality of the children’s immediate social lives.  My main 
observations, partially in contrast to the ordered reality of most 
research texts, then came to rest on the children’s pragmatism in the 
choice of playmates and their ephemeral patterns of action and 
interaction.  As discussed earlier in the chapter, Mandell also 
commented on the children’s chaos, noise and “scatter” (Mandell: 
1988: 447).  Her solution to the problem was to implement a “limiting 
strategy” in which she observed a few children at a time and 
concentrated on their verbal and nonverbal language (Mandell: 1988: 
448).  In Mandell’s case, this ‘limiting strategy’ still allowed 
concentration on the details and complexity of children’s lives – as, I 
hope, did mine.  However, in much mainstream research a ‘limiting 
strategy’ is used, but not really acknowledged, whereby researchers 
attempt to ‘find meaning’ in the chaotic world of young children by 
simply narrowing the focus of attention.  When the researcher’s focus 
is narrowed sufficiently there may indeed be patterns that can fit back 
into an adult’s frame of reference.  Limiting strategies are a necessary 
and valuable tool for any researcher, but in doing it this way - in 
narrowing the focus to filter out the chaos – it is possible that we lose 
sight of important aspects of children’s social worlds.  
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Rather than providing answers on a specific aspect of children’s social 
interactions, my fieldwork prompted me to ask questions about 
research on children more generally.  What, for example, were the 
implications of the researcher’s tendency to look ‘past’ the chaos and 
complexity of young children’s lives in the search for an ordered, 
academic pattern?  In our attempt to answer adult-framed questions 
about the nature of difference (and other matters), do we run the risk 
of missing important factors about children’s lives?  With these 
questions in mind I revisited the literature on children and racism 
that had informed my own research.  
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PART III  
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Chapter Six: The Purpose behind the Purpose 
 
It is not only researchers with an interest in childhood who 
have an interest in children.  The media, business people, 
politicians and policy-makers all have an interest in the 
views, the voice or the perspective of the child. 
This should, of course, be good news in principle for those 
concerned with listening to children and enabling them to 
speak out.  But given this burgeoning interest in children, 
what is there to stop children becoming merely a tool in the 
adult armoury, with no opportunity for genuine participation? 
(Roberts 2000: 225) 
  
After I finished the empirical component of my project I returned to 
the literature on racism that had inspired me to approach my 
research differently, particularly the study by Van Ausdale and Feagin 
(2001) but also that conducted by Holmes (1995).  Rereading these 
studies with the insights that I had gained through my own 
observations I began to question some of the questions they had 
asked and some of the conclusions they had drawn.  If the 
researchers had not been looking for signs of racism, and if they had 
taken into account characteristics such as the pragmatic and 
transient nature of young children’s interactions, might they not have 
reached different conclusions?  Why had research that had employed 
ethnographic methods so as to ‘better’ understand children resulted 
in children being asked questions not far removed from those studies 
that had employed positivist methods these authors themselves had 
critiqued?  
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In attempting to answer this question, my inquiries proceeded in two 
stages, both of which are reflected in the body of this chapter.  In the 
first instance, I came to think that approaching the research from a 
‘social problem’ approach – with racism and/or ethnicity to the fore – 
had ‘hijacked’ researchers’ attempts to ‘better’ understand children’s 
social lives by narrowing the focus to an adult-driven question.  In 
essence this meant that the researchers had misused their 
methodology – that there was a lack of ‘fit’ between their social 
problem frame and the principles of ethnographic research that were 
discussed in Chapter Two (for example, being true to the phenomenon 
in question and avoiding apriori assumptions).  However, on further 
reflection, I came to the conclusion that it was not the topic of racism 
nor a misused methodology that had ‘hijacked’ the researcher’s 
attempts to better understand children, for ‘understanding children’ 
was never in fact their primary intention.  Rather, for Holmes (1995) 
the intention was to gain a better understanding of children’s 
understanding of racism; for Van Ausdale and Feagin  (2001) it was to 
better understand the development of racism in young children.  That 
children per se were not at the centre of these researchers’ interests, 
was, as I shall argue later, masked by the fact that the researchers 
adopted an ethnographic methodology and the language of the 
sociology of childhood.  
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This realisation led me to think more creatively and fully about what 
researching children with the intent of simply gaining a better 
understanding of the variability of their lives and experiences might 
look like.  It also led me to consider the relationship between the 
intent or purpose behind the research to the methodologies employed 
and the type of research that was produced. 
 
In the next section I set out these issues and arguments in more 
detail.  Following that I consider their specific implications for the 
work undertaken by Van Ausdale and Feagin, Holmes and others, 
before moving on to consider a number of more general issues about 
applied social research and children’s lives. 
 
Social Problems and the ‘misuse’ of methodology 
My starting point here is that the general sociological literature warns 
against taking a problem such as racism as the starting point for 
research (e.g. Lowry 1974; May 1993; Silverman 1993).  These 
authors argue that it is important for sociologists to explore the 
values and challenge the assumptions that underpin social problems 
rather than simply taking a given p r o b l e m  a s  a  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  f o r  
research.  Lowry points out that the failure to challenge prevailing 
assumptions promotes the belief social problems exist ‘out there’  
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rather than through the way ‘scientists and laymen define, identify, 
investigate and attempt to resolve them’ (Lowry 1974: ix).  Similarly, 
May (1993) stresses the importance of examining how a social 
problem has been constructed as  a social problem, taking into 
account cultural and historical factors and issues of power while 
Boucher (1995) maintains that the researcher should apply the same 
rigour of analysis to themselves as those that they research: 
For example, if she is studying race in primary education in 
Philadelphia, the first set of questions would be why this 
topic?  Why study race?  Why primary education?  Why an 
urban location?  She might then ask herself if anything in 
her racial experience influenced the choice of topic?  How 
about experiences of one’s education or living in a city?  She 
could then ask similar questions about the choice of 
research topic, theories, methods and so on. (Boucher 1995: 
np) 
 
Social problems also narrow the focus of the research by limiting what 
social researchers seek to find out and indeed what is seen in the 
field.  Ansoff argues that often the narrowness of the questions asked  
in research “precludes the results from being an interesting 
contribution to fundamental knowledge” (Ansoff 1986: 20).  Thus, for 
example, Tim May’s (1993) work usefully indicates how the 
expectations of sponsors can lead to selectivity  whereby potentially 
interesting and/or useful findings that do not fit within the predefined 
parameters of the research are dismissed (May 1993: 37). 
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Issues such as these are particularly relevant where research on 
children is concerned, given that social problems are conceptualised 
by adults in the adult world and reflect adult concerns and values.  It 
is ironic, then, that Part One of this thesis pointed to the continued 
prevalence of the social problem approach in research on children, 
with researchers attempting to find the answer to social problems at 
their perceived origin – in childhood.  It is even more ironic that this 
attempt to diagnose social problems early enough to enable 
intervention still lies at the heart of much research which claims to 
place children at the centre of the picture. 
 
On a related level, the disjuncture between the claim (placing children 
at the centre through the use of ethnographic methods) and the 
actual way the research by Van Ausdale and Holmes was conducted 
(whereby children were often asked set questions and/or reduced to 
categories such as ‘Anna, 3 black’), reveals a fundamental mismatch 
between the ethnographic philosophy and the starting assumptions of 
research motivated by social problem research. 
 
As discussed at the end of Part I, while there is disagreement on what 
exactly constitutes ethnography in terms of ‘procedural rules’ (as a 
‘method’) there is agreement that ethnographic research needs to be 
done in a ‘natural’ setting.  Brewer (2000) traces this naturalism back  
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to its ontological and epistemological roots where, unlike physical and 
inanimate objects, human beings interpret and construct their social 
world.  Thus, as Brewer (2000) states, any of the particular 
ethnographic methods involved must track back to the philosophy 
and theories that underpin them as they involve researchers in 
“commitments whether or not they are aware of it, for they entail 
assumptions about the nature of society and assumptions about the 
nature of knowledge” (Brewer 2000: 28).  These assumptions underlie 
the inductive nature of ethnography and principles such as the 
importance of being true to the phenomenon under study (Matza 
1964: 5) as well as the importance of avoiding a priori assumptions 
and the “premature definition of variables” (Silverman 1993: 36).  To 
deploy ethnography as a means of studying a taken for granted ‘social 
problem’ is thus to use it as a ‘method’ removed of its philosophical 
base9.  In this sense, Van Ausdale and Feagin (2001) and Holmes’ 
(1995) attempts to do research that better understood children and 
racism has been thwarted by a ‘misused’ methodology. 
 
This line of reasoning took me a large part of the way and remains 
reflected in much of the discussion later in this chapter.  However, in 
response to the comments of a colleague who read an earlier draft of 
                                                 
9 These issues are discussed extensively by authors such as Brewer (2000) and Hammersley and Atkinson 
(1995). 
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this discussion, I realised that there was also something more at play.  
This related to why it was that Van Ausdale and Feagin and Holmes 
decided to place children ‘centre stage’ in the first place – to what, in 
other words, was the ‘purpose behind their purpose’.  And this, as 
already indicated, did not seem to be understanding children but, one 
way or another, about gaining a better understanding of the 
development of racism in children . 
 
Thus, while Van Ausdale and Feagin had taken up the sociology of 
childhood challenge to the extent that they had reconceptualised ‘the 
child’ as social actor, and Holmes had set out to “convey young 
children’s knowledge of race and ethnicity in their own terms” 
(Holmes 1995: 3), neither of them had the lives and experiences of 
individual children as their primary interest. 
 
The distinction between ‘the child’ (as a category) and ‘children’ 
(actual children) is often discussed in ontological terms but it is also a 
central issue in the way that research with children is conceptualised 
and carried out.  For as long as the abstract category ‘the child’ is to 
the fore, it is quite possible for researchers to use the language and 
methodology of the sociology of childhood while absenting the voices 
and views of actual children from the research.  This concern is 
expressed by Roberts:  
  189 
Researching children and trying to involve children and 
young people in decisions touching on their lives does not 
necessarily place researchers or others on the high moral 
ground, above those who in the bad old days would research 
children or intervene in their lives without so much as a 
focus group or questionnaire.  It cannot be taken for granted 
that more listening means more hearing, or that the cost 
benefits to children of participating in research on questions 
in which they may or may not have a stake is worth the 
candle (Roberts 2000: 229). 
 
Against this, the challenge that had been put forward by the sociology 
of childhood was to better understand the world of children by, in 
fact, giving primacy to the voices and perspectives of children.  This 
requires a great deal from researchers who take up the challenge: 
they must attempt to put aside their adult understandings of the 
world and the issues that are important to adults and they must lay 
aside any notions of being ‘experts’ about children and accept that 
children know more about their social world than the researchers do.  
But most importantly, they are required to put the children  before 
themselves as researchers or as academics.   Considering the power 
imbalance between adults and children this is an important point, for, 
as Sumsion asks: “to what extent, I wonder, are we really willing to 
relinquish our power as researchers and adults as we seek children’s 
perspectives?” (Sumsion 2003: 8) 
 
Rather than providing the definitive ‘answers’ often required of 
research, researchers who really work from this perspective need to  
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accept that their work will often produce more questions than 
answers.  They need to convince other adults (academic colleagues, 
government officers, politicians) that the voices of children are 
important in and of themselves and that this requires a level of 
commitment to children as children.  Children, not ‘the child’ are ‘the 
purpose behind the purpose’ in this kind of research. 
 
This ‘simple’ fact must therefore shape the types of decisions the 
researcher makes during the research process and also, as in the case 
of Caroline Jones and her study on children’s understanding and 
experience of death and bereavement, whether there will even be a 
‘research project’.  The methodology adopted by Jones (a teacher and 
researcher) involved a class of seven and eight year olds in a series of 
six writing lessons on death.  Reading through the children’s stories 
Jones found that she was unable to remain detached from the 
children’s words.  She felt that it was a betrayal to use the children’s 
personal accounts on such a sensitive subject as ‘research data’: 
As I began to read what they had written I realised the 
project was doomed.  Until that point I had felt ‘objective’, 
only now did I acknowledge that I could not treat their 
words as ‘data’.  There was no way I would make the results 
of their efforts open to public scrutiny.  I had not considered 
the potential emotional impact of using children as 
‘subjects’ … Suddenly, I cared too much (Jones 2000: 95). 
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Against the kind of genuinely ‘children centred’ research, exemplified 
by Jones’ study and the decisions she reached, it is evident that 
research that seeks to understand and provide answers to adult social 
problems still has ‘adults’ at the centre in the sense that they, and 
their concerns, are primary rather than the (infinitely variable) lives 
and experiences of individual children.  As a result the children are 
obscured from view in favour of an abstract notion – ‘the child’ – from 
which data is generated to throw light on the problem the researcher, 
from the perspective of the adult world, wishes to investigate.   
Because the language and method adopted in genuinely ‘children 
centred’ and ‘child as abstract category’ research can be similar, it 
can sometimes be difficult to disentangle the two.  My point, though, 
is that if we look to the purpose behind the research in each case we 
find that it is fundamentally different and this shapes both the 
process and the claims that the research makes. 
 
In the following section I look at the research on racism by Van 
Ausdale and Feagin (2001) and Holmes (1995) and discuss whether, 
even though they challenged the nature of ‘the child’ and employed a 
naturalistic methodology, their focus was still narrowed by an ‘adult 
centred’ research topic and the purpose.  I then compare the process 
of the research and the claims made with two pieces of research that I  
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believe are ‘children centred’ – one by Glauser on ‘Street Children’ and 
the other by Christensen on ‘Quality time’. 
 
The issues discussed in this introductory section – having a social 
problem as a starting point for the research and the intent behind the 
research – are intertwined throughout the following discussion rather 
than being treated separately. 
 
A study of racism or of children? 
It is worth reflecting on the kind of data that are likely to be 
produced through research that is more or less solely directed 
by the researcher’s interests rather than the priorities and 
agendas of the respondents.  This calls for sincere 
consideration of whether the subject of the research makes 
sense to them and how it may be made to reflect their 
experiences and perceptions (Christensen 2004: 171). 
 
Chapter Three of this thesis noted how psychological research has 
produced a plethora of data on children and racism, employing 
techniques such as ethnic awareness and ethnic preference 
techniques.  Being critical of the kind of research that entailed forced 
answers in unnatural conditions, Van Ausdale and Feagin (2001)10 
chose an ethnographic method that, they claimed, would allow them 
to observe children in their ‘natural world’.  They also challenged the 
traditional view of children as ‘objects’ of research. 
                                                 
10 The reference referred to throughout this section is Van Ausdale and Feagin 2001.  
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In this way, Van Ausdale and Feagin clearly set out to view children 
as social actors in their own right, indeed the argument that runs 
through their book relies on this premise.  They argue, for example, 
that the unwillingness to acknowledge racist attitudes among young 
children is based on the assumption that young children are, as yet, 
‘untutored in the ways of adults’ and that, if they do not use racist 
language, this is because they do not yet actively construct the world 
in this way, or that – when and if children do use racist language – it 
is out of ignorance or naiveté (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001: 3).  They 
go on to contend that ignoring the way that children actively create 
their social reality allows adults to deny that racism can exist and 
develop in children of this young age. 
Either assumption allows adults to ignore the possibility 
that children are actively reproducing in their everyday lives 
the matters and realities of race and racism.  Neither 
situation is reasonable, however, since racism remains 
systemic in US. Society.  When adults indulge in such 
denial, they neglect children’s present, active reality and fail 
to understand how children’s actions also create and re-
create society (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001: 3). 
 
Like Van Ausdale and Feagin, Holmes11 wished to “convey young 
children’s knowledge of race and ethnicity in their own terms” 
(Holmes 1995: 3).  As noted in Chapter Three, Holmes did question 
the use of the term race, deciding instead to use ‘ethnic group’.   
                                                 
11 The research by Holmes referred to throughout this section is Holmes 1995.  
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However her critique of the given nature of race appears to be lost 
once Holmes begins to question the children.  As illustrated by the 
following extracts, her line of questioning constantly focuses on a 
simple frame of reference (skin colour) obscuring other points of 
connection and differentiation important to each particular child: 
Inv:  Is there a difference between someone who is black and 
somebody who is white? 
J: (she  nods  yes) 
Inv:  What is the difference? 
J:  Well, somebody’s skin is white, and somebody’s skin is 
black or brown.  Some skin is white, and some is black.  
They’re different ‘cause that’s the way it is.  This one is 
black, this one is brown. (She is holding up a brown and 
a black crayon for me.) 
    (Holmes  1995:  112) 
 
And again with ‘M’, an European American boy: 
Inv.  Are there different kinds of people? 
M: No,  yes 
Inv.  What kinds are there? 
M:  Black people, white, brown 
Inv:  What is the difference between black people and white 
people? 
M:  One’s brown and one’s white.  That’s me (He is pointing to 
his drawing). 
Inv:  If I asked you what the word black means to you, what do 
you think they mean? 
M:  Green, white, black (he is naming the crayon colors in his 
box) 
Inv:  If someone said the word black to you, what do you think 
they mean? 
M:  B-l-a-c-k (He is spelling the word, using the crayon box as 
a guideline). 
Inv:  If you had your choice, would you rather be white or 
black? 
M: Stay  white 
Inv: Why? 
M: Cause  I’m  white.  
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Inv:  If you were to describe yourself, how would you do that? 
Please tell me about M. 
M:  Um, I have a sister, and her name is J, like J in our class 
(he is pointing to his classmate outside).  And I have a 
boat, my dad’s boat, not mine.  My sister has a boat, a 
little boat. 
Inv:  If you had a girlfriend, would she have to be the same 
color as you? 
M:  No.  It would be okay if she was different. 
Inv:  Would you ever choose a black girlfriend? 
M: Yeah 
Inv:  How would you feel about her? 
M:  Good.  I forgot to make my hair. 
Inv:  What do you think the word race means? 
M:  Like having a race and see who wins. 
Inv:  You said girlfriends and boyfriends could be different 
colors.  What about mommies and daddies? 
M:  They could be different. 
    (Holmes  1995:  112-113). 
 
Against Holmes’ claims that she abandoned the concept of race, it is 
evident that her questions only make sense in the context of a study 
on racism.  The focus of the questions here is racism, not ‘social 
relationships’ generally.  Furthermore, the questions are closed so 
that the only relevant answers are those which relate to the colour of 
a person’s skin (for example, is there a difference between someone 
who is black and somebody who is white?). In this way children’s 
attention was almost forcibly brought to bear on skin colour whether 
or not that was an important factor in their reckoning at the outset.  
In other words, Holmes was at risk of creating the states of 
consciousness she set out to investigate. 
 
An interview with 4 year old Stefan actually causes Holmes to reflect 
on the questions that she asked: 
I learned one of the most genuine lessons from Stefan in the 
following conversation.  I asked him, “How does it feel to be 
black”.  Stefan replied, “I don’t know, Robyn,  It feels like a 
person.  I’m just a person, and that’s all I know.”  I came to the 
same conclusion as Stefan.  I’m not really certain what it feels  
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like to be the color white and have never given this fact any 
thought.  It seems reasonable to suppose that, for children and 
adults, being a color is equated with just being a person 
(Holmes 1995: 54). 
 
While this insight appears approximately in the middle of the book it 
is unclear at what point Holmes came to it as interviews quoted both 
before and after it focus on issues of race and colour.  In general she 
also appears unaware that her line of questioning is making little 
sense to the children.  Rather, at times she almost seems to try and 
force the children’s answers to match the research question – the 
topic is fixed and the reality of the children is bent to fit it.  Potential 
opportunities to follow the children’s own conceptualisations about 
how they see themselves are possibly missed because of the closed 
nature of the topic. 
 
The problematic nature of adult-directed research is further 
highlighted by the research conducted by Mehan and Wood (1975).  
Their study clearly illustrates how the social realities of the adults 
asking questions and the children answering them can be quite 
different.  In this study, the researchers looked at children’s 
perceptions and understandings of tests that were carried out in first 
grade of primary school in California.  In one such test the children 
were asked to choose which word “goes best” with the picture on the 
opposite side of the page.  For example the word “fly” points to  
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pictures of a dog, an elephant and a bird.  Many of the first grade 
children chose the elephant, either alone or with the bird, as their 
answer.  When a researcher queried why they had chosen the 
elephant they responded “That’s Dumbo”.  In another test children 
were shown a picture of a medieval fortress and asked to choose 
which consonant the word describing the picture started with: D, C or 
G.  The correct answer was C for Castle, but many of the children 
chose D.  When asked the name of the building the children replied 
“Disneyland”.  In giving the “wrong” answers to the questions the 
children were seen to have “failed” and to have a lesser ability to 
categorise and work in abstractions (Mehan and Wood 1975: 39). 
 
While Van Ausdale and Feagin had challenged the methods of 
previous research and wished to view children as social actors in their 
own right they did not address the inconsistency between this claim 
(viewing children as actors in their own right) and superimposing 
(without the children’s knowledge, consent or input as it were), a 
frame of reference coming directly from their own world as 
professional educators and sociologists.  To the contrary, and evident 
in the following quote, they unselfconsciously saw the role of their 
research as understanding the development of racism in an effort to 
eradicate it:  
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Part of the task facing educators and others seeking change 
is to recognize first how central the tools of race and racism 
are in the social toolbox.  Once that is fully realized, we can 
begin working toward rendering the tools of race and racism 
obsolete.  A first step must be to address, reduce and 
eventually vanquish engrained racist ideas and 
discriminatory practices in all social settings and 
institutions (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001: 201). 
 
While their research involved observation rather than interviews, Van 
Ausdale and Feagin’s starting point and interpretation was similar to 
that of Holmes in that it operated in a relatively closed circuit, 
shutting off the possibility that children might be thinking of other 
things and/or that different interpretations not related to racism 
could plausibly be offered of the same events.  A case in point is the 
following incident, recounted by Van Ausdale and Feagin, when 
Brittany (described as ‘4 white’) is having a discussion with Mike (‘4 
black’) on the colour of his rabbit.  Brittany, to the frustration of Mike, 
is insisting that Mike’s rabbit must be black because Mike is black.  
As Mike is getting upset about Brittany’s insistence about the colour 
of his rabbit, Van Ausdale becomes involved in the conversation and 
asks: 
“Why don’t you think he has a white rabbit at home?”  “He 
can’t”, the child replies calmly, gazing at Mike without blinking 
or smiling.  He renews his howls.  Debi hugs him and rubs his 
back as he sits with her, then tries again, asking Mike to 
describe his rabbit.  “She’s white!” he says indignantly, scowling 
at Brittany and ignoring Debi.  His body stiffens.  “Nope” she 
replies again, “you do not”.  Mike screams at her, stomping his 
feet for emphasis, “I do too!”  Debi takes Brittany’s hand, 
continuing to query her while Mike watches from the comfort of  
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Debi’s lap.   Britanny informs her, “He cant have a white 
rabbit”.  Completely confused by now, Debi finally asks her 
why, and she calmly says “Because he’s Black” (Van Ausdale, 
Feagin 2001: 102). 
 
In their discussion of this incident, the authors argue that Brittany is 
operating within a ‘separatist model’ whereby rabbits must be 
segregated by colour, surmising that: 
It is clear that she has a firm conceptualization of appropriate 
racial identities and role performances.  As she understands 
and speaks the social world, there are certain things that people 
holding a Black identity cannot do, and there are certain 
privileges that those who hold a white identity are permitted to 
do.  Clearly, the latter is superior to the former (Van Ausdale & 
Feagin, 2001: 102). 
 
In this discussion, the authors take a conceptual leap whereby the 
children’s comments demonstrating an awareness of skin colour are 
tied to ‘firm conceptualisation of appropriate racial identities and role 
performances’.  But there are other plausible readings of this same 
incident which do not take this leap, and which hold off the inference 
of racism made by Van Ausdale and Feagin.  If, for example, we were 
to imagine the same conversation but with the words boy and girl 
replacing black and white, the conversation could well suggest either 
a particular form of ‘childlike’ categorisation of association or simply 
of Brittany teasing Mike.  If Brittany had kept asserting that Mike 
could only have a boy rabbit and not a girl one because he is a boy 
and Mike had got frustrated and upset at not being able to convince 
her otherwise (and Brittany had got amused at the scene she was 
creating) would similar conclusions have been reached regarding the 
superiority of girls? 
 
In illustrating the sophistication of children’s use of racial material 
and epithets Van Ausdale and Feagin repeatedly return to another,  
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parallel, incident.  This, particularly because it takes such a central 
place in their report, merits further discussion.  The author’s recount 
that: 
Carla, a three-year-old child, is preparing herself for resting 
time.  She picks up her cot and starts to move it to the other 
side of the class room.  A teacher asks  what s he is doing.  “ I 
need to move this”, explains Carla.  “Why?” asks the teacher.  
“Because I cant sleep next to a nigger”, “Niggers are stinky.  I 
cant sleep next to one.”  Stunned, the teacher, who is white, 
tells Carla to move her cot back and not to use “hurting words”.  
Carla looks amused but complies (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2000: 
1). 
 
I have found it useful to compare this incident with one I encountered 
during my time observing at the centre.  At the end of the outdoor 
play session in a ten minute period before lunch, the children would 
be gathered together to listen to a story.  The children would sit on a 
mat or the grass while a carer sat at the front on a chair waiting for 
the children to get settled.  On one particular day Phoebe sat down 
next to Bridget and Annabel then moved to another spot on the mat 
while muttering the words “I’m not sitting next to smelly people”.  It 
was not evident whether the carer had heard Phoebe’s words but she 
was told to hurry up and sit down and the carer got on with the task 
of reading.  Other than there not being the same significance attached 
to the words ‘smelly people’ as ‘nigger’, the story is remarkably similar 
– even the children’s reaction when they were told off – Carla looked 
“amused and puzzled”, Phoebe also looked amused.  Do Phoebe’s 
words infer a deep seated attitude about the two children she sat next 
to?  One would assume not as she had been playing with the same 
children earlier and would again later.  As we saw in Chapter Four, 
Phoebe was inclined to be moody and when she was in one of these 
moods she would often say mean things to other children.  She was 
also always very keen to get adult’s attention – if new adults came  
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into the centre she would show off or be naughty to get noticed.   
Could her words have been primarily to get a reaction? 
 
It is important to stress that I am not making claims against the 
‘validity’ of the studies examined here.  I am not asserting that the 
researchers ‘got it wrong’ and that I, on the other hand, got it ‘right’.  
Rather, I am suggesting that there are –as always in the social world – 
alternative readings of the same events which may become more 
apparent if the focus is changed slightly and these alternative 
readings may provide important insights into children’s lives. 
 
Researching children, not ‘the child’ 
The previous section used the work of Van Ausdale and Feagin and 
Holmes to illustrate some of the implications of having an adult driven 
purpose behind research involving children.  While these researchers 
might have ‘misused’ the methodology of ethnography, I believe it was 
this primary adult-driven purpose that shaped the subsequent 
research and findings.  In this section I explore research on children 
that has been driven by a different purpose – that of understanding 
children and their lives in the here and now.  This purpose shapes the 
research from the outset with the conceptualisation of the research 
topic and questions, through the decisions made during the process 
and to the claims made about the research when completed.  
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The research question/topic 
In my own empirical research it was not until I had abandoned my 
initial research question that I was able to ‘see’ important factors of 
the children’s lives such as transience and pragmatism – factors that 
were not specifically related to my broad topic of ‘children and 
difference’, but nonetheless provided important insights into the 
social lives of children.  By ‘locking in’ the research question which 
sought to address an adult problem, Van Ausdale and Feagin and 
Holmes possibly closed off opportunities to discover other issues that 
were important to the children they were observing.  In contrast, in 
his study on ‘children of the street’ Glauser (1997) is clear from the 
outset that his primary interest is in understanding what life on the 
street means for the children that spend time there.  His purpose is 
not to ‘solve’ the problem of street children as it affects adults but to 
gain information that would inform an educational program designed 
for these children: 
The need to know more about the situation, characteristics, 
feelings and problems in the everyday life of street children 
arose from an increasing urge to take action on their behalf 
(Glauser 1997: 145).   
 
Glauser’s purpose clearly influences the course of his research from 
that point on.  Because he is seeking to understand the lived reality of 
the children’s lives and not just the abstract concept of ‘street  
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children’ the research question needed to ‘fit’ this reality.  Glauser 
found the term ‘Children of the Street’ used by agencies such as 
UNICEF, non-government agencies, social workers and social 
researchers proved problematic in his attempts to determine who 
were ‘children of the street’ and who were not.  He argues that the 
differentiation is usually based on the relationship between ‘the child’ 
and ‘his/her family’, terms which need to be unpacked to uncover 
some of the assumptions they hide.  Furthermore, the circumstances 
that led to children being on the street were diverse: some stayed on 
the street during the week and went home on the weekend or spent 
the summers on the street and went home for the winter; others spent 
time on the street due to their jobs but also went home (Glauser 
1997: 145).  Rather than trying to fit the complexity of these 
children’s lives to a set category, Glauser eventually saw the positive 
side of not having a clear definition: 
While I seemed to know intuitively which street children were, 
and which were not, ‘children of the street’ when meeting them, 
in the course of my daily work I found myself having difficulties 
explaining the generation of the categories.  Was this a general 
problem of the concept of ‘children of the street’, or was it just 
to do with the way I had understood and applied it?  Everyday 
observation continued to confront me with children in new and 
different situations and, after coming to terms with my anger 
about my apparent incapacity to apply what had seemed to be a 
clear definition, I began to appreciate the creative side of my 
confusion.  I became curious about what else I might come 
across (Glauser 1997: 146). 
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Through his research Glauser developed an alternative way of 
conceptualising the diverse lives of children who spent time on the 
street but acknowledged that this conceptualisation was also a work 
in progress. 
 
By not adhering to a predefined definition and putting the desire to 
understand the children’s lives first, Glauser not only 
reconceptualised his notion of street children but also recognised the 
danger of not challenging conceptions that can have very real impacts 
on children’s lives: 
My practical difficulties had therefore led me to discover that 
the terms and concepts used about street children were not 
only imprecise but also that they lacked operational value.  
The same terms were used in different parts of the world to 
refer to very different types and situations of children.  This 
means that when talking about street children we may do so 
without having a clear idea about what we are talking and, 
in addition, we take the risk of mutual misunderstanding.  
In spite of this the terms and concepts mentioned above 
seen to have a surprising general acceptance.  Clearly from 
a methodological and scientific point of view this is of course 
unacceptable.  But it is even less acceptable that 
international organizations, policy makers, social 
institutions and individuals who feel entitled to intervene in 
the lives of children with problems, do so on the basis of 
obviously unclear and arbitrary knowledge about the reality 
of these children’s lives (Glauser 1997: 150). 
 
Christensen (2002) also points to the problems involved in deploying 
concepts which assume a knowledge of children and what would be 
best for them without asking the children themselves.  In her study of  
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‘quality time’,  a concept that has emerged from the discourse on 
working parents and family time, Christensen (2002) challenges the 
concept which, she argues, is “based on assumptions of what would 
be ‘good’ for today’s children and neglect the perspective of children 
themselves” (Christensen 2002: 77).  She argues that notions of 
quality time are also based on normative assumptions – ‘ideals’ - 
about parents and families: 
‘Quality time’ epitomises the ideal image of ‘happy families’ 
and here parents are key actors.  Parents are responsible for 
making time and situations when, by giving children their 
undivided attention, create ‘family time’ as a harmonious 
experience of togetherness.  This is to be achieved through 
parents and children engaging in activities that 
communicate and support their mutual affection and 
enjoyment (Christensen 2002: 79). 
Christensen conducted a survey involving 489 year seven children 
and an intensive ethnography with 70 children, looking at what 
‘family time’ and ‘quality time’ meant to them.  The ethnographic 
interviews revealed that the children’s views about time were quite 
different from the philosophy of ‘quality time’ espoused by adults.  In 
this respect Christensen identified five aspects of time that the 
children valued: 
a) the value of family time as ordinariness and routine 
b) the value of family time as someone being there for you 
c) the value of having a say over one’s time 
d) the value of time for having peace and quiet 
e) the value of being able to plan one’s own time  
(Christensen 2002)  
  206 
 
As Christensen argues, the children’s responses demonstrate that, for 
them, ‘quality time’ cannot be reduced to a kind of “Filofax-timeslot”– 
a block of time that can be scheduled on a Friday afternoon for family 
‘activities’, concluding that: 
It is also apparent that when asked if they would like to 
have more time with their parents most of the children in 
this study said ‘No!’  However, there was a general consent 
among children that knowing that their parents would be 
there for them when they needed them was of much greater 
importance (Christensen 2002: 83). 
 
Christensen and Glausen’s research illustrates the important insights 
that can be gained by challenging the adultcentric conceptualisation 
of issues and acknowledging the complexity of children’s lives. 
 
Method vs Methodology: a reflexive process 
 
Here lies the ultimate responsibility of the researcher.  The 
comfortable assumption that it is the reliability and accuracy 
of the methodologies being used that will ascertain the 
validity of the outcomes of the research, thereby reducing the 
researcher’s responsibility to a technical matter, is rejected 
(Ang 1996 47). 
 
As discussed in chapter three, just as I needed to adjust my research 
question while in the field, so I needed to adjust certain key aspects of 
my method.  The decision to use the role of ‘least adult’ proved to be 
problematic and the changes I made to it were based more on ethical  
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considerations of what ‘felt right’ in relation to the children than on 
what might be judged as ‘good practice’ after the event. 
 
In her article “Researching with children: lessons in humility, 
reciprocity and community” Jennifer Sumsion (2003) relates the story 
of her first unsuccessful attempt at researching children.  She reports 
that feeling “deflated and dejected, I retreated from the centre at the 
end of the week with little meaningful data, my stance as researcher 
severely challenged and disrupted” (Sumsion 2003: 1).  A year later 
Sumsion returned to her research informed by what she had learned 
before and approached the children with humility – inviting them to 
talk to her but leaving the questions of availability and location to the 
children: 
Being humble meant curbing my impatience, relinquishing 
my customary preoccupation with accumulating data, fitting 
in with the children’s rhythms, and valuing their time and 
agendas above mine (Sumsion 2003: 8) 
 
Similarly, in “Research with children: ethical mind-fields” Lyn Fasoli 
(2001) recognises the challenges of researching children when she 
reflects on the interviews taped during her research: 
Reflecting on this transcript is a sobering exercise.  I hear, 
in my voice, a researcher becoming impatient to do her 
research and using (or at least attempting to use) her 
position to push the proceedings forward… 
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Despite my good intentions to work collaboratively, to allow 
children to have equitable input into the research process, 
to privilege and give voice to their interests and concerns, I 
have clearly overlooked these aspirations in the heat of the 
research process (Fasoli 2001: 5). 
 
By reflecting on such issues both of these authors gained important 
insights into some of the issues of researching children.  Reflecting on 
my own research – especially my naivety before entering the field – is 
also a sobering exercise.  However the gaps between my expectations 
before doing the research and the reality of the actual experience 
enabled me to develop insights that would not have been possible if 
the research had gone ‘according to plan’.  For example I was forced 
to confront issues regarding the roles of adults and children, the 
particular ethical issues involved when researching children, and the 
importance of reflexivity in the field.  But more importantly it made 
me question why I was doing the research and who it was for. 
 
Christensen also records learning the ‘hard way’ when she reflects 
that “my development of good research practice was prompted by the 
children’s initial refusal to engage in the research and closely 
connected to the ambiguity of my role” (Christensen 2004: 168).   
When she first started interviewing the children in her study on 
children’s health and wellbeing the interviews were on a specific topic.  
While the children had control over the process (for example they  
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could stop the interview when they wanted) it was not until later that 
she was able to ascertain what the children had really thought of both 
herself and the content of her initial interviews. 
Then I had been a ‘stranger’ and an ‘adult’, but also, as they 
now confided they thought the subject of our conversations 
(everyday health) were sometimes ‘peculiar’, ‘rubbish’ or simply 
‘boring’ (Christensen 2004: 168). 
 
Again, in the same study, the children revealed how they felt about 
Christensen’s inquiries about the routines of the school, 
characterising them as “all your silly questions” (Christensen 2004: 
168).  So, in this and the earlier instance, Christensen acknowledges 
that while she has was able to complete the early interviews due to 
the co-operation of the children, the children’s feedback threw into 
question what needed to be taken into account in conducting 
research with children.  This forced her to change her tack, abandon 
her questions and adopt what she thought was closer to what the 
children did themselves – by observing and copying them to 
understand the rhythms and routines of the school day (Christensen 
2004: 169).  This required her to take a more ‘restricted’ role, 
prioritising observation over attempts to join in or talk to the children.  
For example she would not attempt to participate in an activity until 
she had observed what the children were doing or was invited to join 
in.  It was this attentive observation - what she terms “the act of 
looking” and attentive listening that she claims were crucial to the 
relationships with the children during the study.  
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By keeping the general methodology (which had at its heart the desire 
to better understand young children’s social lives) as central, I was 
able to adapt such things as the research strategy, questions and 
techniques and still continue with the research.  This meant that I 
had to continually challenge the assumptions I had brought with me, 
to ask questions of myself and the research and to remain flexible.  
Christensen argues that it is only through such perseverance that the 
researcher can stay true to the purpose of the research and develop 
an understanding of children’s views without him or her “making 
unwarranted analytical jumps” (Christensen 2004: 171). 
 
Choosing to do ethnography with children and entering into their 
‘world’ is therefore only the first step in a process that requires 
ongoing reflexivity and adjustment.  The method on its own cannot ‘do 
the work’ on behalf of the researcher.  This is an important point 
because traditionally research has been judged primarily on the 
method (in the sense of properly following the steps and procedures 
inherent in the broader methodology).  If this is sound the research is 
deemed to be valid and instructive.  This concern with following the 
right method is reflected in the following statement by Holmes in the 
conclusion to her book: 
When I began studying young children’s social 
relationships, my primary concern was whether as an adult 
I could gain a clear and accurate view of the world through a  
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child’s eyes.  After reading an overview of the existing 
literature, I pondered the methodological considerations.   
The question of how to collect the data was a crucial one 
because this technique would determine, almost exclusively, 
the richness of the information obtained from the children 
(Holmes 1995: 105). 
 
My suggestion is that is needs to go further than this.  That the ‘how’ 
of collecting data – the methods and techniques involved – need to 
remain constantly faithful to the philosophical and value premises 
inherent in the original choice of methodology and that this may well 
involve adjustments to methods and techniques as the research 
evolves.  And, most important, behind all this there needs to be an 
integral association between the methodology and the purpose of the 
research. 
 
Among other things, and on a more practical note, this suggests that 
the researcher needs to be careful in making claims to being ‘better’ 
or having got closer to understanding children simply because they 
have adopted a naturalistic methodology.  As already noted, “trying to 
involve children and young people in decisions touching on their lives 
does not necessarily place researchers or others on the high moral 
ground” (Roberts 2000: 227).  It may, indeed, muddy the waters by 
implying a level of participation or involvement that does not in fact 
exist. 
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How, then, might we judge the value and integrity of apparently 
children centred research if method alone is not a sufficient guide?  
While this is the topic of another thesis I suggest that the insights 
provided by the researcher’s own self reflection and learning are one 
important key.  Christensen and Prout suggest that “researchers’ 
encounters with ethical dilemmas, and their ways of confronting 
them” (Christensen & Prout 2002: 495) must be recorded if any 
progress is to be made.  I believe that this also relates to the complete 
process of children-centred research – for example, how the 
researcher attempts to challenge their adultcentric concepts, how 
they responded to the challenges involved in getting children to 
participate, how they adapted their questions and followed the 
children’s lead.  Reporting such things is important both because it 
enables researchers to learn from others and because of the children 
themselves.  Although there are some exceptions, for the greater part 
children are still talked ‘about’ rather than talked ‘to’ in research 
accounts and have little chance to ‘answer back’.  It is therefore the 
responsibility of other researchers in the field to recognise and reflect 
on the nature of this gap and what it means.  
 
The process of ‘deconstructing’ children and childhood and 
problematising dominant accounts of children has left a space for new 
ways of theorising and researching children   This requires that that  
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space be left open, to remain a ‘work in progress’, a conversation 
between the author and those who are interested in this kind of work.  
For such a conversation to be useful the author needs to be present 
in their work.  
 
The importance of being clear about the purpose of research 
Throughout this chapter I have explored how the intent or purpose 
behind the research can impact on both the focus of that research 
and the process.  My intention has not been to critique Van Ausdale 
and Feagin and Holmes work as such but to highlight the need for 
researchers to be clear – both to themselves and their readers - about 
what their primary intention is and what that means for the research 
in terms of its focus and limitations.  Clarity on this is obviously 
important at the level of the individual research.  However I would 
argue that it is even more important in terms of the growing body of 
naturalistic work that is being conducted with/on children. 
 
As the sociology of childhood is in its relative infancy there is still not 
a large body of ethnographic research relating to children and 
childhood (Qvortrup 2003: 395).  Research that does observe children 
in their natural settings and/or seeks their perspectives is therefore 
inclined to be put into the same category.  While those who are 
entrenched in the sociology of childhood might notice the difference  
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between research that is ‘child centred’ and that which remains ‘adult 
centred’, others may not.  In a sense this is worse than a gap in the 
research because we can fool ourselves into thinking that we are 
developing a ‘better’ understanding of children’s lives when in reality 
we are only researching those aspects that are important to adults. 
 
There is a danger that in research like that conducted by Van Ausdale 
and Feagin we will come to believe that it did more than address the 
adult problem which was the focus of the research; that, it ‘entered 
into the child’s world’ and therefore provided us with insights into 
children  per se.  This assumption is illustrated by the following 
reviews of Van Ausdale and Feagin’s The First R: How Children Learn 
Race and Racism: 
As the sociology of childhood becomes a more respected and 
active specialty within sociology, recognition grows that 
adults have put far too much stock in the naive child 
stereotype, vastly underestimating children's sophistication 
and active participation in the construction of social reality.  
In The First R: How Children Learn Race and Racism, Van 
Ausdale and Feagin deftly advance this evolution of our 
thinking about children’s lives with jarring examples of and 
insight into preschool children’s construction, negotiation, 
and use of racial understanding and prejudices (Brown 
Rosier 2003:243 emphasis added). 
 
The authors challenge directly what they call a prevalent 
American assumption that very young children are 
incapable of being “racist” or thinking racially.  Young 
children, they insist, are indeed capable of the “abstract” and 
“complex” thinking that “race” requires (Pollock 2001: 853, 
emphasis added).  
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Both of these reviewers suggest that Van Ausdale and Feagin  provide 
us with an understanding of children over and beyond the more 
distinct issue of what children think about race.  On what basis might 
such a claim be made?  The answer is unclear and this alone points 
to the danger of any such representation.  For, as Lutz (1981) 
observes, while the focus of research is always to a degree arbitrary, 
we need to be clear about what it has come to be and be honest about 
our intent: 
The question of focus is always arbitrary – for the photographer, 
the biologist, or the social scientist.  What brings one thing into 
clearly observable focus distorts another thing.  To focus the 
camera lens on the butterfly on one’s nose distorts the face; to 
focus on the face distorts the horizon on the background; to 
focus on the horizon distorts both the face and the butterfly.  
The same is as true in the social sciences as it is in 
photography.  The social scientist has a right to be arbitrary.  
But one should not call the picture of a perfectly good butterfly 
a picture of a horizon (Lutz 1981: 54). 
 
In line with this, I suggest that we need to be as clear about the ‘why’ 
and the ‘what’ of research on children as on questions of methodology 
and setting.  In this sense, we need to constantly ask why  this 
particular piece of research being conducted and what does it seek to 
achieve?   This is not a novel point – it is one that is made in various 
forms throughout qualitative literature.  However for researchers who 
are seeking to ‘do it right’ with competing demands in terms of correct 
methodology and rigorous research, and for policy makers who  
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consult with children (or use the information gained from such 
consultations) such questions are central.  They press us to consider  
what the purpose behind the purpose of our research is and what it 
can honestly claim to be – is it a picture of the horizon or a butterfly?  
In the final section of this chapter I discuss how questions such as 
these have been informed by, and informed my practice as a 
researcher in a research centre. 
 
When Purposes Collide 
The arguments that I have developed throughout this thesis have not 
been formulated in a vacuum. Whilst the traditional model of the PhD 
presumes a process whereby the student goes into the field, collects 
data and returns to an office to ‘write it up’, the actuality is often a 
long way away from this linear ideal.  The term of my candidature has 
spanned nearly four and a half years and during the past two years I 
have been involved in other research in my position as senior 
researcher and research co-ordinator at the Centre for Social and 
Community Research at Murdoch University.  The process whereby 
my ideas have developed has therefore been an iterative one – my 
‘thesis’ thoughts would inform how I approached other projects 
involving children and in turn those projects would inform my thesis. 
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The Centre for Social and Community Research (CSCR) was 
established to co-ordinate research in one of the university’s areas of 
research strength – social change and social equity.  CSCR is largely 
funded by the research income that it generates and therefore has to 
compete for research in the commercial market and respond to 
tenders and projects dependent on outcome based funding.  It, like 
other centres of the same nature, has to meet both demands from the 
academic realm (in the development of academically rigorous and 
‘objective’ research) and the requirements of organizations and 
government departments who work in an environment of ‘evidence 
based practice’ seeking ‘useable’ information to inform policy. 
 
What, then, are the implications for a researcher wishing to do 
‘children focussed’ research, which has as its primary purpose the 
understanding of children’s lives in the here and now, within an 
outcome based environment (with a primary purpose of addressing 
problems)?  In the following discussion I draw on two projects I was 
involved in during the last two years of my candidature to discuss this 
issue. 
 
The City of Rockingham Health and Wellbeing Study 
Over the past decade the Western Australian government has been 
active in promoting active citizenship, participation and consultation  
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across all groups of the community including children and young 
people.  In response to this move, several local government councils 
have formed Youth Advisory Councils and Junior Councils which seek 
to provide young people’s input into the development of policy.  This 
sparked my interest, and towards the end of 2003 I developed a 
research project to ask children and young people what they thought 
of this process of consultation – did they think it was a good thing, 
and if so, what was the best way it should be done?  The proposed 
project also had a small pilot study intended to involve children in a 
consultation process, drawing on the advice they provided and feeding 
the results back to them. 
 
At the same time as this, CSCR had started a health and wellbeing 
assessment for the City of Rockingham.  This project was based on a 
social model of health and was designed to include wide consultation 
with community members.  During discussions it was decided that a 
small amount of extra money should be allocated to seek out the 
views of children and young people in a separate parallel study.  This 
seemed an ideal project for the ‘pilot study’ component of my own 
proposed project – I would simply need to do both parts of the study 
at the same time.  Due to the size of the budget allocated to the 
project my role was to be that of consultant working with a member 
from the City of Rockingham youth team.  The project team,  
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consisting of members from the funding body (the Health Department) 
and the City of Rockingham, were supportive of my aims to find out 
what the children thought about the consultation process while at the 
same time seeking to gain some qualitative data for their own 
purposes. 
 
The research design for this project involved participation of members 
of the City of Rockingham Junior Council - a council which is made 
up of Year Seven students (11/12 year olds) drawn from all of the 
primary schools in the area.  Five groups were formed to organise a 
focus group of their peers in their geographical area.  These 
consultations were to be held in succession so that each consultation 
could inform the next, with the children reporting their experiences 
back to the larger group and the lessons learned being incorporated 
into the next design. 
 
Diverging purposes 
During the first meeting with the first group of Junior Councillors it 
became evident that the participants believed the only way that 
children would take part in the consultations was if they were held 
during school hours at school.  The five focus groups thus became a 
series of 21 focus groups held during school hours requiring co-
ordination of the teachers and parent consent forms.  
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During the course of the project, access to the Junior Councillors 
became difficult because of other Council commitments and school 
holidays.  This made the original iterative process impossible.  While 
it was not desirable, the series of focus groups needed to proceed 
without the groups reporting back on the majority of the occasions.  
Towards the end of the project it was also decided that a 
questionnaire would be sent out to determine whether the information 
gathered from the focus groups was representative.  As a result of 
these factors, the primary purpose of the project increasingly became 
the gathering of ‘data’ rather than gaining an understanding of what 
children and young people thought of the process of consultation. 
 
It was not, however, until the first draft of the report was issued that 
it became apparent how far my purposes and the purposes of other 
members of the project team had diverged.  While I wished to 
foreground the voices of the children and young people in an 
accessible report that could be read by the young people themselves, 
their parents and other community members, the project team was 
keen to produce a report that fulfilled the customary requirements of 
a government report and couching the ‘findings’ in community 
development terms such as ‘strengths’. 
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The project spanned a period of approximately nine months and the 
shift in primary purpose described above occurred incrementally.  The 
implications of the decisions that were being made about method were 
not evident until the project was near completion.  Indeed the first 
decision that could be seen to have changed the nature of the project 
was to take the children’s advice and to conduct the focus groups at 
school during school hours.  This was, I believed, being true to the 
process we had set out to do – there was no point in asking the 
children for their advice if we were not going to follow it.  Ironically 
however this would eventually build an expectation of a more 
representative study than was ever envisaged initially.  Finally, I 
found producing the report required a great deal of compromise in 
terms of what I had initially set out to achieve.  Much of the time I 
would have liked to use reflecting on the process was spent analysing 
figures and compiling graphs.   The challenge of the report writing 
process for research that incorporates the perspectives of children is 
discussed by Mason et al (2003): 
… acknowledging children as co-constructors of knowledge 
in this project has challenged how we as researchers 
represent children in reporting on the project.  For example, 
it has meant that we have resisted employing isolated 
quotes from children (or from any other groups of 
stakeholders) in this discussion.  For us, as (adult) 
researchers, selecting children’s words to fit our text, at this 
stage of the process, would mean simplifying and therefore 
devaluing the children’s and other respondents 
contributions (Mason et al 2003: 37). 
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Similarly, I found that requests for traditional reporting requirements 
such as an executive summary jarred with my desire to let the 
children’s words speak for themselves.   Like Mason and her 
colleagues, I found that summarising the ‘findings’ under headings 
such as ‘strengths’ required a level of simplification of the children’s 
views that was contrary to the methodology of the project. 
 
While I had felt uneasy at different points during the project it was 
not until after its completion, when I was close to finishing this thesis, 
that I was able to articulate the fundamental problem: namely, the 
purpose of the research had changed without this being consciously 
recognised and discussed by members of the project team.  The fact 
that this shift in purpose was able to slip below the plane of sight 
owed much to the fact that all members of the project team overtly 
shared the same aim – to find out about children.  Our notions of 
‘finding out’ were however inherently different.  I was interested in 
finding out about what it was like to be an eleven or twelve year old 
living in Rockingham in terms of issues such as what was important 
to them about where they lived, what made them feel respected and 
what they thought about the consultation process.  The larger project 
team were more interested in finding out information that could be 
‘used’ to feed into policy and to provide a ‘snapshot’ of the strengths of 
the City of Rockingham in terms of their children and young people.  
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Why Young People Desist from Crime 
Discussion regarding this project came late in my candidature when I 
was writing and thinking about questions relating to ‘the purpose 
behind the purpose’.  A community group approached CSCR about 
the possibility of our becoming involved in a project for which they 
had already prepared the funding proposal.  Building on a body of 
criminology literature on ‘desistance’, the question the project sought 
to answer was how young people came to desist from crime, that is, 
after being convicted of offences how they went on the ‘straight and 
narrow’.  The proposed methodology was qualitative, suggesting that 
it sought to hear the experiences and views of the young people.  To 
this end sixty young people would be interviewed either individually, 
in ‘friendship pairs’ or in focus groups. 
 
From the outset, and informed by my thinking on the thesis as well as 
by my experiences on the Health & Wellbeing project, I was clear that 
to be involved at all on this project I needed to articulate the 
difference between what they sought to achieve (find out why young 
people desist so that future interventions can be effectively targeted at 
young people) and what I sought (develop an understanding of these 
young people’s lives and the part crime played in them).  While the 
community group were probably more interested in the kinds of  
  224 
practical advice I was able to give at this stage, this ‘purpose clearing’ 
element, and the recognition of the ability to articulate both to myself 
and the client that we would need to identify some sort of common 
ground if we were to work together on the project, was important.  A 
discussion about what the eventual final report might look like – that 
it would centre on the stories of the young people, not tables and 
graphs – helped to establish just what the common ground might be. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that when research is conducted in 
order to answer an adult conceptualised problem there is a danger 
that, even when employing a naturalistic methodology and viewing 
children as social actors, the research will, by necessity, focus on the 
category of ‘the child’ rather than the lived experiences of individual 
children.  To provide answers regarding ‘the child’ the complexity and 
richness of children’s lives must be stripped away and simplified.   
Seeking to understand ‘children’ requires the researcher to be open to 
the opportunity to see things differently – not already predefined by 
an adult conceptualised problem. 
 
When the focus is on the ‘how’ of research – the methodology, the 
setting and the method of analysis – questions about the purpose of 
the research, whether it ultimately seeks to ‘reform’ or ‘understand’  
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can be overlooked.  This is perhaps particularly the case when 
essentially reformist studies uses the language of the sociology of 
childhood and employs ethnographic methods. 
 
In Theorising Childhood James et al (1998) state that: 
It is timely, not to say urgent, that a discussion about 
methods of researching children takes place … there is a 
need to pay heed to methodology lest the upsurge of 
research activity about children and childhood fails to reap 
a proper and considered benefit (James et al 1998: 190). 
 
However while James et al (1998: 190) acknowledge that “problems, 
theories and methods in social science” are interrelated, their focus 
remains primarily on methodological issues: 
Childhood studies cannot – and indeed should not – escape 
the methodological critique characteristic of debate in the 
social sciences (James et al 1998: 170). 
 
From inside the discipline this is of course a valid point.  For the 
sociology of childhood to achieve any status as a sub-discipline the 
research that is produced must be seen as valid and rigorous as any 
other sociological research.  However the sociology of childhood faces 
a problem that is perhaps unique from other sub-disciplines of 
sociology in that any sociological research that relates to children (or 
even research from other disciplines that employs qualitative 
methods) can find a place under its banner.   It is therefore important  
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that research that seeks to understand the lives of children is 
distinguished from research that continues to provide understandings 
of ‘the child’ for adult purposes or the work of the sociology of 
childhood is in danger of not reaping a ‘proper and considered 
benefit’. 
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Chapter Seven: Implications for Practice 
 
 
During my fieldwork and certainly afterwards, my attention was 
pulled away from the initial topic of my study.  Early on I sensed 
something larger concerning the methodology and purpose of 
research on children was at play and during the course of my 
candidature much of my energy went into exploring what this might 
be. However I still have two obligations to fulfil: to the industry 
partners who partly funded my scholarship and the children who 
were part of my study.  These are addressed in this final chapter. 
 
Inclusion – in the here and now 
In the previous chapter I discussed what became the central thesis of 
this dissertation: the importance of clarity (and honesty) concerning 
t h e  p u r p o s e  b e h i n d  r e s e a r c h  o n  o r  w i t h  c h i l d r e n .   T h e r e  i s  a l s o  
another important underlying theme: the importance of valuing 
children and their lives in the here and now, not just in terms of what 
they might become at some point in the future.   I now return to the 
initial topic of my PhD – inclusive practice in childcare – to discuss 
how adherence to this latter principle might inform theory and 
practice in this area.  My discussion is based on the insights that I 
gained during my time in the field and how these relate to some of the 
challenges that face inclusion in childcare in Australia, as identified  
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by Llewellyn (2002) and Sims (2003).    It is not my intention to enter 
into a wider debate on child care policy or practice but rather to look 
at how my time in the field might add to, or support other research in 
this area. 
 
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the philosophy that 
drives the SUPS program (which seeks to optimise access for children 
with special needs into mainstream childcare centres) is one of 
‘inclusion’.    The theory of inclusive practice draws heavily on certain 
established philosophical and educational rationales.  For example, it 
is argued that children have a right to the same opportunities as 
‘typically developing’ children, that the benefits to the child in 
developmental terms are superior within mainstream classes, and 
that children without special needs should be provided with 
opportunities to learn tolerance for difference (Odom & Diamond 
1998: 3).  
 
In their review of the topic, Odom and Diamond (1998) note that 
policy often focuses on factors that improve access to inclusive 
preschool services.  A recent consultation paper produced by the 
Australian Federal Government on Child Care Support reflects such 
an approach with principles identified such as:  
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•  Child care services eligible for inclusion and 
professional support, regardless of their geographic 
location, have access to quality inclusion and 
professional support that is relevant, appropriate and 
timely. 
•  Inclusion and professional support is targeted to meet 
identified needs and Australian Government priorities. 
•  Inclusion and Professional Support Program features 
better integration with quality assurance, 
responsiveness to changing conditions and support 
needs (Australian Government 2004: 8) 
 
While at the policy level equity of access is the primary goal, Llewellyn 
et al (2002) point to a large body of research that has stressed that 
inclusive practice is only beneficial when accompanied by “high 
quality programs and appropriate curricula” (Llewellyn et al 2002: 1).    
They go on to argue that, given the number of stakeholders across the 
level of government, not-for-profit, community and private enterprise, 
there are many opportunities for inclusion to become “derailed” 
between the policy arena and the implementation of that policy 
(Llewellyn et al 2002: 2).   This is perhaps exacerbated by a policy 
framework that measures outcomes in terms of access rather than 
the (perhaps unmeasurable) quality of the day to day lives of the 
children once they are in the centre.   Furthermore, such policy is 
focussed on particular children.  While the policy of inclusion in 
childcare in Australia has four target groups, the word ‘inclusion’ 
appears to have become synonymous with the inclusion of children  
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with disabilities, for example in their article on inclusion, Llewellyn et 
al refer only to children with disabilities (Llewellyn et al 2002: 2). 
 
The gap between the philosophical principles of inclusion and the 
outcome focus of the government policy is large and both seem 
distant from the practical issues with which adults must deal in 
terms of inclusive practice.  Furthermore, the insights I gained during 
my observations suggest that as far as the children’s day to day lives 
are concerned the philosophical base and the outcome imperative are 
yet more remote. 
 
During my observations I came to see the importance of seeing the 
word ‘inclusion’ as a verb, the practice of including small people; 
rather than a noun – a principle or policy framework.   At the level of 
the category – the disabled child, the culturally or ethnically diverse 
child – it is indeed difficult to imagine policies which can be 
implemented across the board in childcare centres which would 
actually make a difference for those concerned.  Placing a sign that 
says ‘hello’ in different languages exposes children to different 
cultures but does it translate to inclusion of all children on a hour to 
hour, day to day basis?  The point that I am trying to establish here is 
that ‘inclusion’, within this framework is about the inclusion of all 
children, for as I noted earlier in the thesis, it is not only those  
  231 
children regarded as ‘different’ from an adultcentric framework that 
have trouble integrating with other children. 
 
Recognising the pragmatic, practical nature of children’s interactions, 
discussed in Chapter Five, suggests some of the ways the principle of 
inclusion could be translated into practical activities and support for 
all children.   Often during the course of my time in the centre I would 
start a game of ‘chasey’ or ‘going to the zoo on the bus’ and many of 
the children who were, up to that point, sitting and watching would 
join in.  Similarly, and again in practical terms, children new to the 
centre often needed an adult to support their transition.  This might 
just be someone who they could sit beside or play with in the sandpit 
while they got to know the other children and developed their 
confidence.   The importance of this one-on-one interaction is 
reflected in interviews with SUPS workers in Sims (2003) research.  
Participants stressed the importance of the way staff interacted with 
the children - in emotional as well as physical terms - as being a key 
element in ‘quality service’: 
Quality care is the relationship between the workers and the 
children … actually playing with the children, getting down 
to them on their level. 
 
Being involved rather than supervising.  That includes 
cuddling and loving the children (Sims 2003: 4). 
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The importance of this adult-child relationship adds a different 
dimension to my initial research hunch that the children’s happiness 
– and feelings of being included – were less likely to revolve around 
whether they had to wear shoes or if they got rice to eat at lunchtime 
as to whether the other children accepted them and played with them. 
The research modified this view when I found that, for various 
reasons, many of the children chose to spend time on their own for.  
What became clear was that it was often not the company of other 
children that they craved but that o f  a n  a d u l t  –  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e i r  
parents.  When an adult came into the centre they were often 
swamped by children who wanted their attention.   I am thus 
suggesting that emotional and practical support from adult carers is a 
key element in determining whether there can indeed be a culture of 
inclusion within a centre.  Unfortunately, this element appeared to be 
lacking in the children’s day at the centre I attended, with other 
researchers such as Leavitt (1995) and Sims (1993) reporting similar 
findings.  However, a ratio of ten children per adult (set by national 
standards) leaves little room for anything but basic care. 
 
New children were expected to ‘get on with it’ and got little support 
from the carers – either in emotional or practical terms.  While the 
children were introduced at the morning mat session they were 
expected to mix with the other children and to find their own friends.   
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In part this seemed to be driven by a belief that if the children were 
‘pandered to’ they would not learn to be independent, but it may also 
derive from the assumption that childhood is a time of play and 
friendship and that children ‘naturally’ want others to play with.  For 
some children (like some adults), this was indeed the case, for many 
others it was not.   I found that this lack of emotional support often 
distressed me and distracted me from simply recording the children’s 
actions and interactions.  On some days I would be quite upset and 
angry when I left the centre and I required frequent ‘debriefing’ 
sessions with my supervisor, as the following entries in my diary 
illustrate: 
Day 9:  I came away feeling very angry today.  A new girl 
started and she didn’t get any emotional support at all.  Do 
the carers learn not to make a fuss of children when they 
are upset when they do their training?  Apparently it is valid 
to cry if you hurt yourself but not simply because you are 
upset. 
 
Day 12:  I came away feeling sad and angry again today.  I 
felt that my research was really secondary today because I 
spent a lot of time pacifying children. 
 
My frustration was levelled more at the situation than the carers.  The 
ratio of ten children to one carer allows little time for more than 
meeting the physical needs of the children.   As noted earlier, this 
ratio, combined with the training and experience of staff has been 
identified by Llewellyn et al (2002) and Sims (2003) as one of the  
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primary barriers to inclusive practice.  In their 2004 annual report, 
RUCSN expressed this concern along with other issues relating to the 
quality of care for all children: 
While many services provide excellent care and education 
opportunities for children, the Inclusion Support Workers 
visit many more services that have very low quality 
standards.  Inadequate staff to children ratios; unqualified 
and unskilled staff; caring staff who are restricted by 
adverse policies of owners and coordinators; lack of 
resources and facilities – there are the major areas of 
concern.  Quality Care and Inclusive Practice are two sides 
of the same coin – it is impossible to include a child with 
special needs in a service where the program is failing to 
meet the needs of all of the children (RUCSN 2004: 4). 
 
While I only visited one other centre during my study, my experience 
of childcare centres as a parent and researcher gives me reason to 
believe that the centre in which I was observing was one that had 
high quality standards.  However Sims (2003) argues that for as long 
as caregivers’ work is “undervalued and underpaid” concerns 
regarding quality will remain, for it is the care of all children that is 
lacking, not just those with special needs: 
… They’re working under a huge strain and you don’t blame 
them when they go outside and all they want to do is just 
stand there and supervise and not play with the children 
because they are so burnt out and they need that down time 
… (Sims 2003: 8). 
 
Often the case regarding issues of ‘quality care’ in childcare is 
couched in terms of risks to development outcomes (e.g. Belsky 1999;  
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Sims 2003; Vandell 2001).   In other words, if children do not receive 
quality care at this important stage of their life there will be 
ramifications in the future in terms of behaviour and cognitive 
development.  While that may well be the case, it is unfortunate that 
the primary way to judge the adequacy of the care of children is by 
reference to future effects.   At the centre where I observed, much time 
and effort was put in to meeting the children’s developmental needs.  
A program of activities for the week was displayed on the wall for 
parents; a variety of play equipment to encourage different 
developmental outcomes was made available on different days; and 
assessments were conducted on the children on a regular basis to 
ensure that they were developing ‘normally’.  But what of the quality 
of the day to day lives of the children in the here and now?   While not 
dismissing the importance of the provision of activities and 
opportunities for development in childcare centres, if, in the face of 
staff shortages, the choice is between a cuddle for a child who is 
having a bad day and an activity being supervised which will develop 
fine motor skills, should the cuddle not win? 
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And what of the children? 
And the children?  Did I always, as I stated in justifying my 
critical narrative, consider paramount my responsibility to 
these other innocents, wholly dependent on adults to meet 
their physical and emotional needs?  Has my work made 
their voices (or only mine) heard?  (Leavitt 1998: 63). 
 
During the course of this study my attention was pulled away from 
the minutiae of the children’s lives to issues of methodology and the 
intent of research.  However the details of these children’s lives were 
nevertheless vitally important to this project.  In part, this relates to 
the research process itself for it was only in observing the children in 
the minutiae of their daily activities at length that I could appreciate 
the complexities of their lives and the problematic nature of research 
that sought to cleanse itself of this complexity.  But there is another 
equally important reason why it was important that my accounts from 
within the day care centre were included.  This is simply because 
there is a paucity of research that seeks to provide a snapshot of 
children’s day to day lives in day care.  As Graue and Walsh state: 
Researchers do studies, for example, of day care but ignore 
the lived realities of the many children who, from a very 
early age, spend most of their waking hours in institutional 
care.  The result is, as Wolf (1995) points out, findings about 
academic backgrounds of day care teachers, how everything 
about day care that can be measured correlates with 
everything else that can be measured (whether it makes 
sense or not) – everything about day care except what it is 
like for children, and adults, to be there day after day, week 
after week (Graue & Walsh 1998:  xvi). 
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Often, during the course of my observations, I wished I could give 
others a glimpse into the day to day lives of the children I was 
observing.   Unfortunately, academic writing does not lend itself to 
such a visual rendering, for I did not wish to point towards anything 
interesting or noteworthy but to invite the reader to simply sit and 
watch with me.   The experience has shown me the importance for 
adults to regularly stop, sit down on a very small chair or in a sandpit 
and attempt to see things from the child’s view from time to time.  I 
learnt this lesson early in my study when the campus newspaper 
wished to take a photo to go with an article that had been written 
about my proposed research project.  It was organised that the photo 
would be taken at the childcare centre on the campus grounds: 
several children were identified as being available, their parents 
signed the correct consent form, the photographer and I turned up at 
the allotted time.   The children were eating their lunch when we 
arrived but the carer pointed to them and told them to go outside and 
have their photo taken.  I sat on a very small chair at a very small 
table with these two small people and pretended to stack alphabet 
blocks and look up for the photographer who loomed above us.   The 
photographer got increasingly short tempered when one of the 
children did not follow the instructions properly – he was not looking 
up in the manner that he had been told – but eventually the required 
photo was taken and the children could return to their lunch.  As I  
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had sat on that small chair at the level of an adult’s knees, I felt the 
powerlessness of being a child and it was something that stayed with 
me throughout the course of the study. 
 
While research that seeks the perspectives of children and seeks to 
understand their lives is challenging, it can also be intensely 
rewarding.  Children can have a clarity, a way of cutting through the 
tangle of adult concerns to see things as they are, not as they should 
be, and to remind us what is important.  As a parent I already knew 
this.  As a researcher I have come to appreciate the importance of 
leaving time to put aside adult concerns and study children in the 
here and now, and to treat their concerns seriously.  I leave the final 
word to Helen Roberts of Barnados: 
It is clear that listening to children, hearing children, and 
acting on what children say are three very different activities, 
although they are frequently elided as if they were not … 
Children have always been with us.  There have always been 
people who have listened, sometimes there have been people 
who have heard, and perhaps less often, those who have 
acted wisely on what children have to say (Roberts 2000: 
238). 
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